

JPRS 82434

9 December 1982

# Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2675

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FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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9 December 1982

## NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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## CONTENTS

## INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

|   |    |
|---|----|
| Algeria-Morocco Rapprochement Possibilities Discussed<br>(Mustafa al-'Alawi; AL-DUSTUR, 4 Oct 82) .....                       | 1  |
| Syrian, Jordanian Role in Peace Process Viewed as Crucial<br>(Basim al-Jisr; AL-YAMAMAH, 27 Oct-2 Nov 82) .....               | 4  |
| Feasibility of Peaceful Middle East Settlement Examined<br>(AL-MANAMAH, 27 Oct-2 Nov 82) .....                                | 9  |
| Causes, Impact of PLO-Syrian Disagreement Examined<br>(Wadi' al-Hilu; AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI,<br>18-24 Oct 82) ..... | 14 |
| PLO Official on West Bank Leaders' Statement<br>(KUNA, 21 Nov 82) .....   | 17 |
| 'AL-TALI'AH' on Pro-Jordan West Bank Moves<br>(AL-TALI'AH, 18 Nov 82) .....   | 18 |
| West Bank Grouping Backs Jordanian-Palestinian Accord<br>(AL-DUSTUR, 19 Nov 82) .....   | 20 |
| Israel Said Planning Assassinations in Beirut<br>(Voice of PLO, 18 Nov 82) .....  | 21 |
| Paper Interviews Former Ramallah Mayor on Palestinian Issues<br>(AL-QUDS, 11 Nov 82) .....                                    | 22 |
| PLO Radio on Independent Palestinian State<br>(Voice of PLO, 23 Nov 82) .....   | 25 |
| 'VOP' Echoes 'Arafat on Continued Struggle<br>(Voice of Palestine, 17 Nov 82) .....   | 26 |
| Briefs  |    |
| Palestinian-U.S. Dialogue Urged   | 28 |
| Pro-Jordanian Petition in W. Bank   | 28 |

## PERSIAN GULF AFFAIRS

|   |    |
|---|----|
| Report on Discussions of Gulf Cooperation Council Defense Ministers<br>(Ali Hashim; AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI,<br>18-24 Oct 82) ..... | 29 |
|---|----|

## AFGHANISTAN

|  |    |
|--|----|
| Final Report by Norwegian Correspondent Killed in Action<br>(Stale Gundhus; AFTENPOSTEN, 2 Nov 82) ..... | 35 |
|--|----|

## ALGERIA

|  |    |
|--|----|
| Development Goals, Programs, Results Examined<br>(Ali Laib; EL MOUDJAHID, 10, 11 Oct 82) ..... | 40 |
| Control of Population Growth Supported<br>(Nadjia Bouzeghrane; EL MOUDJAHID, 31 Oct 82) .....  | 47 |
| Need for Industrial Maintenance Emphasized<br>(EL MOUDJAHID, 31 Oct 82) .....                  | 52 |

## EGYPT

|  |    |
|--|----|
| Details of Violations by 'Isamat al-Sadat, Family Cited<br>(AL-AHRAR, 25 Oct 82) ..... | 55 |
|--|----|

## IRAN

|   |    |
|---|----|
| Motives of Soviet Policy Toward Khomeyni Regime Studied<br>(Rene Cagnat; DEFENSE NATIONALE, Nov 82) ..... | 60 |
| New Marine Forces To Combat Smugglers, Rebels<br>(Rafiqdust Interview; KEYHAN, 31 Oct 82) .....           | 65 |
| Gendarmerie Gets More Forces for Eastern Areas<br>(Ali Kuchekzadeh Interview; KEYHAN, 23 Oct 82) .....    | 67 |
| Railroad Network in Southeast To Be Expanded<br>(Brother Eskandar Interview; KEYHAN, 1 Nov 82) .....      | 69 |

## ISRAEL

|   |    |
|---|----|
| Schiff Views U.S. Perception of Israeli Strength<br>(Ze'ev Schiff; HA'ARETZ, 10 Nov 82) .....                                 | 71 |
| Rabin on Lebanon, Settlement Freeze, Reagan Plan<br>(Yitzhaq Rabin Interview; Jerusalem Domestic Service,<br>10 Nov 82) ..... | 74 |
| Pentagon Said Opposing Cooperation on Lavi<br>(Yosef Pri'el; DAVAR, 11 Nov 82) .....  | 77 |
| U.S.-PLO Indirect Contacts Claimed<br>(Oded Zaray; HA'ARETZ, 10 Nov 82) .....   | 79 |



|   |     |
|---|-----|
| Schiff Comments on Israeli-U.S. Relations<br>(Ze'ev Schiff; HA'ARETZ, 9 Nov 82) .....   | 81  |
| West Bankers Talk of New Political Signs in Territories<br>(David Richardson; THE JERUSALEM POST, 12 Nov 82) .....                        | 83  |
| Gur on Positions for Dialogue With Palestinians<br>(Mota Gur; DAVAR, 12 Nov 82) .....   | 88  |
| Paper Interviews PLO-Held Israeli Captives<br>(Jerusalem Domestic Service, 14 Nov 82) .....   | 90  |
| Editorial Questions Begin's Alertness<br>(Editorial; HA'ARETZ, 10 Nov 82) .....   | 92  |
| IDF Commanders Discuss War Goals, Accomplishments<br>(YEDI'OT AHARONOT, 17, 26 Sep 82) .....  | 94  |
| Briefs  |     |
| Investments in Lebanon Roads  | 115 |
| Funding for W. Bank Land  | 115 |
| Tyre Commission Recommendations   | 115 |
| Archbishop of Tyre Visits   | 115 |
| Arab Israelis Missing in Lebanon  | 116 |
| Former W. Bank Mayor Discusses Problems   | 116 |
| No Settlements Along Jordan River Bed   | 116 |
| Two Settlements Virtually Unpopulated   | 116 |
| IDF Completes Maneuvers   | 116 |
| Payments on Foreign Debt  | 116 |
| Restriction of Crops in W. Bank   | 117 |
| JORDAN  |     |
| Official Denies Israeli Claims on Deficits<br>(Amman Domestic Service, 21 Nov 82) .....   | 118 |
| KUWAIT  |     |
| Al-Manakh Stock Market Crisis Examined<br>(AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL, Oct 82) .....  | 119 |
| Market Transformation, by Yusuf Shibli  |     |
| Causes, Development of Crisis   |     |
| LEBANON   |     |
| Camille Sham'un Discusses Relations With Israel, Syria,<br>Possible Solutions<br>(Camille Sham'un Interview; AL-HAWADITH, 5 Nov 82) ..... | 126 |

## **LIBYA**

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| Revolutionary Committees Conference Make-Up<br>(AL-FAJR AL-JADID, 27 Aug 82) .....                            | 138 |
| New Dam, Road Inaugurated on Anniversary of Revolution<br>(AL-FAJR AL-JADID, 3 Sep 82) .....                  | 140 |
| Agriculture Plan Outlined for 1981-1985, Animal Resource<br>Development<br>(AL-FAJR AL-JADID, 5 Sep 82) ..... | 142 |

## **MAURITANIA**

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| Briefs<br>French Rural Development Aid ..... | 144 |
|--|-----|

## **MOROCCO**

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| Briefs<br>Cooperation With Finland ..... | 145 |
|--|-----|

## **PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN**

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| History of Current Political System, Unification Issue Discussed<br>(Chris Kutschera; LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, Oct 82) ..... | 146 |
|--|-----|

## **SAUDI ARABIA**

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| Management Professors Discuss Administrative Reform Issue<br>(Abdallah 'Abd al-Qadir, et al.; AL-YAMAMAH, 6-12 Oct 82).. | 158 |
|--|-----|

## **SUDAN**

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| Northern Region Finance Minister Interviewed<br>(AL-SAHAFAH, 26 Aug 82) ..... | 168 |
|---|-----|

## **TUNISIA**

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| Rate of Change in Prices Recorded for Various Sectors<br>(LE TEMPS, 3 Oct 82) ..... | 171 |
|---|-----|

ALGERIA-MOROCCO RAPPROCHEMENT POSSIBILITIES DISCUSSED

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 254, 4 Oct 82 pp 28-29

[Article by Mustafa al-'Alawi: "Who Torpedoes Algeria-Moroccan Rapprochement: 'Peoples' Maghreb' Radio Abandons Its Silence"]

[Text] At a time when improvement was achieved in Algerian-Moroccan relations following the Fez summit, the Algerian information media have hastened to reshuffle the cards and to torpedo all the rapprochement endeavors. A commentator of Peoples' Maghreb Radio has said: "How could the wounds heal while Morocco continues its maneuvers?" Is this Algeria's official opinion or is the media's opinion different from the state's opinion?

It is the common usage and tradition in all parts of the civilized world that reciprocal treatment is one of the simplest rules observed, even in matters involving dealings between two hostile countries. Thus, this rule has become the common distinguishing factor between civilization and barbarism and one of the guarantees that strengthen the feeling among the envoys exchanged by states that the age in which primitive tribes put the envoy of hostile tribes in a huge cauldron and cooked him before his flesh was shared by the tribal chiefs has gone and that we are in an age in which an official envoy is received with the appropriate ceremony and is seen off in the same manner, regardless of the nature of the reply he receives or of the message he is entrusted to convey.

Thus, when Ahmed Taleb Ibrahim, Algerian minister of foreign affairs, arrived at Fez Airport to attend the Arab summit, he was received with the Algerian flag flying next to the Arab flags, with the Algerian national anthem being played and with hugs and embraces on the aircraft steps. What is more, the Algerian minister departed Fez aboard a plane of the Royal Moroccan Airlines in the company of Yassir 'Arafat, the PLO chairman.

Official government sources in Rabat have affirmed that Ahmed Bensouda, the adviser to King Hassan II, and a number of Moroccan physicians flew on the same plane to accompany 'Arafat who had become indisposed in Morocco, thus making it necessary for Moroccan physicians to accompany him to Tunisia.

Bensouda did actually arrive in Algeria on an undisclosed secret mission, perhaps connected with the improvement developing in Algerian-Moroccan relations. At his press conference, the Moroccan monarch said that this improvement was the result of the atmosphere prevailing in the conference's activities, asserting that the relations would undergo further improvement.

What was the reciprocal treatment?

On the day after the Moroccan envoy's arrival in Algeria, Peoples' Maghreb Radio abandoned its long silence over Morocco--a silence during which it left the vituperation, defamation and vile words against Morocco and its monarch to POLISARIO Radio transmitting from Algerian territory. The departure of Peoples' Maghreb Radio from its silence is the decisive proof that the Algerian officials have their own method of reciprocal treatment. On that day, this radio heaped insult and abuse on Morocco and its king. Moreover, its commentary was identical to one that had been already broadcast by POLISARIO Radio. ~~Peoples' Maghreb Radio~~ was not content with rebroadcasting this article but followed it with desert songs played by the POLISARIO band. These songs have become numerous these days, and there is only one reason for this, namely to keep the POLISARIO fighters preoccupied with singing songs now that they have become tired of waging losing battles.

This failure in the sphere of reciprocal treatment, this vulgar action on the part of the Algerian media, this regression to an outdated style and this constant harping on the same tune are in great contrast with the seriousness characterizing the Algerian political approach these days. Moreover, the Algerian media's conduct is tantamount to an open denial of the reports circulated by the international wire services to the effect that the Moroccan royal adviser's visit comes within the framework of a Palestinian-Saudi mediation. In the same vein, the TUNISIAN NEWS AGENCY reported that His Majesty King Hassan II had received Taleb Ibrahim for 2 hours at the conclusion of the [Fes] conference activities, REUTERS reported that President Chadli Bendjedid had received Bensouda and the KUWAIT NEWS AGENCY reported that "Algeria and Morocco have agreed on the groundwork for reaching a solution to the Sahara problem. This groundwork is based on conducting a referendum relying on the population census figures from the Spanish colonialist era."

If the groundwork of which the news agency spoke is the only common groundwork between Algeria, which demands a referendum, and Morocco, which declared at the second Nairobi conference its acceptance of a referendum, then the conditions for the Algerian-Moroccan rapprochement, about which the Moroccan monarch has spoken with utter confidence, are a solid fact. There is no doubt that both sides have reached the narrow gate at the same time. What continues to be surprising is that the Algerian media have hastened to reshuffle the cards and to bury the threads. This reshuffling and burying leaves no doubt that the fingers involved are very close to the Algerian centers of influence and are well informed. The genius of those involved in the reshuffling and burying has used in the commentary broadcast by Peoples' Maghreb Radio paragraphs indicating that there are, indeed, endeavors to bring the views closer to each other--paragraphs such as the one which the commentator asks critically: "How can the wounds be healed while Morocco continues its maneuvers."

The Algerian information media and the European media subject to Algeria's influence have tried to torpedo rapprochement endeavors in every case. We need not go far back for an example. After announcement of the outcome of the Fes Arab summit proceedings, with Arab consensus and with the signatures of the Arab nation's representatives, after Yasir 'Arafat had announced personally his approval



of the summit resolutions and had declared this approval from Algeria, which he visited after the summit, and after the Algerian state's official commitment to the summit resolutions, POLISARIO Radio declared its rejection of all Arab action and described all of the Fes conferees as traitors, agents and reactionaries. POLISARIO Radio did not even exclude the Algerian minister of foreign affairs, the president of Syria or the PLO chairman.

Thus, the Algerian contrast concerning reciprocal treatment is added to the contrast between Algeria's official commitments to Arab solidarity and the Algerian media's vilification and defamation of this solidarity, which the Arab leaders in Fes agreed is the only way for the Arab nation to overcome the humiliation inflicted on it as a result of its differences, the genius of its information media for vilification and calumny and the defeat of its armies at the hands of the Israeli armies.

The only logical interpretation for this contrast lies in the major purge in which President Chadli Bendjedid is engaged to gradually oust evil and corrupt elements from the ruling apparatus and expel the feudalist merchants who have used peripheral battles and fabricated problems to fatten their assets in foreign banks. But the constant damage the Algerian media are causing the Algerian state's credibility and its adherence to its international commitments require that the Algerian president devote greater attention to the information sector because it is impossible for the world and the Arabs generally and for Morocco in particular to deal with two states within a single state.

If this conclusion is wrong, if there is actual coordination in Algeria's supreme policy and if there is no contrast between this policy and the state's information media, then this means that the western wing of the Arab nation here in the Arab Maghreb is merely in the early phases of a long struggle in which more blood will be spilled, in which the hearts of the brothers will drift apart and in which the completely united Moroccan people will sacrifice for a sacred cause whereas the Algerian people's feet will be sinking deeper into quagmires impeding their processions and into crises and problems--and the Algerian president is well aware of the Algerian people's viewpoint of these crises and problems.

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CSO: 4504/38



SYRIAN, JORDANIAN ROLE IN PEACE PROCESS VIEWED AS CRUCIAL

Riyadh AL-YAMAMAH in Arabic No 723, 27 Oct-2 Nov 82 pp 24-25

[Article by Dr Basim al-Jisr: "Syria and Jordan Before Peaceful Solution; Has Peaceful Solution Entered Implementation Phase?"]

[Text] The race between a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and resumption of the steadfastness and confrontation policy entered a decisive phase a week ago. The cards on which the Middle East future depends for a long time to come are out on the table.

Yasir 'Arafat's visit to Jordan, though not all the details of its immediate causes and outcome have been disclosed, is the second natural step following the PLO's acceptance of the Fez summit resolutions.

The visits by King Husayn and by the delegation representing the Fez Arab summit to the United States are considered complementary steps, or executive steps, for the new policy that the Arabs have agreed to follow.

Yasir 'Arafat's meeting with Claude Cheysson, the French minister of foreign affairs, in Tunis is nothing but one of the numerous preparatory steps being taken secretly, openly and in between to move the train of the Arab-Israeli conflict toward peace.

But while international efforts and Arab steps and positions in this direction are multiplying and uniting, significant and sudden obstacles are rising to pose a barrier to this course--obstacles such as:

Syria's objection to Yasir 'Arafat's visit to Amman, the position of five Palestinian organizations toward Jordan and its likely role and the reaggravated situation between the Christian forces and the Druze in Lebanon.

What are the actual reasons behind these "sudden obstacles," where does the peace train stand at present and who, we wonder, will win the new drive, begun in the wake of the latest Arab summit, in the race to war and peace?

A few days ago, the French LE MONDE said that during his meeting with the PLO chairman, Pope John Paul II said to his guest:

"I believe that the interest of peace in the Middle East requires, among other things, that the PLO give up terrorist operations, acknowledge Israel's right to protect its safety and restore stability and security to Lebanon."

The paper reports that Abu 'Ammar said in reply:

These three points are now acknowledged by the Palestinian leadership.

This position, declared by the PLO chairman before the Pope, undoubtedly reflects a current reality. The PLO's acceptance of the Foz resolutions leads to poting for the political solution and to freezing all military activities and revolutionary stances. But this position is tied to the response of the other parties concerned, specifically:

Israel's position vis-a-vis the U.S. plan and the Foz summit resolutions.

The U.S. position on the Palestinian people's rights.

The position of the Arab countries, particularly of Jordan and Syria.

The position of the Palestinian National Council.

These four position s are also linked to each other.

In the wake of Israel's invasion of Lebanon and the dispersal of the Palestinian fighting forces, the Palestinian National Council knows that the armed struggle against Israel needs some time, not to say a lot of time and preparation, to be resumed and that the political option is the wake of what has happened in Lebanon. Many of the Palestinian leaders and Palestinian bases believe that the peace procession will not restore to them their rights or their land. This is why they view with reservation, even with suspicion, the talks that will take place between the Arab leaders and the U.S. administration and the talks that King Husayn may hold within the framework of the U.S. plan and of the Foz resolutions. Therefore, Yasir 'Arafat's tas of persuading the Palestinian National Council to adopt the U.S. or Arab peace plan will not be easy, unless his efforts are helped by the Arab countries, especially Syria and Jordan.

What is the position of these two Arab countries, which would be more strongly affected than others by a peaceful solution?

Insofar as some, if not to say most, Arab countries are concerned, Abu 'Ammar has the needed support. But the position of Syria and Jordan differs from that of the other Arab countries.

The Arab countries that are not adjacent to Israel do not fear the repercussions of peace on their existence, their regimes or their internal situations. Rather, a peaceful settlement of the Palestinian issue is likely to spare them the "problems" created by continued Arab-Israeli conflict. As for Syria and Jordan, the situation is totally different because they fear that a peaceful settlement may be brought about at "their expense."

Syria, which does not reject in principle to a comprehensive solution of the Palestinian issue, demands--and this is its right--that the Golan be restored to it and that it be a partner, in the solution, not excluded from or a victim of this solution. Syria considers any solution dictated by the United States and Israel a solution that upsets the balance of the international forces in the area and, consequently, a solution that undermines Arab rights and poses a threat to the Syrian and pan-Arab interest.

Jordan's position is more critical than the Syrian position, considering that Jordan is directly responsible for the "peaceful solution" whose broad lines are no longer secret to anybody. These broad lines provide for Jordan to assume responsibility for the West Bank during the interim period between Israel's withdrawal from the West Bank and establishment of the Palestinian state on it.

So far, Israel has not acknowledged the principle of restoration of the Bank to its owners and its separation from the so-called "land of Israel." Despite acknowledging the principle of the gradual liberation of the West Bank, the PLO has not ceded the principle of establishing a Palestinian homeland or state on it. As for the United States, it has not yet declared its acceptance of the establishment of the Palestinian homeland and state in the West Bank and Gaza even though it has acknowledged the principle of the Palestinian people's right to determine their future and even the principle of the establishment of a Palestinian homeland.

How can the transition from the "principled positions" to "implementation" be made? Or, how can the Palestinian resistance's position be reconciled with the position of Israel and with the U.S. plan?

Through negotiations and talks, of course, as long as the war is at a halt and the positive tendency is predominant. This is what is happening at present and what will keep the Arab and Western capitals busy throughout the coming weeks, or months. But what chance of success do these negotiations and talks have?

There is no doubt that advancing the situation requires more than positive readiness to accept a peaceful solution.

At a minimum, advancing the situation requires that:

1. Israel back down on its position on the West Bank and the Golan (this has not happened).

2. The United States acknowledge openly the Palestinians' right to a homeland and a state (has not yet happened).

3. The Arab countries, particularly Syria, support Jordan in the steps that the United States and the international community believe to be essential for passing the peaceful solution through temporary Jordanian supervision over the West Bank (has not happened).

Is Israel prepared to back down? Is the United States capable to reassuring the Palestinians over their future? Is Syria capable of facilitating the Jordanian solution?

The SUNDAY TIMES commented in its latest edition on Syria's position, saying: Syria will find itself isolated from the Arab countries if it declares openly its rejection of a peaceful solution of the Palestinian issue. However, Syrian officials do not conceal their doubts regarding the usefulness of the efforts being exerted. They will give themselves a period of time (1 or 2 years) before they disavow a peaceful solution. President al-Assad has told the British minister of foreign affairs in part that if necessary, Syria is prepared to sit with Israel around the negotiating table provided that a just peace is possible. But the Syrian president has also said that the Palestinian state must first be established before it enters into a confederation with Jordan, and must be established on the Palestinian soil.

As for the Israeli Government, despite its insistence on its position toward the West Bank and its rejection of the U.S. and Arab plans, it has begun to view with concern the Arab-U.S. rapprochement and, in particular, the Jordanian-Palestinian rapprochement.

As for the United States, it seems that it is determined to follow a three-sided policy to achieve its plan.

On the one hand, it will not exert military and economic pressure on Israel to force it to back down on its position vis-a-vis the West Bank. But at the same time, the United States will insist on the principle of the Palestinian people's right to self-determination, especially for the West Bank Palestinians.

On the other hand, it will exert efforts to convene a Jordanian-Egyptian-Israeli conference and perhaps a Jordanian-Israeli conference in which the Palestinians will be represented within the Jordanian delegation to determine the future of the West Bank.

However, the United States will exert efforts in the United Nations through the EEC countries to develop recognition of the Palestinian people's rights from just a principled recognition to an international legal acceptance of these rights taking the form of an amendment to resolution 242 or recognition of the PLO.



The fact is that the efforts now being exerted by the Arab countries and the United States to find a peaceful solution for the Arab-Israeli conflict are sincere, serious and positive efforts, and so is the desire prevalent among most of the European countries. But there are some Arab countries that fear--and it is their right to do so--the consequences of this solution to their situations. These countries are Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. Lebanon fears that this solution will lead, even if only temporarily, to the continued presence of a half million Palestinians on its soil--a presence that affects the country's sectarian balance. Syria fears that the solution will saddle it with sole responsibility for continuing the pan-Arab and Palestinian struggle if the solution is achieved at the expense of the PLO or at the expense of Syrian territory (the Golan). Jordan fears shouldering the responsibility of administering the West Bank, in case Israel withdraws from it, whether a Palestinian state is established on it or not.

But what is more important than the reservations and fears of these three countries is that the Israeli position, which rejects withdrawal and the establishment of a Palestinian state, constitutes the main obstacle in the path of peace.

The Yez conference resolutions are considered a minimum for the pan-Arab concessions. The PLO's acceptance, or nonrejection, of these resolutions and of the U.S. plan is considered the maximum that the Palestinian leadership can withstand. However, there is still a vast gap between the positive Arab and Palestinian attitude and the Israeli rejection.

We wonder, what can the U.S. administration do to bring the positions of the two sides closer to each other?

Rather, what can Syria and Jordan do to help the PLO safeguard the Palestinian people's rights?

If this historical disagreement did not exist between Amman and Damascus, and if the ruling regimes in Damascus, Amman and Beirut realized that their pan-Arab and national interest vis-a-vis the Israeli challenge is the same, then perhaps the chances of settling the Arab-Israeli conflict peacefully or by war would be greater.

But...

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FEASIBILITY OF PEACEFUL MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT EXAMINED

Riyadh AL-MANAMA in Arabic No 723, 27 Oct-2 Nov 82 pp 26-28

[Article] "From Fes to Washington: Desired Peace and Feasible Peace"

[Text] Washington--Exclusive AL-MANAMA Dispatch--Observers are awaiting cautiously what outcome may be produced by the contacts with U.S. officials of the seven-member committee stemming from the Fes summit. There is a consensus of opinion that the final outcome of these Arab-U.S. contacts will determine whether the present momentum in search of lasting peace will continue or not.

Most Western experts believe that the "post-Hairut" phase will perhaps provide the best opportunities to achieve a comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East, despite the numerous problems involved. These observers justify their belief by asserting that the three parties to the dispute have reached definite convictions that continuation of the conflict and its development in the manner witnessed in the Lebanese arena is likely to cause political troubles and upheavals that none of these parties would escape. The experts list the new given facts that make conditions more conducive to a real accomplishment as follows:

Arabs: They have for the first time reached a decisive resolution concerning the strategic path that must be followed to restore the just rights after having lived throughout the years in a dilemma between the military option and the peaceful settlement.

At the latest Fes conference, the Arab states approved unanimously the need to deal with the issue peacefully. Thus, a main source of disagreement that was dividing the Arabs into two conflicting camps has been eliminated. Formation of the seven-member committee to contact the internationally influential powers has come as a practical translation of this conviction.

Israeli: Events in Lebanon have revealed evident disgruntlement among the Israeli people with the policy of "military might" on which the Likud government relies. What is most serious about this phenomenon is that it has reached the Israeli Army itself, where anxious whispers are going on in the Israeli regime's lobbies regarding the lessons learned from the

war in Lebanon. It has become evident to the Israeli people that a peace not founded on justice and mutual trust will remain shaky, despite the enormous war machine possessed by Tel Aviv. The observers add that the bad reputation Israel has gained at the international level has motivated many of the Jewish organizations abroad to express solidarity with the Palestinian people for the first time and to oppose Israel's policies openly. An Israeli expert has underlined this tendency, saying: "For the first time ever, the argument of Israeli security is no longer convincing, not even to the Israeli people and to world Jewry."

The gist of this change is that numerous forces within the Israeli society have begun to aspire to a kind of peace different from the peace sought by the hawks of the Likud coalition. Whatever is said regarding the limited nature of this change, the Israeli leaders themselves are aware that Israeli public opinion is no longer prepared for another "mess" similar to the "Lebanese swamp."

United States: It is the third party whose vital role in any settlement has been underlined by recent developments. Western observers say that this is the first time that Washington has thrown its full weight behind finding a way out of a crisis that is directly threatening its interests. This transformation in U.S. policy is embodied in the plan presented by President Reagan at the beginning of last September in which he demanded openly that Israel withdraw from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Western observers point to the "enthusiasm" that has developed in the U.S. position and that could boost the European role itself, after the Europeans suffered from a "lukewarm" U.S. stance during the days of the European Initiative.

#### New Climate

It is the belief of all these parties that the new climate requires quick action so that the current momentum imposed by the events will be put to use. The Arabs have taken the initiative by sending the seven-member committee to Washington. Chaired by King Hassan II of Morocco, the seven-member committee met with the U.S. president in Washington at the beginning of this week. Even though the meeting has produced nothing new insofar as the general U.S. position is concerned, it was nonetheless beneficial in familiarizing the U.S. officials with the details of the Arab peace plan approved by the PLO summit and in discussing aspects of the U.S. plan presented by Reagan. The fact is that this was the main purpose of sending the committee. The committee did not essentially go to sign any documents or agreements but to familiarize itself with the details of the U.S. plan, to try to establish common grounds between the two plans and to find out the extent of the sincerity of the intentions of the Americans to push ahead with their program under the shadow of the decisive Israeli rejection.

A former U.S. official close to Secretary of State George Shultz fears that the insistence of the Americans on their position toward the PLO and their adherence to Reagan's line will take the crisis back to a stage of

dangerous freeze. In this respect, Western diplomats have warned that the most dangerous element in the positive current climate is time. These diplomats assert that unless the parties concerned move with the required speed and display an adequate degree of flexibility in the give-and-take to prevent small obstacles from impeding the peace efforts (sentence as published). The Western political circles generally are apprehensive about a number of factors that could deny the world the opportunity to utilize the current chance. The most important of these factors are:

1. The remaining period of Reagan's presidency, which ends in 1984. Observers say that it is necessary to utilize the Republican president's strength and firmness for fear that U.S. Middle East policy may return to zero after his departure from the White House. This problem is many-sided. It is not yet clear whether Reagan will run for president again or not. Moreover, Israel may move its lackeys in the United States to defeat him in any future election if it becomes evident to it that he is serious about implementing his plan or initiating practical steps in this direction. An official of one of the Washington public opinion polling agencies has said in explanation: President Reagan is presently passing through the phase of "presidential stability." Unless he makes long strides on the path to finding peace in the Middle East, he will be embroiled in the final year of his presidency, even during the "campaign season," and the Zionist lobby's activity [sic]. A prominent WASHINGTON POST journalist adds: Reagan can exploit the current wrath of some Americans against Israeli actions in the wake of the invasion of Lebanon and the Beirut massacres. Slow movement by America or the emergence of obstacles impeding the U.S. administration's actions will result in the waste of precious time that will "cool" this chain of bloody events and limit their effect with the passage of time.

2. Observers believe that Israel has begun an intensive campaign to foil the U.S. plan. They further believe that secret contacts started some time ago between Senate and House members and U.S. Jewish organizations to dissuade the President from demanding Israel's withdrawal from the West Bank. Joseph Nisco, an ex-assistant secretary of state and a Middle East affairs expert, has warned that Israel ultimately will be able to persuade Washington to abandon the U.S. plan. It seems evident that Israel hopes that the Arabs will express reservations that will save the U.S. administration's face. Some critics even go so far as to say that the Reagan administration was wagering on a stiff Arab adherence to the letter of the Yom summit resolutions and that this would save the United States an inevitable confrontation with the Israelis over withdrawal from the West Bank. The only way to deny Tel Aviv this opportunity is to show tangible Arab openness to the positive aspects of the U.S. plan while making sure that the U.S. position moves from words to deeds and without giving up the demand for ultimate establishment of the Palestinian state. This will be no easy matter if the peace steps move in a positive line. A prominent U.S. official hinted at this when he said: If a referendum is held in the West Bank and if the Palestinians support the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, then Reagan will not obstruct this.



3. A third factor that may have a negative impact on wasting the present climate of a search for peace is the failure to utilize the current circumstances to loosen the firm U.S.-Israeli connection. It has been noted that the U.S. media, which are well-known for their complete alignment with Israel, have opened their doors to writers who oppose Israeli policy and the absolute U.S. support for this policy. This is a premeditated initiative on the part of U.S. political circles and is a message addressed to Menachem Begin and his allies primarily and an implicit warning that Reagan can poison the air to obstruct the economic (\$800 per Israeli citizen annually) and military aid that Israel needs. The experts assert that tangible Arab cooperation with the U.S. administration is likely to widen the disagreement between Washington and Israel and impose on the Reagan administration a commitment to exert concerted efforts on the Israelis, even if the situation requires toppling the Likud government and in the end getting rid of Begin and Sharon.

On the other hand, the view of officials of the West European countries, which hope that the new U.S. movement will continue and which strongly support this movement, point out the need for the Arabs to understand a fundamental fact, namely, that the political solution option unanimously approved by the Pax summit will not turn into a practical reality without real cooperation with the United States and without overlooking the points of disagreement and moving to the points of agreement in the Reagan plan. A British diplomat who visited the Middle East recently has pointed out that it is better for the Arabs to cooperate with Reagan to achieve Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza than to take a negative principled position that enables Israel to entrench its settlement activity there. The diplomat added that Arab hesitation vis-a-vis this point will waste a good chance to stop the process of "swallowing the Bank" for which the Israeli Government utilizes all its resources and which it gives top priority.

The British diplomat recalls the true nature of the enormous Israeli projects in the occupied territories, asserting that Israel has seized 60 percent of the land and 75 percent of the water resources and that there is a plan to build (20) new settlements in the Bank and the Strip.

Western diplomats agree with this opinion, considering that time is a decisive factor in the Israeli Judaization game and that the passage of every new day creates a new reality difficult to change in the future. It seems that the Israeli Government plans to make withdrawal from the West Bank an impossible process and to impose on Israeli public opinion the rejection of such withdrawal in the face of any U.S. administration or even an Israeli government from the Labor Party, which supports the Reagan plan.

The general question remains: What comes after the seven-member committee's contact with the White House? Will suitable circumstances be available to Reagan to move to the phase of exerting pressure on Israel to accept the principle of withdrawal from the Bank and the Strip--a principle forming the essence of any peaceful settlement--or will the entire crisis back-track to the phase of dangerous stagnation?

There remains a fact that must be pointed out in this respect, namely, that the PLO's loss of its strong base in Lebanon, with all the political, military, cultural and organizational presence that this base means, and the consequences emanating from this loss make it dangerous to take the Palestinian issue back to the previous state of ambiguity and perplexity. The opinions of those conversant with the secrets of the Middle East conflict are unanimous that the present situation requires in the first place a flexibility on the part of the United States that leads to broadening the scope of the Reagan plan to encompass the basic Palestinian demands, including the demand of initiating direct and serious negotiations with the Palestinians, and, in the second place, an Arab flexibility that bolsters the U.S. movement and utilizes the opportunity of the possibility of imposing a complete Israeli withdrawal from the Bank and the Gaza Strip. These positions, if achieved, could constitute a major gain for the Palestinians and for the cause of peace in general.

R494

CSO: 4404/72



CAUSES, IMPACT OF PLO-SYRIAN DISAGREEMENT EXAMINED

Paria AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 285, 18-24 Oct 82  
pp 24-25

[Article by Wadi' al-Hilul: "Damascus-Palestinian Resistance: Palestinian Issue is Pan-Arab to al-Assad and National to 'Arafat and Herein Lies Difference"]

[Text] Has the Syrian-Palestinian clash taken place and have matters reached the point where efforts are needed to disengage the two sides?

The truth is that more than one circle wishes that a clash would take place, without any of these circles having to do anything to defuse it. Syrian-Palestinian relations have been "tense" since before the Israeli invasion of Lebanon--an invasion taking place 15 years after the June 1967 war. "The truth is that these relations have always been tense, experiencing some relaxation every now and then. The relaxation comes every time the Palestinians become certain of the importance of the Syrian strategic depth for the Palestinian armed struggle and the Syrians become certain of the need to deal with the Palestinian reality represented by the PLO which, in turn, is represented by Yasir 'Arafat. Moreover, Syrian-Palestinian relations return to normal every time Yasir 'Arafat becomes certain that the olive branch policy has not served its goals and that it is necessary to shake the Palestinian rifle. This rifle exists only in Syria. Even when the rifle was present in Lebanon--and it is still present there in part--the presence of the Syrian army operating within the Arab Deterrence Forces (ADF) in Lebanon constituted the guarantee for the continued presence of the Palestinian rifle. As for the goal of Yasir 'Arafat, the PLO leader, it is obvious, namely, to safeguard the freedom of the Palestinian movement through the rifle one minute and the olive branch the next. The fact is that the previous phase did not provide many opportunities for use of the rifle and all bets were on the olive branch. This wager has not ended yet."

Do these words from a well-informed Arab source sum up the truth of Syrian-Palestinian relations?

Perhaps these words sum up some of what takes place in discussions on these relations but they do not reflect the entire truth. It is difficult to reconcile somebody who leads the Palestinian action with somebody who considers the Palestinian issue a pan-Arab issue and, consequently, a part of his responsibilities. This is where the problem starts. Abu-Ammar is concerned with the independence of the Palestinian decision. The statement by Ahmad Iskandar Ahmad, the Syrian minister of information, gives the impression that what Yasir 'Arafat is doing in Jordan reflects the position of part of the PLO Executive Committee and, consequently, does not reflect the opinion of all of its members. The Syrian minister of information has asserted in his statements that a number of the Executive Committee members opposes what Abu 'Ammar is doing in Amman. It is well-known that the Palestinian-Jordanian talks center on a common position toward the second phase of the search for a formula for Palestinian self-rule. It is also well-known that King Husayn of Jordan wants a Palestinian commission that opens the door to Jordan's participation in seeking a way out of the tangle of self-rule negotiations. Such a thing cannot be achieved without Jordanian-Palestinian coordination on the future of the Bank and the Strip and without unifying the two positions on the basis of establishing a federal union between the West and East Banks. Meanwhile, Damascus--as well as the official PLO position--insists on the establishment of a Palestinian state first so that the Palestinians can then determine the nature of the relations they want with Jordan and with others. This means that the Syrian position agrees with the Palestinian position openly and disagrees with this position every time Yasir 'Arafat, holding the olive branch, moves away from the Palestinian rifle. But can Syria be more for Palestine than Palestine is for Palestine?

#### Mu'awiyah's Hair

Well-informed Palestinian circles exclude the possibility that the Palestinian-Syrian differences will go as far as cutting "Mu'awiyah's hair" between the two sides. This "hair" has nearly been cut many times before but it has always found on the Syrian and Palestinian sides those who retie it. It is difficult to count the number of times Syrian-Palestinian relations nearly exploded and the times the fuse was extinguished before the spark could reach the powder. The struggle between the two sides is secret and hidden, and it barely moves into the open before returning to political and diplomatic discussion, thus causing the return of rumors, reports and statements that pour oil on the fire, though often without starting a fire that would be difficult or impossible to put out.

Does this mean that the disagreement is confined to tactics? Perhaps so and perhaps the "story is more a story of an overflowing heart than it is the story of a pomegranate." Syria has a thousand apprehensions about the Jordanian movement and fears Jordan's joining in the self-rule talks because such a step would expand the framework of the Israeli-Egyptian peace through Jordan. Syria would then be almost completely engulfed by a sea of Arab hostility. This is why the Syrian suspicions concerning

Palestinian-Jordanian rapprochement are intensifying. If Syria is the source of complaint at present, the Palestinians were the source of such complaint during the Syrian-Jordanian honeymoon--a honeymoon that impeded the Palestinian movement.

#### Rifle and Olive Branch

There remains a question: Is the disagreement beginning to surface in the Syrian-Palestinian relations of a new kind that will sunder the relations forever? The fact is that this depends to a large extent on how serious are the efforts seeking to find a political settlement that takes into consideration the interests of all parties in the region. If peaceful efforts are advancing in the serious manner necessary, then the return of the resistance to Jordan is an axiomatic thing that will enable Abu 'Ammar, the PLO chairman, to move the Palestinian cadres and fighters from Damascus to Amman. But if matters remain unchanged, and the Middle East is full of trial balloons at present, then it will be difficult to achieve this end, especially since the strongly worded Israeli warning that has accompanied the Palestinian-Jordanian talks is clear in threatening Jordan with an Israeli invasion if Jordan permits the return of the armed Palestinian struggle to its territory. Israel has spoken openly of a Palestinian return to Jordan, on condition that the PLO declare its abandonment of the armed struggle. Should this happen, informed sources speak of Palestinians agreeable to the idea and other Palestinians who reject it and who cling to the rifle and to abandoning the olive branch. Then, these sources say, it would not be unlikely that the PLO would splinter between Damascus' course and Amman's inclinations, unless life is restored to an international conference to discuss the bases of a comprehensive peaceful settlement. Many speak at present of the horizons of the comprehensive settlement with a degree of optimism. Should military withdrawals from Lebanon take place, implementation of the idea of an international conference would seem imminent, unless the idea itself needs a new war to stir it.

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CSO: 4404/59

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

PLO OFFICIAL ON WEST BANK LEADERS' STATEMENT

LD211838 Kuwait KUNA in English 1736 GMT 21 Nov 82

[Text] Damascus, 21 Nov (KUNA)--The PLO considers the statement recently issued by five West Bank leaders "as a serious precedent" that would harm the Palestinian cause on all levels, PLO Executive Committee member Yasir 'Abd Rabbuh said Sunday.

Reports said that Elias Freij, Rashid al-Shawa, Mustafa al-Natsheh Hikmet al-Maari and Nadim al-Zaro [names as received] have signed a statement calling on the PLO to recognize the Jewish state and the Security Council resolution 242 and considering the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people but not the only one.

'Abd Rabbuh, who also heads the PLO Information Department, said we urge these people to revoke their statement and halt similar activities which contradict the PLO line and Palestinian unanimity including that of those within the occupied lands.

The statement includes an item which can be exploited by enemies to our people in undermining the gains of our struggle and confusing the world public opinion which has enhanced its support of the Palestinian revolution.

'Abd Rabbuh charged that this statement further serves designs aimed at changing the PLO resolutions and harming the Palestinian rights particularly when this statement does not even hint at the major demand unanimously approved by the Palestinian masses, namely the creation of an independent Palestinian homeland.

The statement by the West Bank leaders further calls on the PLO and Israel to exchange mutual recognition at an equal footing as if the signatories (the West Bank leaders) were not part of the Palestinian people, the PLO official said.

'Abd Rabbuh urged all national powers within the occupied territories to adopt a unanimous and decisive stance to safeguard the continuance of Palestinian unity and confront all suspicious attitudes and activities which attempt to sabotage this unanimous stance.

CSO: 4400/100



## INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

### 'AL-TALI'AH' ON PRO-JORDAN WEST BANK MOVES

JN221223 Jerusalem AL-TALI'AH in Arabic 18 Nov 82 pp 1, 11

[Excerpts] A group of people, including former senior officials and others wishing to assume ranking positions, are visiting various figures and villages to obtain signatures on a petition calling for developing Jordanian-Palestinian cooperation, agreeing to Resolution 242 and authorizing King Husayn to continue negotiating a solution to the Palestinian issue. In line with this, an attempt is underway to form delegations that will go to Amman to declare their allegiance.

Observers interpret these attempts to collect signatures and form delegations as aimed at exerting pressure on the PLO and at informing it that these signatories and delegations also hold shares in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. These attempts are also aimed at telling the PLO that these figures can establish an alternative leadership if the PLO refuses to authorize Jordan to negotiate a solution to the Palestinian issue.

Meanwhile, these petitions and delegations are meant to be used by King Husayn to stress to President Reagan when he meets him next month that the Jordanian regime possesses "a Palestinian card" in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and that with some U.S. "encouragement" he can replace the PLO.

AL-TALI'AH has learned that the efforts to form delegations and sign the petition began after the return of a mayor from an Amman visit. This mayor was the core of the moves and meetings which were aimed at convincing figures of such social status as municipal council members and charitable societies to support a confederation between the West Bank and Jordan and to authorize King Husayn to speak on behalf of the Palestinians with U.S. President Reagan. The aims of this move have been stressed by this mayor's statements.

In a closed meeting with some figures, this mayor reiterated what took place in the closed meeting he held with King Husayn--a meeting which lasted 1 and 1/4 hours. He said that the king had asked his help in sending petitions and delegations to Amman expressing support for Jordan. The king expressed the Jordanian regime's fears about the ambitions of Gen Ari'el Sharon, who is said to be planning for the occupation of eastern Ghor and the tops of the Jordanian mountains overlooking the Jordan valley. The king also said that Sharon wants to turn the Jordan River into an Israeli river and the entire Jordan valley into an Israeli agricultural area. The mayor added that King Husayn had pointed out that Jordan is militarily incapable of confronting



Sharon's ambitions, believing that the only way to do so is represented in establishing a long-term dialogue with the U.S. administration--a dialogue which requires Palestinian authorization, something which PLO Chairman Yasir 'Arafat refrained from giving to him during his visit to Amman.

He added that the king talked about the Soviet Union's stand and said that the Soviet Union had offered and is ready to offer all that is needed for a military confrontation with Israel. However, the king said, we cannot accept Soviet aid because making use of it requires changing the whole economic, political and military infrastructure of Jordan, which we are not ready to do. Therefore, the only option we have is to hold dialogue with the U.S. administration regardless of the results of this dialogue.

It is well known that the abovementioned petition calls on the PLO to agree to the U.S. demands, including the authorization of King Husayn, recognition of Resolutions 242 and 338, simultaneous recognition of Israel and other demands which were described by Yasir 'Arafat as humiliating. It has been learned that the popular organizations and other circles refused to sign this petition.

CSO: 4400/100

## INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

### WEST BANK GROUPING BACKS JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN ACCORD

JN191010 Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 19 Nov 82 pp 1, 13

[Text] Amman--The unionist grouping [al-tajammu' al-wahdawi], which embodies Jordanian-Palestinian accord, has affirmed its support for and blessing on the cohesion between the Palestinian and Jordanian peoples out of its faith in unity.

In a statement issued yesterday in the West Bank and Gaza, the grouping said the recent Jordanian-Palestinian meeting in Amman was a living embodiment of the path of salvation, a symbol of the cohesion of both peoples and a true concrete expression of their common destiny.

The grouping added that the cohesion of the two peoples is nothing new and that the unification of the East and West Banks is a historical inevitability.

The statement says: The meeting of our brothers in Jordan was based on firm convictions, because the path of salvation is now clear and no power on earth can stand in the way of the will of the masses and the wish of the one people, who are united by blood bonds and common hopes and sufferings.

The statement affirms that the Jordanian-Palestinian meeting in Amman set clear general outlines and bases for future cohesion between our peoples out of the common faith that we are all advocates of unity, not disunity.

The statement says that the grouping in the West Bank and Gaza blesses and supports this step and considers its gains the property of the masses which they must protect and promote, because they are a living, realistic embodiment from our long sufferings.

The unionist grouping calls on the Jordanian Government and people and the Palestinians to work for more cohesion.

In addition, reports from the West Bank say that West Bank and Gaza personalities have drafted a document on which they will collect as many signatures as possible to be addressed to His Majesty King Husayn and the PLO affirming their support for Jordanian-Palestinian rapprochement and the idea of establishing a confederation.

CSO: 4400/100

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

ISRAEL SAID PLANNING ASSASSINATIONS IN BEIRUT

JN182037 Baghdad Voice of PIO in Arabic 1600 GMT 18 Nov 82

[Unattributed report]

[Text] Reports from the Lebanese capital say that hundreds of Israel's Mossad intelligence elements have recently penetrated Western Beirut to assassinate or kidnap several leaders of the nationalist Lebanese parties and other personalities. Reports say that the aim behind these criminal acts is to augment sectarian divisions, create numerous problems and crises and divert public opinion away from the main issue of ending the Israeli occupation of Lebanon.

Citing well-informed sources in the Lebanese resistance, Arabic newspapers said that the resistance is now waging a battle to prevent these elements from realizing their objective. The operation to purge West Beirut of these elements will be carried out in stages so that the enemy will not get a chance to carry out their mission.

Exclusive reports say that hundreds of enemy intelligence personnel entered West Beirut in Lebanese Volvo's accompanied by dozens of agent elements belonging to a well-known sectarian organization in Lebanon. Reports say groups of these cars entered Beirut on Sunday and dropped a number of civilians at certain apartments which had been occupied by some Palestinian and Lebanese evacuees in the areas of Ra's Beirut, Mar Ilyas, al-Qantari, Zuqayq al-Balat, Corniche al-Mazra'ah, Tallat al-Khayyat and al-Awza'i. Reports say that these elements were assigned the task of sending radio cables on the information they are able to collect. The radio signals which were intercepted give detailed information about politicians, leaders of political parties, party offices and nationalist leaderships. This information will serve as a prelude to surprise attacks that may begin soon. These attacks are either assassinations or kidnappings.

Reports also say that the infiltrators are now looking for people who had heroic roles in confronting the Zionist invasion of West Beirut and in the attacks which forced Israel to withdraw from West Beirut. Elements of the Lebanese resistance are now carrying out a well-planned, large-scale search to find the Mossad elements and their agents in order to eliminate them. Reports say that the Lebanese resistance has called on all Lebanese to be careful in dealing with suspect elements. The resistance said that its arm would reach all those who deal with the Zionist enemy, regardless of their position.

CSO: 4400/100

## INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

### PAPER INTERVIEWS FORMER RAMALLAH MAYOR ON PALESTINIAN ISSUES

JN151614 Jerusalem AL-QUDS in Arabic 11 Nov 82 pp 1, 7

[Exclusive dispatch]

[Text] Ramallah--There has been much talk recently about Jordanian-Palestinian rapprochement, particularly in the wake of PLO Executive Committee Chairman Yasir 'Arafat's visit to Amman and the important talks he had with King Husayn. These talks laid the ground for a common platform between the two sides for dealing with the Palestinian cause on the basis of understanding the nature of the current situation, particularly after the war in Lebanon.

To shed more light on this issue, AL-QUDS met former Ramallah Mayor Nadim al-Zaru who spoke in detail about Jordanian-Palestinian rapprochement, the proposed confederation, Reagan's initiative and the Pex summit plan.

Al-Zaru stressed that he sensed from the meetings the PLO Executive Committee delegation, led by Yasir 'Arafat, had with King Husayn and Jordanian officials and the meetings that the Palestinian side held with the Arab kings and presidents that there is an urgent need to intensify these contacts, particularly with Jordan, because the region is passing through a distinctive and decisive political stage in the wake of U.S. President Ronald Reagan's plan for a settlement of the Palestinian cause.

Al-Zaru added that visits by Palestinian officials have been welcomed by the Palestinians inside and outside the occupied territories and that they hope that these visits and the talks which take place during these visits will achieve more coordination between the two sides in the interest of the Palestinian cause and the region at large.

#### Full Realization of the Nature of the Current Situation

During my contacts with my Palestinian brothers, I have sensed that they fully realize the nature of the current stage and the importance of coordination between the Jordanian and Palestinian sides for proceeding forward to seek a just and peaceful settlement that will end occupation and help them to remain on their land. They also think the Pex summit resolutions are a courageous and sound step on the path of the solution that will safeguard the remaining rights and land.



### Reagan's Initiative

On President Reagan's initiative, al-Zaru said that the majority of the inhabitants of the occupied territories believe that President Reagan's proposal contains positive factors, particularly on the Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories and freezing the establishment of settlements. They also believe that by merging these proposals with the Pae summit resolutions one could have an integrated plan that will contribute to ending the Palestinian people's tribulation which has been going on for the past 35 years.

### Palestinian Hopes

Al-Zaru said that the Palestinians in the occupied territories expect the Palestine National Council (PNC), which is scheduled to convene soon, will take into consideration the current circumstances of the Palestinian cause and adopt resolutions which will overcome any obstacle obstructing the current efforts for ending the Palestinian people's tribulation and returning the land to its owners while not forgetting that so far Israel has confiscated 50 percent of the occupied territories and has established settlements on them. This poses a threat to the Arab presence in the occupied territories.

### The Jordanian Role

On the Jordanian role in any talks to settle the Palestinian cause, al-Zaru said that King Husayn has an important role to play, particularly since the Amman talks, the Pae summit resolutions and President Reagan's initiative. King Husayn is now shouldering a big responsibility in this delicate stage.

As we have previously said the PNC must take this point into consideration and consequently support the Palestinian and Jordanian side, bless any stand the two sides agree on to implement the Pae summit resolutions or discuss any other plan that will end the current tragical situation.

Al-Zaru added: That's why I propose the formation of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian political committee whose task will be to deal the political action in this current stage.

On King Husayn's proposal on the establishment of a confederation between the East and West Banks, al-Zaru said that this issue must be discussed after Israel withdraws from the occupied territories so that this will not influence the talks in case they begin. One, however, must stress that there is no difference between a Jordanian and a Palestinian because the union between the two is organic and has been one of the most successful unions in the Arab world. This is the stand of the majority in the occupied territories. The most important issue is to put an end to occupation.

### Reagan's Determination to Implement His Plan

On his meeting with Philip Habib, U.S. envoy to the Middle East, al-Zaru said that he met with him as part of a Palestinian delegation approximately 1 month ago during his visit to Amman. We asked him several questions about President

Reagan's plan and we sensed from Philip Habib's replies that President Reagan is determined to implement his peace plan for the Middle East and that the U.S. stand consists of settling the entire issue, including the problem of Jerusalem, in such a manner that will safeguard Arab rights in the city.

#### **Understanding of the New Realities**

Al-Zaru added that he believes that the Palestinian officials understand the new realities which had emerged in wake of the war in Lebanon and that he is sure that their stand on the Reagan plan is not negative.

#### **The Decisive Year**

Concluding, al-Zaru said that talk about mutual recognition calls for a recognition by the United States and Israel of the Palestinian people's right to self-determination on their land. He expressed the belief that the coming year will be a decisive one with respect to the Palestinian cause, whether through war or peace.

CSO: 4400/100

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

PLO RADIO ON INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE

JN231825 Baghdad Voice of PLO in Arabic 1610 GMT 23 Nov 82

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] When it insists on the establishment of the independent Palestinian state and considers it a basic condition for peace in the Middle East, the PLO does not proceed from secessionist inclinations. The Palestinian state is not an established state and united with another state for the PLO to call for a secession. When insisting on this demand, the PLO does not proceed from the desire to add another state to the number of states which are members in the Arab League but from the need to liberate the land of Palestine from the Israeli occupation through all means and to enable the Palestinian people to exercise a right that has been acknowledged by international legitimacy; the right of self-determination and the establishment of their independent state.

While stressing this, the PLO, however, also affirms that though a Palestinian state has not yet been established, there should be good relations between the Palestinians and neighboring Arab countries as well as with all the other Arab countries. These relations should be based on equality and devoid of any tutelage or any tendency toward containment. In light of this concept, one can discuss the framework of Palestinian-Jordanian relations which can be accepted by the Palestinian people and which was outlined by Brother 'Abu 'Ammar [Yasir 'Arafat] during his visit to Jordan when he described these relations as being equal ones between Palestine and Jordan, dictated by the special, historical and contemporary relations which exist between the Palestinian and Jordanian people and by our principled conviction in and commitment to our militant program which responds to the Palestinian and Jordanian people's aspirations for unity.

CHG: 4400/100

## INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

### 'VOP' ECHOES 'ARAFAT ON CONTINUED STRUGGLE

GP171924 San'a' Voice of Palestine in Arabic 1600 GMT 17 Nov 82

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] Dear brothers. In a statement Brother Commander Abu 'Ammar [Yasir 'Arafat] emphasized that commando operations against the Zionist presence in Lebanon will continue and will witness a qualitative and quantitative development.

Many people believed that the Palestinian revolution commander's statement was a mere media fuss and was for local consumption while others began to ask how would commando operations against the Zionist enemy escalate while the Palestinian revolution forces are distributed in Arab lands far away from the common borders with occupied Palestine.

Hardly a few days had passed after Brother Commander Abu 'Ammar's statement when the joint Palestinian-Lebanese forces blew up the headquarters of the Zionist occupation army in Tyre, southern Lebanon. The result of the operation was that the headquarters, an eight-storey building, was destroyed and that all those who were in it and who numbered--according to the Zionist enemy 400 soldiers and officers--were killed or wounded.

The enemy tried to belittle his losses and distort facts; he admitted a small part of his losses. However, he later admitted the heavy losses which he sustained.

We will not talk about the enemy's losses following the Tyre operation. However, we want to emphasize that our way is that of armed struggle and that the Palestinian revolution whose struggle is 18 years old knows how to reach its enemy and how to strike him at the proper place effectively. During this long period of struggle, the Palestinian revolution has possessed the means, mode and experience which enables it to deal its blows with its long hand which will reach the enemy wherever he may exist.

The emphasis by Brother Commander Abu 'Ammar on the escalation of heroic operations against the Zionist enemy is one which the world feels embodied in reality



through the actions being carried out by the joint forces on the arena of struggle which has expanded to include a large part of the Lebanese territory as well as occupied Palestine.

The forces which have launched the severest and most violent battles against the Zionist-U.S. force and have achieved crushing victories over 3 months of continued struggle and stiff battles, are able to disturb the sleep of the enemy and deal deadly and effective blows on him. The Tyre operation is a beginning and real example of what will be the revolutionary action against the Zionist presence all over the occupied territories.

CSO: 4400/100

## INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

### BRIEFS

PALESTINIAN-U.S. DIALOGUE URGED--The recent trends on the Palestinians' readiness to negotiate with the United States, which is considered the strongest power that has direct influence on the region's events, indicate a profound realization of the requirements of the current stage. It would be a wise step to initiate a Palestinian-U.S. dialogue on the basis of rights and justice. For example, Israel is seeking to establish channels of contact with the Soviet Union and even to restore diplomatic relations with it because such developments are in its interest. Although we can never imagine an alliance with the United States similar to that between Israel and the United States, there is no doubt that establishing a platform, no matter how simple, to explain the Palestinian viewpoints on the official U.S. level would be an important achievement. Meanwhile, other efforts should continue on all levels to guarantee the Palestinian people's rights. It is also important at the current stage of the Palestinian cause to make alliance with all active Arab potentialities and forces without sensitivities as long as the target is to find a just solution that can end our people's agony and long suffering on the basis of these people's inalienable right to self-determination. [Text] [JN221038 Jerusalem AL-QUDS in Arabic 14 Nov 82 p 1]

PRO-JORDANIAN PETITION IN W. BANK--Jordan has failed in collecting signatures from inhabitants of Judea and Samaria on a petition supporting rapprochement between Jordan and the Palestinians. Our correspondent Pinhas 'Inbari has learned that PLO supporters opposed this petition because its formula was sympathetic to Jordan, and they demanded rewording it. As a result, the signature collecting was stopped, and the Jordanian envoys returned to Amman empty-handed. Our correspondent notes that several mayors had already signed the petition, but later retracted their signatures. In contrast, in the 'Ayn Bayt ('Ilmah), near Nabulus, refugee Mukhtars convened and expressed support for the petition being circulated by Jordan. [Text] [TA171201 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1100 GMT 17 Nov 82]

CBO: 4400/100

REPORT ON DISCUSSIONS OF GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL DEFENSE MINISTERS

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 285, 18-24 Oct 82  
pp 22-24

[Articles by 'Ali Hashim: "Cooperation Council States Build Biggest Air Defense Network in Area; War Industrialization Postponed and Protecting Strait of Hormuz Is Task of Sultanate of Oman; 'Post-Lebanon' Phase Is Major Concern and Lebanese Situation Inspires 'Red Line' to Protect Gulf"]

[Text] Riyadh--Preparations for the "post-Lebanon" phase, expected in the Gulf with the onset of the coming year, are being made by initiating implementation of the last part of this year's agenda on the area level.

The number one issue for implementation in the last section of the agenda was the conference of the ministers of defense of the Gulf Cooperation Council. This conference was held in Riyadh last Sunday in the presence of six ministers: Prince Sultan ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, Saudi prime minister and minister of defense and aviation; Shaykh Salim Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah, Kuwaiti minister of defense; Shaykh Hamad ibn 'Isa ibn Salman Al Khalifah, the Bahraini crown prince, minister of defense and commander of the armed forces; Shaykh Hamad ibn Khalifah ibn Hamad Al Thani, Qatari crown prince, minister of defense and commander of the armed forces; Shaykh Muhammad ibn Rashid ibn Sa'id Al Maktum, the UAE minister of defense; and Fahd ibn Taymur, prime minister and minister of defense of the Sultanate of Oman.

Ibrahim al-Suhbi, Cooperation Council assistant general secretary for political affairs, has described the conference as "being held within the framework of the comprehensive and extensive movement to be witnessed by the Cooperation Council in the next few weeks and to be crowned with the meeting of the Supreme Council of the member states in Bahrain on 9 November."

The Supreme Council is the abbreviated name given to the Gulf summit, since this council includes the leaders of the Cooperation Council's six member states.

Before the summit, which will be the third since the establishment of the Council, the ministers of foreign affairs of the six member states will hold their conference on 2 November 1982, the fifth session of this ministerial council.

The first in this series of conferences and meetings was the meeting that included the ministers of defense, because the sole concern of the Gulf in this period has been the concern of internal security and defense.

#### Complete Defense Network

The communique issued by the ministers of defense conference and the details reported on its meetings have not revealed the whole truth. Military conferences are not accustomed to disclosing all of their discussions, considering that they are "secret." But even the final communique and the statements of the ministers concerned did not reveal what has taken place and may be taking place in the Gulf arena first because of the sensitivities existing among the area's states and second because of the important and serious nature of the resolutions.

It has been learned that the declared issues that were discussed pertain to defense plans that had been studied by the chiefs of staff in their meetings 3 months ago. The chiefs of staff at that time chose what the Saudi and Omani papers contained.

The Saudi paper presented projections for action on common defense and on resources the kingdom could offer to put those projections into effect.

Only the Omani paper presented a complete plan for defending the Gulf.

The Omani plan focused on viewing the Gulf as a single defense area. The most important point in the plan is the Strait of Hormuz, which the Omani Ministry of Defense characterized as a lake with no outlet and with its main defense lines being the territories of the countries surrounding it. But the Gulf's main artery, rather the only inlet and outlet linking the Gulf with the world through the Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea and, consequently, the Sea of Oman is the Strait of Hormuz.

The international sea corridor to and from the Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz is an Omani sea corridor, considering that the deep navigable waters are Omani territorial waters. The waters leading eastward from this corridor to the Iranian coast are shallow waters fit for the passage of only small boats and not for tankers or ordinary or super cargo ships.

The Omani intuition concerning the strait came true when the sultanate took charge of protecting the strait 3 years ago in the wake of the collapse of the Iranian imperial regime and when the Gulf war broke out more than 2 years ago between Iraq and Iran.



Despite its modest material resources, the sultanate has been able, with the experience and capability of its armed forces and by these forces keeping pace with modern military science, to preserve the safety of international shipping, prevent closure of the strait and keep it clear of dangers of the war.

The sultanate has filed away a plan it presented nearly 2 years ago in which the area's states were to participate in achieving self-security and in which Oman demanded that the countries consuming Gulf oil, especially the United States, Britain, France and Japan, contribute to the cost of achieving this security.

This was before the establishment of the Cooperation Council. But now the sultanate focuses on the intrinsic resources of the Gulf states to preserve the area's security and to protect the Strait of Hormuz against any future eventuality.

The Sultanate of Oman has laid down the bases of a complete defense network. There remains what the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has offered.

It is well known that Saudi Arabia possesses the strongest air defense network in the Gulf area, excluding Iran and Iraq, and a vast radar network, which includes the AWACS it has purchased from the United States and the British Nimrod aircraft which are superior to the AWACS in their precision. Saudi Arabia negotiated the purchase of the Nimruds with John Nott, the British secretary of state for defense, during his visit to Riyadh 3 weeks ago.

Saudi Arabia presented to the conference of the Gulf ministers of defense a complete study on expanding the Saudi air defense network so that it can cover the air space of the Cooperation Council member states and so that the surveillance aircraft it uses can cover the entire area and the surrounding areas of the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa and the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula.

The Saudi plan, it has been learned, was approved and preparations are underway to implement it after experts and technicians are in place. It has been decided that all of these experts and technicians will be from among area citizens. If this is impossible at present, then specialization scholarships can be sent to friendly countries concerned with such specializations.

#### Arab Weapon Industry

The newest topic dealt with by the conference pertains to a joint arms industry and whether this industry should be a purely Gulf industry or a joint Gulf-Arab industry.

The ministers of defense had discussed the issue before. It had also been discussed by the chiefs of staff and the experts, but no decision had been taken on it for several reasons.

In the Riyadh conference, held at the beginning of this week, a new element developed in the issue.

This element is connected with the U.S. proposal seeking to "persuade Saudi Arabia to finance the production of U.S. 3-G and FX-16 fighter planes in Egypt."

According to a Defense Department spokesman, this proposal by Washington seeks to bolster the defense capabilities of the Middle East countries so that they can produce U.S. aircraft in Egypt to help Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states defend themselves. The plan would cost \$2 billion.

The Gulf states have had previous experience with Egypt in weapons production. These states established the Arab War Industrialization Agency with al-Sadat's Egypt. The agency was headed in the past by Dr Ashraf marwan and each of the Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE) had its representative in the agency. These states paid billions and it was found after experience that the billions "dissolved" and that the Egyptian side concluded imaginary contracts with several Western firms which, it was ultimately proven, did not provide a single Arab-made handgun bullet.

Then came al-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, the conclusion of the two Camp David accords and the subsequent estrangement. The agency "fell apart" and the representatives of the Gulf states returned home to lick their wounds--wounds inflicted by an industry that died before it could see the light.

In the previous ministers of defense conference, held nearly 6 months ago, the issue of war industrialization was raised anew, provided that the industry would be a purely Gulf industry. But discussion of the issue was postponed until a complete study compatible with the conditions pertaining in the area could be conducted to find out the fate of the monies paid by the Gulf states to the Industrialization Agency's budget and, finally, to find out if Egypt would return to the Arabs or if the Arabs would return to Egypt.

At the latest conference in Riyadh, several questions were raised:

1. If the arms industry is to be a Gulf industry, then the money is available but the experienced manpower is not. Should the help of Arab, and which Arab, manpower or foreign manpower (Asian, for example) be employed in this industry? Should such manpower be trusted with the fate of such a sensitive industry as the arms industry, considering that this manpower may, for political or nonpolitical reasons, cause the obstruction or collapse of this industry?
2. Proceeding cautiously to learn the fate of Egyptian-Arab relations in the wake of the recent relaxation experienced by these relations since the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and Cairo's role in defending the Palestinian issue and Lebanon's and Cairo's international movement to that end.

3. Consulting experts to compare the cost of manufacturing weapons locally and the cost of importing them and comparing the "independence" of the local weapon, keeping in mind that the raw materials will be imported, and the impact of the imported weapon on the "independence" of its use.

4. The issue of Saudi Arabian financing of the production of U.S. war-planes in Egypt was not brought up because it is tied to the issue of arms manufacturing as a whole and will be discussed when necessary and at the proper time when a decision is made on the parent arms production issue.

#### "Post-Lebanon" Phase

What has been announced is simply headlines on issues that have been kept hidden and that have not occurred to anyone.

The most important and serious of these issues is the "post-Lebanon" phase, which means, in "plain Arabic," as they say:

Will the next phase be the Gulf phase?

Or has Lebanon's phase eliminated all the phases up to the parent phase or issue, namely, the Palestine issue?

Or does the Soviet Union's failure in the Beirut-Lebanon battle and its withdrawal and retreat to its shell in the Middle East mean that the area has fallen finally into the bosom of the United States, i.e., the West?

Or is the Soviet horse, which has stumbled in Beirut, preparing to start the fire somewhere else, considering that it has planted mines in Aden and Ethiopia and that these mines derive life from a fuse extending to Libya, which supplies it with money, weapons and mercenaries, including Cubans and others.

The conference wondered:

Is this the American era and is the Gulf satisfied, deep down, with this era?

Or is it the Israeli era under a U.S. canopy, and is this era seeking ultimately to put the area within the reach of the Israeli stick and to find a solution, any solution, under the threat of this stick?

The conference did not pause long before this question after having referred to the political resolutions and aspirations of the second Fes summit. These are issues involving positions that concern the political leaders and that are in the hands of the political leaders, who will try to study and solve these issues in their next summit.

But the conferees, being ministers of defense, dwelt long on the Gulf war developments and the Fes summit resolutions concerning them, considering that this is an Arab war, especially if the Iranian forces move deep inside Iraq's borders. It will then be the duty of the Arab countries, led by the Gulf states, to implement these resolutions.

## Bisharah and Studies

'Abdallah Ya'qub Bisharah, the Gulf Cooperation Council secretary general, who took part in the conference sessions, was the "number one silent man" this time.

On its first day, the conference held two sessions. The first was opened by the Saudi minister of defense, who stressed that international charters and guarantees are useless and that what is really beneficial is a common defense strategy--statements that underline the presence of the Saudi plan.

On his part, Bisharah emphasized that the conferees presented technical studies, prepared by military committees, on cooperation and coordination in the sphere of defense.

But the fact is that the Gulf states this year have allocated more than \$30 billion for defense. A major part of this sum "has been allocated" to equip the Omani Army with the latest aircraft and radar network, to help build naval bases and to supply a fleet of cruisers, all of which will be designated to protect the strait of Hormuz.

The 2-day conference approved recommendations pertaining to the exchange of military information, to collective retaliation against any aggression and to unifying the training of the area's armed forces.

After 2 days of serious meetings, the outcome was a comprehensive military plan based fundamentally on building the biggest air defense network in the Middle East and a defense plan that has an impact on the defense plan.

The recommendations concerning both plans will be presented, "for the sake of information," to the ministers of foreign affairs, who will meet under the name of the "ministerial council." On being approved by this council, the recommendations will be presented to the third Gulf summit, which will convene on the 9th of next month in Manama, the capital of Bahrain, under the chairmanship of Shaykh 'Isa ibn Salman Al Khalifah, Bahrain's ruler.

The Gulf summit will approve all of the recommendations. While exerting serious efforts to build "self-security," the members of this summit feel deep down that the area's position has been decided and that the fall of the international left in Beirut has ended the myth of the Red scare, thus achieving the goal once voiced by Tashid 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Rashid, undersecretary in the Kuwaiti Ministry of Foreign Affairs, when he said that there is a Red line surrounding the Gulf area that no power in the world can surpass.

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**FINAL REPORT BY NORWEGIAN CORRESPONDENT KILLED IN ACTION**

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 2 Nov 82 p 39

[Report by Ståle Gundhus: "With the Afghan Guerrillas in the Fight Against the Russians"]

[Text] No other Norwegian journalist, and few western journalists, for that matter, have gotten a closer acquaintance with the guerilla forces in Afghanistan than Ståle Gundhus, who was killed on 24 June 1982 during a Soviet attack on a guerilla division he was with at the time. During his three extensive trips in Afghanistan he lived with the guerilla soldiers. A short time before his death he sent a letter to his family back home in Norway that gives a vivid insight into the war that the Afghan resistance movement is waging against the occupying forces. With the permission of the family we are presenting the letter, which was brought out of the country by courier, in excerpt. The accompanying photographs were taken by Ståle Gundhus during his first two trips.

Besides his work as a free-lance reporter, Ståle Gundhus was a law student at the University of Oslo. He was especially interested in international law, and intended to write a special assignment in that field based on the situation in Afghanistan. He had also gone through officers' school in the infantry and was a reserve second lieutenant. His military training was useful in his observations of the warfare in Afghanistan.

As I am writing this I have been in Afghanistan for over 6 weeks, and am now at a guerilla base on some wild mountain northwest of the town of Yarah. The place is called Sadaki, Koh-i-Noor. The base is exceedingly well known to the Russians; no danger of revealing that "secret." The area of the base has been photographed from all angles by photographic reconnaissance planes. Bombs fall constantly.

The base itself is located in a deep cut, with the mountain peaks towering 200, 300, 400 meters above us. We sleep, eat, and while away the time drinking tea

under a heavy rock overhang that extends downward toward the bottom of the cut. Nature laid a fine terrace under the overhang, so that we have a first-class lounge with lots of light and air, and at the same time well sheltered from weather and wind. Fresh water is fetched from springs on the mountain.

The place is not easy for enemy hill troops to take. To get to the base one must either clamber up and down over the mountain or follow a deep, narrow creek-bed from the end of a valley just south of the base and up. The Russians have tried several times without success, the last time 2 months ago. Numerous wrecks of Russian tanks bear witness to its having been made hot for them. The enemy had to withdraw after having lost at least 300 men killed and wounded. Of course, all numbers should be taken with a grain of salt. It is certain, however, that the mujahedin took full advantage of the extremely rugged terrain, which offers countless firing positions and hiding places. It is equally certain that they are good soldiers.


The leaders admit that they have had significant losses in killed and wounded during the attacks on the main base--due to Soviet mine-laying from the air with butterfly mines and antipersonnel mines placed in concealment under the hill by engineer troops. I have been able to see with my own eyes that the floor of the valley and the level country below the base are strewn with mines. Not very nice. According to reports, some 300 mujahedin and civilians have died. It is possible that this is an exaggeration--as a rule they take the line that fits best into the "story."

The guerilla soldiers assert that the Russians used gas during the last attack on the base. Some say that the gas was dropped in bombs from fighter-bombers, others that the gas was spread with rockets and automatic cannon projectiles from Mi-24 combat helicopters. All describe the effect of the gas as floods of tears and shortness of breath, followed by unconsciousness in case of large doses. Some add that one gets headaches and diarrhea. No deaths are reported. As a countermeasure the guerilla soldiers have lighted bonfires to make the gas rise in the air. The smoke from burning rubber is said to work extra well. In the last attack the Russians are also said to have poisoned the water of a brook that runs through the base area from north to south. The reports of gas and poison cannot be confirmed or denied.

The only military action during the time I have been here--nearly 14 days--was an air attack 6 days ago. It was about 10:00 in the morning when we who were sitting under the overhang suddenly heard the whine of jet engines, accompanied by the thudding of the base's heavy anti-aircraft machine guns. Seconds later came the booms of the first bomb impacts.

Four MiG-17 fighter-bombers, presumably from the Afghan air force, and four Ilyushin 28 twin-engine medium bombers (presumably Soviet) came swooping in over the camp at 30-second to 1-minute intervals. They came at low speed, at an altitude of about 1,000 meters, in a straight line from south to north. That way, of course, they were exposed to the guerillas' machine-gun fire, but the intention was probably to do precision bombing in order, if possible, to get hits down in the narrow cut.

It did not go especially well. The nearest bomb landed on a peak 300 meters below the overhang where the people were lying under cover. One machine-gunner



was slightly wounded by a little fragment in the abdominal region. That was all. A MIG-17, on the other hand, had a good going-over with 12.7-mm projectiles, and flapped out of sight like a wounded crow. The MIG later crashed on the way back to Shindand.

The commander here, Haji Mohammad, was beside himself after the attack. With enthusiasm. As a former major in the Afghan air force (before Taraki) he rejoiced that a treacherous Karmal pilot had gotten him just deserts. Only too bad it was not a Russian.

The reason that Haji Mohammad has been able to work up to such a position of power is that he is a hard-working, capable military man. He was the first one in Parah to take up the fight against the communists in Kabul, back in the fall of 1978, under Taraki. From the beginning he and his friends naturally got weapons and ammunition from the resistance organization Harakat-e-Ingalah-i-Islam, which has its headquarters in Peshawar, Pakistan. Gradually other guerilla groups grew up in the villages, with various party connections. Many of them found it smart and natural to accept Haji Mohammad's leadership at the top.

Another commander might perhaps have insisted that those under

Guerilla with 12.7-mm machine gun, chiefly for use against the Russian armored helicopters. What the guerillas need is a few heavy-caliber antiaircraft rockets.

him belong to his party. Haji Mohammad, on the contrary, set himself the goal of uniting as many different parties as possible. The subordinate guerilla groups have maintained their respective connections with Peshawar or Quetta-Barakat, Afghan National Liberation Front, Harzli Islami-Khalis, National Islamist Front, or whatever it may be. This way Haji Mohammad is sure of supplies of weapons from all sides.

It is not easy to say how many men Haji Mohammad has under arms. He himself gives the number as 5,000. That seems somewhat high, although it is quite possible that there are 5,000 guerilla soldiers--both on Mohammad's and on other chiefs' strength lists. He has at least 1,000 mujahedin under his command, perhaps more.

I consider the men's proficiency and tactical maneuvers at a low level in combat to be brilliant. It is not for nothing that Haji Mohammad's men have managed to repel a series of massive attacks on the base. To judge by the reports that stream in, the units down in the village are ever so active. It is constantly reported that two Soviet tanks have been blown up by mines here, one destroyed with antitank rockets there, 30 Russians killed, etc., etc. Most of the strikes are in the form of ambushes of Soviet convoys, especially along the Herat-Kandahar highway and the stretch of road from the highway to the town of Varah.

The ambushes are carried out by combat patrols that rarely number more than 15 men, armed with one, sometimes two RPG 7 antitank rockets (Soviet or Chinese), mines, rifles, automatic rifles, and submachine guns of various brands.

At regular intervals Haji Mohammad's forces attack the enemy's bases and barracks. The Soviet and Afghan camps in the town of Varah have been attacked several times by mujahedin. Operations have also been carried out against Shindand, the main Soviet base for air and hill forces in western Afghanistan. Several hundred guerilla soldiers may participate in such operations. Big attacks are often supported by mortars, the mujahedin's heavier weapons, and 12.7-mm machine guns.

By all indications the hardest battles are fought out when enemy forces attempt to force their way into villages where mujahedin are staying, or when the enemy attacks the main base in Sadshil.

It seems quite clear that it is the *Munawwar* that bear the brunt of the fighting against the mujahedin and that suffer the greatest losses of men and material.

The Afghan government forces are far fewer in numbers and are chiefly used as scouts and interpreters for the Soviet forces. Small Afghan units are regularly taken along on Soviet offensive expeditions, but presumably more for political reasons than from military necessity. The Afghan government soldiers' unreliability and low combat morale are legendary. The greater part of Babrak Karmal's army has deserted, and desertions are still occurring, at about the same rate that new recruits are forced or enticed in.

The mujahedin's own account of the battles may indicate that the Soviet hill forces are now behaving more aggressively and determinedly than before. As



far as Mohammad is concerned this has the effect that every now and then he gets word that some of his men have fallen in battle. The casualty figures seem greater than I had previously thought was normal among the mujahedin. Not long ago a whole combat patrol of 15 men--except for one mujahed--was wiped out in a skirmish with Soviet chasseurs. *Neither* Haji Mohammad's men take greater chances in battle than usual usual, or else the Soviet troops in Parah are more competent and braver than their colleagues elsewhere in Afghanistan, or else the Russians in general have pulled themselves together against the mujahedin. Taken with what I can hear on the BBC and the Voice of America, this last seems to be the case.

Now as before, here in Parah as elsewhere, the Russians are especially active in the air. The guerillas' supposed hangouts are constantly attacked with fighter-bombers and helicopters. This regularly leads to perceptible losses for the mujahedin. The most dangerous thing is to drive around in a jeep or on a tractor in the daytime. The Russians bomb and fire at practically all vehicles they come upon. The Soviet pilots apparently rarely bother to find out whether it is mujahedin they have got in the bomb-sight. Consequently it is the *civilian* population, and not the guerillas, that suffer most from the Russians' bombs, rockets, and machine guns.

A new development is that the Soviet MI-24 combat helicopters have begun to fly in the dark as well. It is especially the guerillas' infiltration routes in the Pakistan border areas that are exposed to Russian night flying, according to Afghans and reliable sources among the mujahedin.

All figures that come from that quarter are to be handled with caution, regardless, and I will content myself with indicating that *many* of the mujahedin's vehicles are said to have been destroyed by Soviet combat helicopters recently when they were crossing into Afghanistan under cover of darkness. Still more guerilla soldiers are said to have been killed, driving, on horseback, or on foot.

In comparison to the literature on the subject the Russians are feeling their way forward with advanced light-amplifying equipment, "low-light television," and infrared heat-seeking devices. *The technique* is well known and is used in most European and American forces.

The Americans routinely carried out airplane and helicopter operations in the dark during the war in Vietnam, and now the Russians are doing so in Afghanistan. So far it seems clear that the Russians have only equipped a few MI-24's for night flying, and that they do not constitute any great threat to the guerillas, viewed as part of the whole picture. Not so far.

Right now there is not much to say about the trip out here except that it took 6 weeks. Conditions in regard to transport from Pakistan to Parah/Herat are *very* difficult. I traveled by bus, jeep, and tractor from Quetta. The route ran in part through the desert province of Nimroz, a depressing place. More about that later.

In closing let me say that I am hale and hearty and having a wonderful time. It will still take some time to complete the program. I may have to speed things up, cut down on the itinerary.

## DEVELOPMENT GOALS, PROGRAMS, RESULTS EXAMINED

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 10, 11 Oct 82

[Article by Ali Laibi "Chief Two Years Later" ]

[10 Oct 82 p 3]

[Text] The erection of those little walls served two purposes in the eyes of the inhabitants: shielding homes from prying glances and at the same time widening the usable living space. Thus it is hoped to restore a traditional style of dwelling fully adapted to the requirements of the Algerian family. The idea for this dwelling is not something new; in Chief several houses of the former El-Asnam, if not the majority, were constructed in the same way as the chalets, especially the ones in the popular areas of El-Firem, Bocca Bahoun, and "rural" and "emergency" villages.

So the disaster-stricken families do not feel like strangers. What is more, the ones that were living in the HLM [Low-Cost Housing Program] hell and the promiscuity of the "haouch" [slums] have seen their life style transformed.

And a great calmness now characterizes the new housing sites. It is only in the early morning, when people are going off to work, that there is any sign of life perceptible. Or in the evening, when the gangs of youngsters take up their favorite game of football on playing fields scuffed bare among the open green spaces.

On certain hilly sites, contractors are buckling down to the task of strengthening small groups of dwellings by the construction of retaining walls. The rock composing the hills is crumbly. There is fear that sections of wall may collapse as a result of rainwater, which might damage the flimsy little houses. The work seems to be progressing rapidly, particularly since many facilities have been granted the contractors.

## A Mushroom Town

The other part of Chief should be seen too: Chettia, the farthest away of the four main sites, and also the most important if one is to be convinced that the martyred city has been well and truly brought to life again. Near the socialist village of the same name on the Tenes road, Chettia is, so to speak,

a veritable mushroom town that sprang up in the space of a few months, as a result of [words missing] intended for the open green spaces.

Nearly 6,000 chalets have been installed in an area of several dozen hectares, and with all the necessary collective equipment for the operation of every group, such as the colleges, grammar schools, schools, health centers, poly-technical schools or sales points for national companies, etcetera....

It is not yet ideal, of course. The "things" that make up the special character of a town, like places of entertainment, little shops or supermarkets, are still missing, though they are programmed for in the emergency plan. But life is gradually getting organized. Telephone booths and bus shelters have already been installed.

In reality, the importance of this new living center can only be discerned at dusk; with the lights on, Chettia takes on unexpectedly gigantic proportions. It is simple: it does become gigantic. And the young people, with their customary spiritedness, amuse themselves making wild comparisons: Chettia is "Dallas" (?), "it is the Megalopolis." I am told that these comparisons are inspired by the amount of street lighting. The system erected in a few months is so dense that it may surpass that of the white city of Algiers, our gloomy capital!

The analogies made by the inhabitants of Chlef between their town and other conglomerations, and also that way of thinking, of course, betray concerns other than their being taken care of in social planning. Indeed, there is no talk of earthquakes, tents, or any of the privations that the population endured during the months that followed the earthquake activity. Needs have become different, and in many cases less urgent.

The inhabitants complain chiefly about the inadequacy of transportation and the problems created by this gap in inter-site connections. Many of them informed me that bus service was not regular. The wali [governor] himself confirmed that 13 buses are out of action.

You have to live in one of the Chlef sites to feel and understand the distress of the workers. The town has blown apart into four separate parts, fairly distant from each other and very far away from the old town center, where all social and government activity is concentrated.

The absence of transportation, or rather, its inadequacy, has added to the phenomenon of clandestine taxis, just as it has created situations similar in many respects to those in the capital: by the bus stops, dozens of users fret impatiently for hours waiting for some hypothetical bus to come and pick them up.

Some citizens have resolved this problem in their own way. They have taken to the motor cycle, a product subject to limitless speculation. These two-wheelers are sold on the black market for over a million entimes. Despite the high price, they are snapped up like hot cakes. Today the motor cycle is part of the scenery in Chlef. They are to be seen in their dozens, in their hundreds; hence the proliferation of repair shops in every corner of the old city.

### What of the Little Corner Shopkeeper?

The other concern is connected with the inadequacy, or rather absence, of appropriate commercial structures on the sites. The program of construction of large areas and supermarkets is encountering some delay in execution. The negotiations between the National Office for the Promotion of Prefabricated Building (ONEP) [as published] and certain firms specializing in this area began fairly recently. According to the wall, construction sites will be started probably before the end of the program for 1,600 small businesses to be distributed over the villages.

So far, commercial activity has been kept in the old city area, mainly at Zeboudji and along the Oran Road. It should be recalled that tradespeople set up booths along the main roads of certain districts only a few weeks after the disaster. Needless to say, the almost totally disorderly establishment of these businesses initially created many problems for the local authorities, especially for the sanitation and health services. But as the situation improved, the authorities were induced to keep and even encourage these small businesses, whose social usefulness made itself felt very quickly. State organizations became involved with these tradespeople. Such is the case with SNNCA [National Construction Materials Company], OFLA [Algerian Fruit and Vegetable Office], SEMPAC [expansion unknown], SOGEDIA [Food Industries Management and Development Company], and ONACO [Algerian National Marketing Office].

With needs increasing in this area, many tradespeople have been induced to reopen their old shops in the town center, although the danger of buildings collapsing has not yet been removed. It is frightening to see customers nonchalantly sitting at tables inside cafés with walls completely split through. "It is understandable," a young worker told me, "there is hardly anything within the new districts."

It is especially the need to recreate some semblance of liveliness, to put some heart back into the town, that prompts people to frequent the old town center. Out of nostalgia, too, perhaps...

Except for the cafés, there are no meeting places. The need for communication becomes terribly urgent, especially in young people...

In the emergency plan, the cultural aspect was classified as a third priority, after the rehousing of the disaster-stricken families and the establishment of the educational and health structures.

Now that the situation has become distinctly better, and that the main problems have been solved, taking charge of cultural life is becoming increasingly imperative. According to information obtained at the governorate level, the construction of cultural and entertainment infrastructures will start before 1983.



Moreover, Chlef is also experiencing some problems whose appearance is not really related to the earthquake, but to the development threshold that it had reached and the way in which it worked. In this connection, it is somewhat useful to recall the flagrant differences between town and country that were typical of this governorate, as well as the difficult situations still experienced by the rural population. One concern: health.

"At one point, we were receiving so many patients that it was impossible to put them all in the hospital," a young doctor told us. The health director himself told us that the summer of 1982 was particularly "hot."

"It is impossible," he said, "to curb certain illnesses, especially the ones transmitted by water, if the problems of potable water supply are not solved for the citizens as a whole."

In the governorate of Chlef, this issue remains a disturbing one: in many areas, the water is drawn from uninspected wells, the irrigation ditches, and even from Chlef wash. One can therefore understand the anxiety of the health officials and their inability to combat effectively diseases whose eradication can only be achieved with the improvement of conditions. "It is the decade of water that we must inaugurate."

Thus hydraulic engineering is on the black list. But sector officials are defending themselves. "We acted," they say, "in terms of the situation prevailing immediately after the earthquake." The first of the priorities was to repair all the irrigation ditch system and then to go on to the drilling of wells to supply the new living centers with drinking water.

Now the town of Chlef is no longer bothered by the water cut-offs that are observed in almost all our cities. In most of the sites, there is constant running water. What is much more, the drilling of about 15 wells is expected, to strengthen the supply. Now, the hydraulic engineering services deplore the lack of drilling machines. The tent hamlets and the little villages are where the problem is most acute. An ambitious supply program has been worked out. Tours have taken place through all the communes and districts to take note of the needs and make the technical feasibility studies. Operations have been listed for Ouled-Ziad, Tachta, and Zeboudja... areas where there exists practically no water.

There is also the supply operation for 132 rural habitat sites. The studies are finished and the execution has started in many places. But there is a problem: materials and hydraulic engineering equipment are lacking.

#### **Urgent Needs**

The rural areas, also severely tried by the earthquake, received the benefit of a 23,000 housing unit operation. In 1981, only 140 housing units were completed. But still, it is expected that the delay will be made up on the basis of completion of 6,000 units at the end of this year. There are already about 778 construction sites scattered throughout the governorate.

## Better Still, Reconstruction in Stone

Truthfully speaking, one cannot talk of delays in the execution of the governorate reconstruction program. It was established according to priorities to be met each at the proper time. And it must be said that an admirable job has been done, since not one single disaster-stricken family is living in a tent. And not one student is in a canvas school building, either.

As concerns school attendance, Chief students are no longer being sent to other governorates. And for good reason: 4,021 classes have been set up and all new students have been enrolled in schools. The intermediate course level itself comprises over 60 CEM [Colleges of Intermediate Studies]. The Chief district alone has three extra CEMs, which will be temporarily turned into a paramedical school, an institute of educational technology (ITE), and a training resource center.

For secondary education, the eight grammar schools in the program have been delivered, and the academic year started in the normal way at the beginning of this month. The authorities are very pleased: the promise made to the president of the republic has been kept.

It is felt, in addition, that the reopening of the schools this year took place in better conditions than in pre-earthquake years. Double sessions have been eliminated and overcrowding of classes reduced as much as possible.

However, a few difficulties are noted in Miliana and Ténès districts. The justification offered is the fact that the greatest expenditure of effort has been made around zone 1 (Chief-Boukadir), the one most affected by the earthquake. To make up the shortfall noted in the two districts, the authorities voted in favor of prefabrication temporarily.

It is understood that recourse to this type of construction throughout the entire disaster zone is only temporary. So the inhabitants will not have to be too concerned about the fragility of their little houses, for Chief will be rebuilt in stone.

[11 Oct 82 p 3]

Much has changed in Chief. The bulk of the wagers taken on by the state has been won. But despite these impressive results, the governorate is still experiencing the repercussions of the earthquake. For this reason, it is still considered a disaster area. Certain infrastructures of social and economic nature, whose usefulness is obvious, are not yet in place, and new needs are making themselves felt, for in Chief there is one compelling truth: not only must what has been destroyed be reconstituted, but also the deficiencies existing in all areas must be made up. In other words, what has to be done is catch up with the previous development plans, and at the same time, respond to the new needs that are arising. A task that is not at all an easy one.

If the project is taking a long time, it is because the construction of the rural houses is being done according to earthquake-proof standards, and therefore requires a relatively longer period of time, especially for the heavier dwelling in which the structures are made of cement. For the modular dwelling, the work goes more quickly as a result of the use of metal beams. In both cases, however, the recipient must finish his building himself.

Long overlooked, the rural areas have received the benefit of an important road building program. The goal is to manage to build 400 to 500 kilometers by the end of 1982. For the sake of comparison, only 200 kilometers are said to have been laid out in 10 years. Another piece of luck is coming up for the country people: according to the wali, the economic activity will gradually be moved out of the Chélif valley. The first objective is connected with reduction of density there, both in human and economic terms. "We have to go onto the foothills and thus give the rural people the chance of benefiting from development." In 1983, 80 percent of the projects contained in the Communal Development Plans (PCD) will be assigned to the disadvantaged rural areas.

This is what the well informed officials of the hydraulic engineering services think will happen. The situation in this area is critical, because of the drought: the dams are down to the danger level, and in the middle of summer even. The dam on the Fodda wash, of which the storage capacity is 225 million cubic meters, now contains nothing but mud. The water level has dropped 32 meters (3 meters below the critical level), a level that has never before been reached since it was put into service. That means, among other things, that this work is no longer of the slightest use. It is to be hoped that this year's rainfall will be heavy enough to make large quantities of water available so that it will be useable next year.

If the drought persists, the worst is already expected. And indeed, what can be done to save the 5,000 hectares of citrus in the Chélif valley? The agricultural units are not equipped to face the water shortage. The solution, as the agriculture director sees it, is to pump the water out of the bed of Chélif wash, which is considered to be a natural irrigation channel. A quota of motor-pumps must of necessity be withdrawn from the equipment intended for small private peasant-farmers. One obstacle remains: there is a lot still to be done as far as pipe-laying is concerned.

In addition, this year's agricultural season has not been a great success. A glaring deficit is recorded in animal fodder production, even, in a governorate which has always produced a surplus.

#### Emergency Services

Chélif's health infrastructures, it should be recalled, were completely destroyed by the October 1980 earthquake. To provide for the greatest emergencies, the authorities turned the town's CFA [Adult (Vocational) Training Center] into a temporary hospital pending the completion of the emergency program, which contained a large number of health-related projects.

In fact, the disaster area has received eight large hospitals. It is said that the excavation work has started, and the building materials for the Ténès hospital (it is being built out of prefabricated sections) are being brought to the site.

As a whole, the program seems well along: out of 18 polyclinics planned, 3 are open to the public and out of the 47 health centers, 27 are already operational. The medical corps itself is estimated at 223 physicians. But there is a shortage of specialists, especially in gynecology.

However, the health director explains, conditions are very favorable for the practice of specialties, especially at Miliana and El-Attaf. "But the local specialists disdainfully refuse to work in the cities of the interior." Chief officials have received the promise that 50 Vietnamese specialists will come in the near future to strengthen the ranks of the medical corps.

In addition, the start of operations of the mobile hospital that the Ministry of Health has just assigned to Chlef is eagerly awaited. It is self-sufficient and can function anywhere.

With this new acquisition, the health coverage will be considerably expanded. What is more, it is hoped to inaugurate increased epidemiological surveillance with the creation in 1983 of a special center. For the problem of health in Chlef still resides in the prevention of infectious diseases which should have disappeared a good 10 years ago.

12149

CSO: 4519/28



CONTROL OF POPULATION GROWTH SUPPORTED

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 31 Oct 82 p 9

[Article by Nadjia Bouzeghrane: "The Immediate Prime Concern"]

[Text] The evidence is at hand. It is a fact, a real concern. Algeria's population is growing out of control and places the country among those with the highest rate of population increase.

One thing is now essential: population control, a reduction in the birth rate. The Office of Secretary of State for Social Affairs, which is responsible for this very delicate task of drafting the main lines of a national family planning policy, recognizes that the action needed is very complex because of its multifaceted impact. Nevertheless, the determination to draft such a policy and carry it out is real. To that effect, the Office of Secretary of State for Social Affairs has joined with other government and party structures and agencies in initiating the dialogue on the subject.

Echoing the concerns of political leaders, Social Affairs officials say that the goal is to define and work out a population and family policy in keeping with economic and social development programs, so as to meet the demand for goods, equipment and services.

Based on the age distribution of the population, the potential for growth will make it impossible -- unless additional efforts and funds are found -- to meet society's needs for housing, health, education and recreation.

In other words, it is high time that a population policy, in keeping with the requirements of economic and social development, be implemented.

Until only recently, the idea prevailed that economic development was the solution to the population problem, that improvements in the people's social, cultural and economic conditions, resulting from that development, would bring about a drop in the birth rate.

Consequently, the population question was somewhat concealed for the benefit of action waged on behalf of economic development based on the recovery of natural resources and their development.

## Family Planning Based on Free Choice

Over the past two decades, Algerian society has undergone profound changes, manifested by a considerable increase in social needs. Consequently, there is an urgent need to meet those needs, while maintaining the rate of industrialization and promoting agriculture.

In its resolutions, the Fourth Party Congress emphasized the need, within the framework of the overall health policy, to ensure protection of mothers and children so as to achieve a family balance in relation to a population increase on a par with the rate of growth of the national economy. It also stressed the need for a family policy "through programs of suitable action whose goal is the establishment of birth control based on free choice and individual consent."

Consequently, the Fourth Party Congress recommended the allocation of human, material and financial means indispensable for the implementation of a national program to space births. Supporting the resolutions of the Central Committee of the FLN, the general report of the Five-Year Plan (1980-1984) emphasized that action to reduce the birth rate has become indispensable in order to improve the effectiveness of national development and endeavor in any consistent way to meet the social needs expressed in a lasting manner.

In cooperation with other national structures, the Office of Secretary of Social Affairs undertook to promote and implement a family planning program, to organize and control the rural exodus (every year, some 170,000 persons leave rural areas for good), and to take action aimed at a rational occupation of the national territory, accompanied by a distribution of socioeconomic and cultural activities.

The prime immediate concern now is to rectify the inadequate attention paid so far to the matter of population growth.

## Seven Children Per Family on the Average

No legislation spells out action spacing births except the Public Health Code. The latter views the spacing of births as a means of protecting the health of the mother and the child. Article 119 of the Public Health Code stipulates that the "national policy on birth control through contraception is based on a concern for protecting the health of the mother and the child, as well as the mental and social well-being of the family by providing them with all suitable means approved by the Ministry of Public Health with respect to medical and health care and education."

Article 120 of the same text states that "no coercion may be applied with respect to family planning" and that "no means contrary to legal provisions may be used without the knowledge of the couple."

Birth control is viewed as a matter of health protection and as the province of maternity and pediatrics clinics and other agencies such as health centers. This is clearly inadequate, given the means devoted to such action and the figures relating to it.

In 1980, some 280 maternity and pediatric centers and family planning centers were following the program put forth in 1974. They provided advice to 3.6 million women in 331 989 consultations, scarcely 10 percent, from 1974 to 1979 and prevented 250,000 pregnancies during that same period. This is a matter of the availability of services and of funding that must be reviewed, inasmuch as family planning is a question of health protection for both the mother and child. This is especially true because it concerns their physical and mental well-being, when it makes it possible to avoid exhausting and dangerous close pregnancies. When one realizes that at the age of 20, 56.6 percent of all women are married compared with 9.6 percent of all men; that the female population capable of bearing children makes up 21.8 percent of the population -- an important proportion given the fact that 46 percent of that same population (18,666,000 on 1 February 1980) is under the age of 15; that the overall rate of fertility is 201.2 per 1,000 in 1980; that most women have an estimated 7 children; that 60 percent of all births still take place in the home; Then family planning takes on its full significance as preventive action protecting both the mother and the child.

#### Ignorance Over Taboos

However, what one has here is far from a simple medical act. Basically linked to the social status of the woman to which it is addressed, it implies availability, accessibility, followup and understanding as to its usefulness and scope. However, contraception often runs up against ignorance, a lack of information. Information available is often distorted, surrounded by prejudice in a still traditional society enclosed in its restraints, while sexuality is often a taboo subject. Ignorance wins out over taboos with respect to contraception, especially when many women use archaic, risky, uncertain and dangerous contraceptive methods. This means that family planning can only be effective and lasting when it is well explained, understood, accepted and available at all times and in all places, even in the most remote corners of the country. Some 280 or 300 family planning clinics distributed unevenly cannot take the place for wide-ranging, long-term action.

A study on family planning made by the Algerian Association for Population and Social Research (AARDES) shows that in the period from 1966 to 1977, the average size of households rose from 5.9 to 6.6 persons. The survey also reveals that over 50 percent of the women living in cities covered by the study and 36 percent of rural women responded favorably to the principle of family planning. Although the men were more reserved, they showed no basic reticence.

#### Rational Use of Space and Economy

In 1980, the average woman had 7.3 children. Is it the access to family planning that is lacking? Has a moderation of previously positive attitudes taken place? Has there been an effect of the distribution of income resulting from development plans? These are questions to examine which do not point to any reduction in the birth rate.

Algeria's demography directly links notions of uncontrolled population growth and the birth rate. There are other factors involved, such as population

density -- that is, the area-population ratio. Five-sixths of the national territory is desert. The average population density is low: 50 inhabitants per square kilometers in 1980, compared with 41 in 1966. Another factor is the urban-to-rural population ratio. The urban population, amounting to 29 percent in 1966, rose to 42 percent in 1979, while 170,000 persons leave rural areas for the cities every year. For 1990, predictions on urban occupation are 60 percent. This urban concentration cannot fail to engender problems of all kinds, which everyone will experience in his own sphere.

A policy of family and population planning should therefore take into account and correct imbalances in the occupation of space. The coastal area is overpopulated at the expense of the back country. In order to achieve rational use of space and the economy, we must work toward the scattering of the population with accompanying facilities (infrastructure, jobs, services, housing, and so on). Internal migrations, intensive urbanization and the rural exodus: These are all problems which regional development must correct by ensuring, through the reorganization and redeployment of economic activities, equivalent living conditions and social programs throughout the different regions of the country.

#### **Urgent Needs**

Through the redistribution of the economy in order to achieve stabilization and a rational occupation of the territory, it will be necessary to look at the relative underpopulation of some regions, the upgrading of agricultural work, the origins of the rural exodus and the anarchic development of the large cities.

"By virtue of its scope, the demographic phenomenon is the essential factor based on which one must evaluate the objectives, content and value of the economic and social policies," emphasizes the general report of the Five-Year Plan (1980-1984). This is obvious when it is a matter of social needs stemming from the evolution of the population and its structure.

In 1978, 47.3 percent of the population was under 15 and 3 out of 5 Algerians are under the age of 20. Half of the population was born after independence and only 3.8 percent is 60 or over. If the rate of population growth remains as it is, the Algerian population will total 37 million by the year 2000, only 20 years away.

According to the annual report on execution of the National Plan for 1980, drafted by the Ministry of Planning and National Development, the population increased by only 581,000 during that year. The school-age population (from 6 to 13) represents one-fifth of the total population, while the active population makes up only 20 percent of the total population (1 woman for 100 men) and its increase was 3.8 percent.

The rapid increase in the population and its extreme youth constitute serious obstacles to areas such as health, education, professional training, housing, jobs and leisure. The number of households increased by 80,000 in 1980, going from 2,514,000 to some 2,593,000 from 1 January to 31 December 1980. This is an important indication of the new social needs, especially housing.



### Avoiding the Breakdown

In 1966-1978, out of over 400,000 housing units planned, 144,000 were built. The annual report on execution of the National Plan points out that in 1980, the public sector delivered 44,000 urban and rural housing units. Nevertheless, given the objectives assigned to the sector by the Five-Year Plan, these results remain inadequate for several reasons. With respect to other sectors, progress made is overshadowed by the demand, which is greater than possibilities of satisfying it. An example of this demand in an average perspective would be the year 2000. By that time, health services will have to handle 1.26 million births and in order to achieve the minimum standards set by the WHO, the existing infrastructure will have to be increased five times. During that same period, 9 million children will have to be educated -- and only for an average future. For the time being, the environment exerts an overwhelming influence on daily life and when one says "environment," one is really saying "population" and "demography."

Furthermore, the economic development to which our country aspires and which it is trying to achieve signifies and has as its objective the economic independence that would be expressed in social well-being, a way of life. And yet, with an ever growing demand, national production that cannot meet the needs, there will be distortions or even a breakdown.

It is that breakdown that must be avoided.

11,464

C80: 4519/53

## NEED FOR INDUSTRIAL MAINTENANCE EMPHASIZED

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 31 Oct 82 p 7

[Text] Current problems in the area of industrial equipment maintenance have posed the overall question of maintenance in Algeria.

A national maintenance policy is now being set up, based on three main principles: the organization of maintenance, the manufacture and supply of spare parts, and finally, personnel training and retraining.

Algeria's need to have a more rational and longer-term use of industrial equipment thus makes it essential to pay special attention to maintenance, more attention than in the industrialized capitalist countries, for example, where, because of obsolescence, equipment is replaced before it is actually unsuited for use. This has caused officials to reflect upon the definition of a maintenance policy and its organization at the unit, enterprise and national levels.

Officials have noted that at the unit level, most repairs of broken down equipment are performed by production departments or, at best, budding maintenance departments working without planning or any systematic methods or even records.

## Role Within the Enterprise

Production units are particularly lacking in personnel in charge of maintenance and skilled workers. They experience great difficulty in having a normal supply of spare parts.

Consequently, there must be some organization in order to provide every production unit with a maintenance department, whose organization and structure will depend upon the size of the unit. There must also be an office division whose essential mission will be to follow up on maintenance. The inspection of equipment and the planning of maintenance must be set up within these maintenance departments.

Within the enterprises, action must be undertaken and concerns: the definition of a company maintenance policy and its organization; interunit and interenterprise coordination, particularly with respect to spare parts, through

the establishment of a system of codification and standardization; the training and career plans of maintenance agents; the definition, execution and management of common maintenance means; provisions to be taken with respect to new equipment purchases so as to facilitate maintenance; and exchanges of experience and the dissemination of technical documentation.

### Maintenance and Technology

At the national level, it is recommended that there be created, within the ministries concerned by maintenance, central maintenance directorates whose essential duties will be the promotion, coordination, followup and supervision of maintenance activities in the sector considered. Regarding the Ministry of Light Industry, it will be the role of the directorate of maintenance and technology to: define a policy and organization of maintenance of industrial equipment within the sector and the establishment of programs and plans of action; the drafting and proposal of measures needed to carry out programs for the maintenance of production machinery in the sector and the development of the activity of producing spare parts and maintenance-related services; the study, planning and proposal of measures aimed at developing innovation and standardization for the promotion of the normalization of industrial property.

Finally, in a concern for improving the coordination of all action undertaken in each ministry in the field of ministry, a proposal has been made for the establishment of a standing interministerial committee responsible for maintenance and made up of representatives of all ministries.

### Manufacture and Supply of Spare Parts

The second main principle on which actions to develop maintenance must be based is the manufacture and supply of spare parts.

The extent of the need for spare parts requires the rapid implementation of a coherent, coordinated program of action aimed at meeting the immediate needs of the production units and at permitting the development of a capital goods industry. Officials in the Ministry of Heavy Industry emphasize that it is the task of national public operators and essentially the national companies to develop the manufacture of spare parts and national subcontracting. Within such a framework, the Ministry of Heavy Industry proposes to take the following steps:

To provide production units with their own means for the repair and replacement of spare parts. It is essentially a matter of universal machine tools (lathes, drilling machines, processors, and so on).

To set up regional maintenance means, alongside the large industrial complexes and under their responsibility, aimed at the replacement of equipment, the manufacture of spare parts and specific maintenance. Initially, these common maintenance means will be affiliated with the large complexes in order to take advantage of the organization of experience and the market offered by such complexes, before being set up as independent maintenance units under the Ministry of Heavy Industry.

To improve the distribution of standard spare parts. It is essentially a question of reexamining the list of monopolies that does not respond to the needs expressed by the national market due to the scope and diversity of products handled by a single structure. Second, it is a matter of choosing suppliers of spare parts, involving suppliers of standard parts in the availability of their products and their manufacture in Algeria in exchange for a supply contract covering several years.

To simplify import procedures is the final element.

#### Professional Training

The third main principle of the maintenance function is professional training and refresher courses for personnel in charge of maintenance. The Ministry of Heavy Industry believes that the difficulties encountered essentially stem from inadequate basic training, which forces enterprises to abnormally extend training period and results in the chronic instability of maintenance personnel. The Ministry thus proposes action essentially aimed at: continuing the effort to set up professional and technical training schools; to develop basic training in the methods and preparation of work; to spell out the status of instructors in enterprises, thus making it possible to use all available resources for continuous on-the-job training; to certify professional training in enterprises by a diploma recognized throughout the country; to lift procedural limitations on the national training program subcommittee through the effective application of provisions existing for all programs under six months; to upgrade the maintenance function and promote the accumulation of knowledge and experience; and to promote stability through the granting of seniority bonuses.

11,464

CSO: 4519/54



# DETAILS OF VIOLATIONS BY 'ISMAT AL-SADAT, FAMILY CITED

Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 25 Oct 82 p 3

[Article: "Surprises in 'Isamat al-Sadat's Case; He Restricted His Son's Residence to Mit Abu al-Kawn So That Son Might not Compete With Him in Imposing Protection Money on Investors; 'Isamat al-Sadat Recounts Story of His Disagreement With His Brother, Late President"]

[Text] The case of 'Isamat al-Sadat, the brother of the late leader Anwar al-Sadat, is expected to produce a number of major surprises. So far, the investigation tends to confirm that 'Isamat al-Sadat exploited a number of high-ranking state officials and extended his influence and control over them in his position as the late leader's brother. They helped him and offered him all the facilities he demanded for himself or for others on whose behalf he intervened.

Those officials then covered up for 'Isamat and did not dare to face the late president with the issue of those violations after they had learned that the president used to get extremely angry whenever he heard of his brother's violations and deviation. Those officials, who are now included in the current investigations, continued to help 'Isamat after they became certain that the president had refused to take firm steps against his brother, such as referring him to the courts or referring his violations for investigation, and that he was content with warning his brother, with issuing instructions banning his entry to the Alexandria Port, or the Port Said free zone or with denying him, and some of his sons, travel abroad.

AL-AHRAR has learned that Counselor 'Abd al-Qadir Ahmad 'Ali, the socialist public prosecutor, is conducting extensive investigations to uncover these officials, proceeding on the basis of the instructions of President Husni Mubarak that no one is above the law and that every man must be treated as an ordinary person before the law, regardless of his worth or might.

## 'Isamat Refuses

At the beginning, 'Isamat refused to report to the socialist public prosecutor's office for investigation and expressed his surprise at being summoned. However, he then agreed and went to find out the secret behind his being summoned.

At the socialist public prosecutor's office, 'Isamat al-Sadat realized that his being summoned was the final, not the first, step in issuance of the decision to impound his property.

Before the decision was taken, numerous complaints had been received by and had been examined and investigated by the socialist public prosecutor's office. Contacts were then made at the highest levels, considering that such a decision could harm or be used to harm the reputation of the late president. But clear instructions were received that every man be treated as an ordinary person before the law, according to his rights and his responsibilities, and that the proper decision be made in light of the investigations.

Thereupon, the Ministry of Interior began immediately preparing its reports on 'Iamat al-Badat in response to the request of the socialist public prosecutor. The ministry prepared a long list of violations attributed to 'Iamat al-Badat and his sons from 1974 until the present. The Ministry of Interior reports also listed a number of cases in which 'Iamat al-Badat had been accused but on which not a single sentence was issued, including the felony of embezzling 70,000 pounds of the funds of the Nile Bus Company in Suez. This felony was committed in 1966 but the trial did not start until 1974 and no decision has been issued yet. The reports also cite long lists detailing the property of 'Iamat al-Badat and his sons, property valued at tens of millions of pounds that have not been determined yet. This property is spread throughout the seven governorates of Cairo, al-Jinah, al-Minufiyah, Alexandria, al-Qharbiyah, al-Fayyum and Port Said.

#### Denial Followed by Silence

After gathering all the information, the socialist public prosecutor's office summoned 'Iamat al-Badat. He came and was interrogated throughout 2 full hours.

'Iamat denied everything attributed to him. But then in the face of the number of incidents cited, 'Iamat resorted to silence.

During the interrogation, 'Iamat al-Badat dealt with his relationship with President al-Badat, saying that his brother despised him, that he feared for his position because of him and that, therefore, he banned him ['Iamat] from visiting him and decided not to associate with him so that he may not be misunderstood. 'Iamat also said that the president used to send intermediaries to warn him against engaging in certain acts. 'Iamat al-Badat expressed his strong resentment over the conduct of his brother, the late president, toward him and toward his family.

Before 1300 last Tuesday, the interrogation ended and 'Iamat al-Badat left the office. At 1400, after details of the interrogation were presented to Counselor 'Abd al-Qadir Ahamd 'Ali, the socialist public prosecutor, a decision was taken to impound 'Iamat al-Badat's property. This decision was the last thing which would occur to 'Iamat al-Badat who kept repeating throughout the interrogation: "Of course, it is unthinkable that you will seize my property."

On the evening of the same day, 21 judiciary committees headed by the most brilliant counselors assisting the socialist prosecutor were moving into Egypt's governorates, carrying with them the Ministry of Interior reports, to look for the property of 'Iamat al-Badat, his 13 children and his 4 wives and to impound it. These measures came as a shock to 'Iamat and to his children.

On the following morning, some of the committees began to present their reports after having successfully completed their mission during the night and in all the governorates to which they had gone.

These committees were headed by counselors Mahmud al-Sharbini, Hilmi al-Najdi, Muhammad al-Shadhili, Ramadan Hasanayn and Sana' Khalil and were supervised by Counselor Husni 'Abd al-Hamid, the head of the Property Directorate, who had personally accompanied the heads of the committees.

Even though the late president had rescued his brother from one certain predicament which could have led to 'Isamat's destruction, 'Isamat mentioned his brother's name with a degree of bitterness. President al-Sadat had once been told that his brother had been involved in bringing in a drug shipment from abroad in 1978. The late president became extremely angry and ordered his brother arrested immediately and jailed. This decision remained in force for 6 weeks. But the president's family members intervened with the president to release 'Isamat. In the face of their insistence and persistence, the president agreed and released him, only to find 'Isamat resuming his previous activity.

Even though 'Isamat scaled down greatly the volume of his activity after the death of the late president, the reports pouring in against him motivated the socialist prosecutor to make a decision to act on them, either filing the complaints or completing the measures required. This--the measures--is what has taken place. Far from al-Sadat family, the investigations are now moving to uncover other officials who facilitated 'Isamat's deviation and covered up for him. There is a consensus of opinions that major surprises will be revealed in the coming days and that the socialist prosecutor has received assistance to carry on with the investigations to their end and made public the outcome step by step and supported by documents.

AL-AHRAR has learned that a number of citizens subscribing to Mit Abu al-Kawn Association, registered under No 1049 of 1979, recently submitted a complaint to al-Manahiyah police department in Alexandria against 'Isamat al-Sadat in his capacity as the chairman of the association's board of directors because they have not received the lots belonging to them in al-Sa'd City, located on kilometer 21 of al-'Ajami coast, Alexandria, even though they have paid the full value of the lots and even though they have contracts signed by 'Isamat al-Sadat personally.

#### Rug Exporting

The investigations have also shown that Jalal 'Isamat al-Sadat used his influence, purchasing a large volume of rugs from some suppliers at a low price amounting to 50 pounds per [square] meter whereas the price was 75 pounds. He then exported the rugs to the Soviet Union by way of the (Tabata) Company for the price of 120 Egyptian pounds per meter. The company is headquartered on "Adli Street, Cairo. The suppliers include a rug merchant by the name of Ahmad Zaki Sulayman and a rug factory owner named 'Abd al-Rahman Tal'at.

AL-AHRAR has further learned that Jalal 'Isamat is the distributor for (Miar Up) soft drink in al-Jamah District in accordance with a contract concluded between Tabata Company and the Nasr Carbonated Drinks and Food Preservation Company.

Last year, 'Isamat al-Sadat used his influence to win a pipes deal from al-Nasr Pipe Production Company at the official price and then sold the pipes on the black market at higher prices.

The socialist public prosecutor also has an important report presented to him on 11 October 1982. This report has been one of the immediate reasons behind the issuance of the decision to seize 'Isamat al-Sadat's property. The report lists the family's activity as follows:

International Maritime Shipping and Import Agencies Company--al Salam Agency--located on al-Suwayqah Street, across from the National Telecommunications Agency. The company has another branch on Zakariyah Ahmad Street in Cairo.

Represents of Danish, British, Italian and French shipping lines, in addition to dealing with a number of other Dutch, Italian and French lines.

They engage in large-scale goods clearance operations in Alexandria Governorate and have an office in the Port Authority complex in al-Mahmudiyah, Alexandria. This office's operations were stopped after President al-Sadat's death.

They collect cash money from shipping, unloading and transportation contractors in Alexandria Port and from the oil companies by competing in the advertised bid invitations and then by demanding that these winning the bids pay them money in return for their withdrawal from the bidding and for not competing with them.

What is interesting is that the report notes that Tal'at 'Isamat al-Sadat lives in Mit Abu al-Kawn village, having been banished there from Alexandria by his father, 'Isamat. He was competing with his father in illegal acts of favoritism in entering into commercial deals and in collecting protection from investors, exploiting his father's name without his father's knowledge.

#### **Salah Salim's Land**

The important report adds that the family property includes 4 Renault trailer trucks, each purchased from (Ghubur) Company for 105,000 pounds; 5 Savim trucks each purchased from Muhammad Rajab, for 145,000 pounds, contracting company which owns a number of cranes, a warehouse and a truck garage next to the (Santa) Company on al-'Ajami Road in Alexandria, lands next to Sidi Karir, with cranes, pile drivers, silos and gravel. This is in addition to the property and real estate checked by the committees formed by the socialist prosecutor's office and other property not checked on yet.

AL-AHRAR has learned that the socialist prosecutor's office has received several other reports from other persons.



Huda 'Abd al-Latif, Jalal 'Isamat al-Sadat's wife, leased a piece of land with an area of 3,000 square meters on Salah Salim Street in 'Ayn (al-Sirah) from Cairo Governorate and then ceded the land behind the governorate's back to Rif'at Su'udi, a car dealer from Bab al-Luq, for a certain sum of money.

When the governorate decided to terminate all the leases for this land and for other pieces of land on Salah Salim Street, the car dealer warned in the presence of witnesses from the governorate that he has receipts for the sums he had paid Jalal 'Isamat's wife in return for her ceding the land to him.

#### Involvement of Some Officials

The investigations have revealed that a large number of officials of the Ministry of Interior, of Alexandria Governorate, of the Ministry of Supply, of the Ministry of Economy and of the Ministry of Finance helped 'Isamat al-Sadat and his children in their activities. Nobody confronted 'Isamat and his children to put an end to their enormous violations or to investigate the reports submitted against them by a number of citizens who had demanded that the authorities concerned protect them from those activities. But those authorities turned a blind eye to the citizens' reports.

The investigation have further disclosed that 'Isamat al-Sadat and his sons sold damaged meats, poultry and vegetables to the Ministry of Supply, with the knowledge of the ministry's top officials. After al-Sadat's assassination, the ministry suddenly issued a decision terminating all deals with them.

The investigation has also disclosed that a number of 'Isamat al-Sadat's sons apprehended for security violations and referred to the police stations concerned. Investigations of those violations were suspended immediately and none of the violations were referred to the prosecution in accordance with the provisions of the law. The violations include a car accident as a result of which a citizen was seriously hurt and an assault by one of 'Isamat al-Sadat's sons against a number of security men who were interrogating him on one of his violations.

It is to be noted that Nabawi Isma'il, the ex-minister of interior, had issued a decision providing special guard to 'Isamat al-Sadat and his children. This guard consisted of nearly 250 men who continued to guard 'Isamat al-Sadat's family until the socialist public prosecutor's decision seizing their property was issued.

R494

CSO: 4504/53

MOTIVES OF SOVIET POLICY TOWARD KHOMEYNI REGIME STUDIED

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Nov 82 pp 69-71, 78-83

[Article by Rene Cagnat]

[Excerpts] The West, always more attentive to regions about which it receives better information, has forgotten Iran. It should, however, be following with interest what is happening in Tehran: the USSR is sitting pretty there. This is shown by Rene Cagnat, who heads the Group for Study and Research on Soviet Strategy (GERSS) of the Foundation for the Study of National Defense. Holder of a master's degree in Russian and graduate of the Political Studies Institute, he is completing a doctorate in the Sino-Soviet conflict and the peoples of continental Asia. He is the author, with Michel Jan, of "The Environment of Empires" (Laffont, 1981), which describes the fate of the Central Asiatic minorities, from Iran to Manchuria.

On 23 February 1981, Leonid Brezhnev in his report to the 26th Congress of the PC [Communist Party] of the USSR illustrated in qualified words the attitude--at once opportunistic and reserved--of the Soviet Union in Iran.

"The Iranian revolution, which has become an important phenomenon of international life in recent years, possesses a special character. In all of its complexity and its contradictions, it is fundamentally an anti-imperialist revolution, even though an internal and external reaction is doing its best to take that character away from it.

"The Iranian people is seeking its road to freedom and opening up. We sincerely wish it success in that area and we are prepared to develop good relations with Iran on an initial basis of equality and, obviously, reciprocity.

"The slogans of Islam are being spread in recent times in certain Eastern countries. We communists have a respectful attitude toward the religious beliefs of populations of the Islamic confession, as toward any other religion. What is important is to know what goals are being pursued by the forces claiming to represent any faith. A fight for liberation may be deployed under the banner of Islam. Historic experience, even the most recent, bears witness to this. But historic experience also reveals that beneath Islam's slogans a reaction is

operating which is stirring up counter-revolutionary uprisings. There follows the necessity to discern the real content of any movement."

Thus does Moscow affirm its sympathy with the Islamic revolution, but stressing meanwhile how great is the risk of seeing this "revolution" take an aberrant direction. This balanced position translates in the field to a truly Byzantine Soviet policy. Despite the developments in the Iran-Iraq war, the USSR is continuing its indirect support to Tehran. In fact it is providing, via the Volga, the Trans-Siberian and the Caspian Sea, transport for 30 to 50 percent of Iranian imports; this great increase in traffic to the North enables Iran to have a nearly normal flow of supplies, despite the quasi-closing of the Persian Gulf. Moreover, the Kremlin is suggesting that the Tudeh Communist Party maintain absolute loyalty to Khomeyni, whatever snubs they receive in return.

But should we be surprised? Moscow, at the same time, is supporting Iraq, a signatory in 1972 of a friendship and cooperation treaty with the USSR, tied to CAEM [COMECON] and above all a pivot toward the Emirates and the nonaligned countries. The partial embargo on deliveries of Soviet arms only lasted from September 1980 to July 1981. Since then Baghdad has been receiving various supplies at the rate of about 300 tons per day, via Syria at first and now via Jordan and Kuwait.

The Kremlin is being very careful not to make a choice between Iraq, which was formerly somewhat under the USSR sphere of influence, and Iran, which is so fiercely anti-American. By quietly giving pledges to both belligerents, that is to say by keeping "two irons in the fire," it is preserving its assets come what may, and by making careful use of ways of applying pressure on each camp, it is preparing for the future.

What does the USSR intend to safeguard or obtain in Iran in this way? What means is it using? The historic approach will reveal a continuing process in which the revolutionary initiatives of the communists or Persian minorities will become entangled with the classic action, from state to state, of the Soviet Union, which is sometimes extremely pressing.

#### The Policy Adopted Toward the Islamic Republic

The defiant attitude is evident against an anticommunist theocratic government, the center of instability at its borders, which had the effrontery to ask that a consulate be opened in Douchanbe and Iranian cultural centers in Tashkent and Ashkhabad, and which maintains special radio broadcasts beamed to Central Asia. Moreover, in June 1982 the Islamic Republic refused to participate at Geneva in the conversations proposed by Moscow, between Pakistan, Iran and the new Afghan Democratic Republic. It also revealed itself to be insensitive to representations by the Kremlin, which considers that the Gulf war serves "imperialistic interests" and which voted on 16 July 1982 for the Security Council resolution demanding that the fighting come to an end. Finally, the Iranian government on several occasions denounced the 1921 treaty--only verbally, however.

However, the Soviet Union is fully aware of the advantage it derives from Khomeyni's anti-Americanism. It is pleased with a whole series of "positive" decisions taken by the Imam:

- the end of the "gendarme of the Gulf" role that formerly devolved upon Iran;
- the withdrawal from CENTO [Central Treaty Organization];
- the policy of independence and nonalignment;
- the break with Israel and South Africa;
- the direct support to the Palestinians;
- the rejection of agreements with the oil consortium, etc.

In the face of such "gifts," the Ayatollahs' hostility toward the second "Great Satan" and the curb periodically applied by Iran to economic cooperation with the USSR count for little. So the Kremlin is not using this malevolence as a pretext for measuring out to Khomeyni support that in the event is taking on an unsuspected magnitude. At the very most it contents itself with scrupulously toning it down, as if it did not want to alert Tehran to the real level of its influence. As a matter of fact, Moscow from now on will not lack for means of applying pressure on the Islamic government.

"The inside route" (the Caspian Sea, railroads and roads out of the Soviet Union) constitutes the jugular vein of the Persian economy as long as the unavailability of the Chatt El Arab persists. It would enable the USSR to modulate a suppression of Iran, if the latter were too hostile toward the USSR.

"Oblique" aid from allies of the Soviet Union such as Syria and Libya can also be meted out, while making it possible for the Politburo to assist the Islamic Republic without making a public display of being in its camp; the two-irons-in-the-fire policy depends on this.

The KGB's technical support of the army and above all of the Savama (Savak in its new form) provides the windfall of an interference with the interest of the state--a windfall that is potentially exploitable.

The Soviet refusal to intensify the deteriorating situation among the minorities over which Moscow and its henchmen exert some influence (the Kurds, the Azerbaijani and, to a lesser degree, the Arabs, Turkomans and Baluchis) is accompanied, by way of a warning, by very localized "Marxist" subversive activities--in Baluchi country in Khuzistan and in Ghilan, for example.

But the key element in this very subtle Soviet policy is still the Tudeh Party, whose loyal support of Khomeyni has proved very useful.

It would seem that Moscow wanted to take advantage of the tension in Iran to strengthen a Communist Party that was especially safe, but which was no longer anything more than the shadow of the large organization it had been just before the war. Even while displaying the greatest submissiveness to the Imam, Mr Kianouri is quite obviously hoping to rally to his own side the malcontents, the opportunists, as well as certain Islamic or anti-American elements. He is also hoping to take advantage of the frequent purges in the state apparatus to infiltrate his partisans almost everywhere. To that end, he has at his



disposal in the Tudeh ranks personnel of superior quality, a good part of whom are now serving with distinction in the administration if not in the government. Even the Shi'ite clergy is not exempt from this penetration: as long ago as the 1960's the Tudeh, in peace conferences, was using the services of a mullah who was called the "red mullah;" today it is a mullah deputy to the Majlis, Khoeghina, who is attracting attention through his pro-communist sympathies. To tell the truth, the Iranian Communist Party's membership in the pro-revolutionary alliance has disarmed some prejudices and, despite anti-communism's violent accession to power, has given the Tudeh a new audience. The longer the current instability lingers and deepens, the more this "responsible" party will be able to tackle Khomeyni's succession with serious chances for success.

Thus the Soviet Union, inside Iran, seems to be playing the Tudeh's game, adopting toward the Islamic Republic a patient and wise attitude, like its previous attitude toward the Shah.

And as in the Shah's time, this policy confers on the USSR a certain margin for maneuvering in Tehran; thus the Islamic government, undoubtedly aware of the risks of subversion it is running with regard to the USSR, gives only rather symbolic support to the Afghan insurgents. For example, it refused to allow the installation in its territory of radios intended to support the insurrection in indigenous languages. In any case, it is seeing to it that Iran does not serve as a rear base for the revolt. It is finally beginning to tolerate the building in Baluchistan, on the Iran-Afghan border, of a Soviet listening post; this post, which was constructed on Kohemaleksia Mountain, 400 km from the Indian Ocean and 700 km from Saudi Arabia, is the first sign that the USSR is utilizing strategically important Baluchistan.

Eventually, the Soviet Union--this is the most probable hypothesis--should continue its discreet and uncompromising support for the Islamic government, consisting of providing reinforcement of the Tudeh party even while enabling it to change direction later. The perpetuation of the excesses of those who are called in Moscow--and elsewhere--"religious fanatics" makes it possible in this way for the USSR to discredit throughout the world--and at home--a religious activism that is extremely resistant to its influence.

Whatever hypotheses are envisaged, /the least plausible reaction is a military intervention in Iran by the USSR/ [in italics]. The "Afghan trap" experience must be extremely dissuasive on that subject. Occupation could only be produced for a very serious reason, such as "Western army intervention on Iran's soil" or "destabilization of the Soviet Muslim republics" originating in that country. There is no doubt that the Kremlin would then invoke Art VI of the 1921 treaty, which in the eyes of the USSR is still valid, to have its troops cross the Iranian borders to the north and east. But this would take place according to the gradation imposed by Art VI, that is to say in the very last extremity. The USSR in any case is carefully using so many means of effective pressure in Iran that a massive recourse on its part to armed force looks superfluous, even in support of a Tudeh come into power. On the other hand, a discreet intervention by special troops is conceivable.

One barely imaginable hypothesis involves a repercussion of the Islamic revolution in Soviet Muslim countries, most likely in Azerbaijan; certainly after that happened the USSR would cease all support of the Islamic revolution, and would bring into play against it all of its capability for subversion and pressure.

One last possibility, not to be ruled out, is civil war in Iran. In that case the USSR would use to the maximum its communist or regional assets. If these proved inadequate, it might very quickly support those parties having affinities, even remote ones, with the Marxists, particularly the majority Fedayans, who are quite close to the Tudeh and have the advantage of an armed militia, which the Communists still lack. In any case, a victory by "reactionary" forces would give the USSR, in the strictest continuity of its political line in Iran (or elsewhere), the opportunity to prove its realism once more, and to collaborate with the new regime by sacrificing the Tudeh if necessary.

In this civil war the USSR would model its intervention on the intervention /it would imitate/ [in italics] to Western forces. "It must be clear," declared Brezhnev, "that any interference and all the more reason--military interference in the affairs of Iran--a state in contact with the Soviet Union--would be considered by the USSR an attack on its own security." Its intervention might well then resemble a military action of intimidation, in Iran or elsewhere. But once more, all the political or subversive levers would be brought into play before it would resort to such an extreme measure.

From the Caucasus to Afghanistan, therefore, the Soviet noose is being put in place and is already in a position to make use of any internal division, with help from the Tudeh. But the USSR is not in a hurry: it will close the trap only when /the balance of power is regionally favorable/ [in italics]--tomorrow or ten years from now, perhaps.

The process that the Kremlin is persuaded leads to victory over capitalism is made up of waiting, of deteriorating situations, of unexpected offensives, of retreats and counter attacks, using insofar as possible every oblique alliance and method.

In Iran, once again waiting predominates, less in the context of a preparation which is being given a new test by the political and social crisis. Even as it tries to organize maximum cooperation, the Kremlin is watching and waiting for the opportunity that the Ayatollahs' regime may well furnish. The USSR, then, by means of the internal support it has been able to create, can recover discreetly, or if that is impossible, cause the religious power to be beaten; the regional power struggle and analysis of the international repercussions of the action envisaged will dictate its choice. Whatever the choice, the Soviet breakthrough promises to be formidable, from a country whose geostrategic value and energy are incomparable today.

8946

CSO: 4619/6

# NEW MARINE FORCES TO COMBAT SMUGGLERS, REBELS

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 31 Oct 82 p 15

[Interview with Rafiqdust, member of Supreme Council of Revolution Guards Corps, Bushahr; date not specified]

[Text] Bushahr: The marine forces of the Revolution Guards Corps are formed to take responsibility for combatting anti-revolutionaries, smugglers and to protect the Islamic Republic within the territorial waters of our country.

Rafiqdust, member of the Supreme Council of Revolution Guards Corps, entered Bushahr for the purpose of inspecting the ninth region corps and to become acquainted with the war supplies problem of the region.

After he attended the mourning ceremonies for Hoseyn Ben 'Ali 'Allah Al-Salam, he gave an interview, among the people of Bushahr, with the reporter of the central news unit. After the announcement of the formation of the marine forces unit of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, he said: "The purpose of the formation of these forces is to guard the Islamic Republic and to combat the anti-revolutionaries and the smugglers along with the brothers of the naval force and the army of the Islamic Republic of Iran."

He expressed the hope that with the formation of these forces, the revolutionary corps will be able to be present and will be active in the territorial waters of our country. In regard to the purpose of the establishment of the ministry of corps, Rafiqdust said: "The purpose of the corps ministry is to establish contact between the guard corps, Majlis, and government and better mobilization of the corps in view of supplies, supervision and complete execution of the laws and observance of the Islamic orders in the corps units."

In regard to the present possibilities of the army supplies in the war front, he referred to the generous and abundant help of our martyr raising nation during the imposed war and said: "In the history of world wars, such tremendous support from a nation towards their fighters has not been seen, and this matter is based on the rightfulness and genuineness of our Islamic revolution."

He added: "In the beginning of this undesired and imposed war, we did not have plenty of supplies, and most of them were furnished by our heroic nation. The brave Islamic fighters are fighting in the war fronts against the aggressor enemy, bravely and generously and have drawn blood from the enemy. Therefore, we could claim that now our war supply capacity is ten times more than the beginning of the war and we see now that we are able to continue the war for many months and years."

At the conclusion, he referred to the formation of two complete armoured divisions and one complete artillery division by the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps from the war loot of the defeated army of Saddam. In regard to the future of war he said: "As the supreme council of defense has announced, we are determined in the war fronts to fight until complete victory over the aggressor Ba'hist army, until the fall of the infidel Saddam and the installation of an Islamic Republic in Iraq, which will be chosen by the Muslim and oppressed people of Iraq."

9815

CSO: 4640/35



# GENDARMERIE GETS MORE FORCES FOR EASTERN AREAS

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 23 Oct 82 p 2

[Interview with Col Ali Kuchekzadeh, commander of IRI Gendarmerie; Zahedan Semanal; date not specified]

[Text] Zahedan: Colonel 'Ali Kuchekzadeh, commander of the Islamic Republic Gendarmerie, accompanied by the commander of the regional gendarmerie of the country and the responsible authorities for the political and ideological sections of these areas, participated in a five-day seminar in Zahedan. At the conclusion of the seminar, he talked about the results in a special interview with the reporter of the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC NEWS AGENCY.

First, about the purpose of this seminar, he said: "The main purpose of this seminar was to study training questions along two lines, ideological and military. With regard to our needs in the ideological line, the responsible brothers in the political and ideological divisions have made tremendous efforts, but with the expansion of activities of the gendarmerie, whatever efforts we make are not enough. Main changes are needed to establish a series of gendarmerie stations."

He added: "With regard to the military, we have to prepare our brother soldiers to show them how to fight in the war front against world blasphemy, both in internal fronts and foreign fronts, considering the possibilities at their disposal to fulfill their duties."

He added: "The other purpose of this seminar was to discuss various activities. Regarding the war, we have fought with unparalleled unity with other armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Kurdistan and other regions to confront the enemy and antirevolutionaries. We have been able with God's help to crush Islam's and the Islamic Republic's enemies on both internal and foreign fronts. It was agreed that priority must be given to the deprived areas like Sistan and Baluchistan and other areas that face the enemy. They will be provided with human forces, arms and logistic support. We hope to be able to take effective measures in this regard."

He added: "The other purpose was our personal structure which is needed in order to spread the message and genuine culture of the Islamic revolution to the gendarmerie stations. It was agreed with the help of our responsible brothers in political and ideological sections to prepare the young forces, especially in the training centers. In this regard, with God's will, the changes will take place with the proper basis, applicable to the aims of the Islamic Republic."

He added: "In this seminar, by studying the results of the previous seminar this year, it was seen that after three months of executing these programs, good results have been obtained. Among them, we were able during this time to activate the anti-smuggling campaign teams. About the questions of ideology, it was agreed each month that one hundred soldiers be trained and dispatched to various posts. At present, in Baluchestan and Nistan Province, this program is implemented and it is agreed that this program will be carried out throughout the country."

Colonel Kuchakzadeh, the commander of the Islamic Republic Gendarmerie, about the formation of the border forces told the reporter of the Islamic Republic news agency: "In this regard, the first effective steps have been taken and up to now, nine border forces have been formed in the eastern areas of the country. We must take effective measures with respect to ideology, personnel, supplies and logistics in relation to the border forces. We hope that these forces will be able to be an effective factor for the protection of the Islamic land. We hope to act in a way that no aggressor power will ever attempt aggression against our Islamic lands."

9815

CS01 4640/35

## RAILROAD NETWORK IN SOUTHEAST TO BE EXPANDED

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 1 Nov 82 p 19

[Interview with Brother Eskandar, director general of the Southeastern Railroad Network; date and place not specified]

[Text] Yazd--During the next five years railroad construction activities will be completed on the 670-kilometer Bandar 'Abbas--Bafq line and 550-kilometer Kerman--Zahedan Line and these lines will be ready to use. While announcing this in an interview with a correspondent from the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC NEWS AGENCY, Brother Eskandar, director general of the Southeastern Railroad Network, said: Plans for expanding railroads existed in the past, but little heed was paid to them. After the triumph of the splendid Islamic revolution, in view of the economic sanctions, and following that, the imposed war and the super-powers' plots, the Islamic Republic decided to expand railroad service in the Southeastern area. Work has been begun by railroad contractors for building roadbeds for several sections of the Bafq--Bandar Abbas line which will go through the cities of Sirjan--Rafsanjan and Gol Gohar on its way to Bandar 'Abbas. The work of planning a line from Kerman to Zahedan which will go through Bam has been completed and staking is now beginning. Its various sections will soon be turned over to contractors. With regard to the self-sufficiency of the Southeastern railroads, he said: Steps have been taken with respect to this matter, and some machine parts are now being made, but in the main railroad factory in Tehran repairs are being done on diesels, cars, and engines, and we have succeeded in making cylinders, rings, and many other parts with the resources at hand which meet the desired specifications on the basis of comparisons with foreign samples. He said concerning this region's railroad earnings: In comparison with the years prior to the revolution the monthly earnings of the southeastern railroads have increased four or five times over and railroad tariff revisions and an increase in the amount of goods being hauled in the south are playing a major role in this. Railroad earnings during 1981-1982 were 1,798,664,265 rials, which is a significant increase over the earnings in this area during 1978-1979 which were 515,461,205 rials.

This area's earnings also increased by 80 percent over the period of 1980-1981. Currently a monthly average of 150,000 tons of cargo such as wheat, meat, iron products, "Clinger" products and chemical fertilizer are being hauled in this area. Concerning passenger facilities, Brother Eskandar said: Since the transport of goods has priority now we mostly use freight trains.

However passenger trains are available three days a week. With regard to facilities, previously first-class deluxe coaches and second-class ordinary coaches were used on this line, but because of disrepair at the present time the best coaches in the railroad service are being used, which are the first-class express sleeping cars and the second-class express cars, with the best conveniences.

Concerning the role of the railroad in the imposed war and this region's accomplishments in the reconstruction of the Ahvaz-Khorramshahr line, the director general of the Southeastern Railroad Network said: In these times the railroad is like a military unit in the field. The most important issue since the victory of the revolution for the railroads of the Islamic Republic is the reconstruction of the Ahvaz-Khorramshahr line along its entire length of approximately 100 kilometers, which was totally destroyed at the hands of Saddam's mercenaries. At the outset this line was built in a year by foreign contractors, but this was done in a period of three months and a few days through the efforts of the brothers of the railroad. We must add that eight kilometers of the Ahvaz-Khorramshahr line and also 17 residential units at the Khorramshahr station were built by workers from this area.

9310

0801 4640/38



## SCHIFF VIEWS U.S. PERCEPTION OF ISRAELI STRENGTH

TA101623 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ In Hebrew 10 Nov 82 p 7

[Commentary from Washington by Ze'ev Schiff: "The Balance of Power in the Wake of the War"]

[Text] The results of the war in Lebanon did not surprise the Pentagon militarily. At most, U.S. military experts are willing to say that they were surprised by the "clean" Israeli show, without any losses, in the dogfights and the attacks on Syrian missiles. According to them, the results of the war had been predicted, considering the IDF's vast deployment and the sophisticated U.S. weapons at Israel's disposal, and the scope of the forces used in Lebanon. The military results of the war have now, and will probably also have in the future, certain implications on the political-security relationship between the two countries. We would be well-advised to be ready for the argument that will yet come up on this issue.

One of the claims already being heard in Washington is that, militarily the Arabs are weaker than it seems and certainly weaker than Israel has always claimed when expressing its concern to the Americans, either when asking to purchase additional sophisticated weapons systems or when it objected to U.S. arms deals with the Arabs. There have always been arguments on this issue between Israel and Washington. An outstanding example is when Israel asked that the armies of various Arab countries that are not direct confrontation states should be taken into account in calculating the balance of power between Israel and the Arab states; or when Israel objected to the sale of the AWACS and other equipment to Saudi Arabia, or to the sale of aircraft and modern missiles to Jordan.

Now that Israel has been overproudly flexing its military muscle, it should not be surprised that this sometimes boomerangs. Even those U.S. experts who agree that at times the IDF had difficulties in completing its missions in Lebanon, also think that given the current situation in the Arab world, Israel is at present and in the foreseeable future not facing a worrisome military problem. Egypt honors the peace treaty with Israel, Syria is completely isolated, and Jordan will refrain from joining any fighting coalition against Israel. The Iraqis, whose increasing military potential Israel held in high regard, have shown low military efficiency. According to this conception, even if the war in the Persian Gulf ends, Israel should not worry about the

amount of weapons possessed by the Iraqis since it has become clear that their army has difficulties in using them properly.

In other words, the formula whereby the quantity of weapons in the hands of the Arabs ultimately turns into quality has somewhat lost its value in the eyes of the Americans in the wake of the war in Lebanon, and given the way we chose to present the IDF as the army of a rising superpower. This is the price we might pay in exchange for the deterrent power we attained in this war.

The U.S. experts believe that in the present situation the IDF may defeat any military coalition of the Arabs. This view ranges from the assessment that Israel can defend itself in the various difficult military situations that might emerge in the foreseeable future, and the assessment of a military expert that the IDF can in the next 5 to 7 years defeat an inter-Arab military coalition that would also include the Egyptian Army if Egypt violates the peace treaty. Attention should be paid to the Egyptian element in the question of the balance of power. While the U.S. experts currently regard the Egyptian Air Force as undergoing a construction and rehabilitation process, they believe that within 5 to 7 years it will be a strong and advanced force, thanks to the modern U.S. equipment it is receiving. According to them, if the Israeli Air Force is at present capable of successfully competing with all the Arab air forces, then this will be far more difficult in the future due to the progress to be made by the Egyptian Air Force.

Several conclusions may be derived from the way Americans now see this military balance and some of them are being felt already today. There are U.S. officials who claim that because of Israel's outstanding military advantage, the current period is the best suited for political arrangements. Due to the Israeli military advantage, there will probably be some Arab leaders willing to reconcile themselves with Israel's existence, who will refrain from drawing up offensive plans against it. It is my impression that this conclusion is not just aimed at Israel. Time and again, Washington takes pains to demonstrate this to the Arab countries, albeit the other way round. In other words, it underscores the threat posed by a strong and unpredictable Israel to persuade the Arabs that it would be better for them to strive to reach an arrangement with it under the aegis of the United States, and thus attain achievements which they cannot accomplish militarily or through pressure.

Another conclusion may be drawn from the way the balance of power is seen today. As far as the U.S. experts are concerned, the military significance of the results of the war is that Israel is sufficiently strong today. However, there are those who already claim that Israel is too strong, far beyond the requirements of its security needs. The answer to the question about whether the U.S. administration will regard Israel sufficiently or too strong, largely depends on the willingness of the Israeli Government to coordinate its positions with Washington, both on the Lebanese issue in the immediate future and on President Reagan's peace initiative in the following stage. The more we appear to be digging in our heels to the U.S. administration, the more the claim will gain ground that Israel is entrenching its positions because it was overly strengthened by the United States.

If we do get to such a situation, it is doubtful that the U.S. reaction to a "too strong Israel" would be undermining arms supplies to Israel. It is more likely that the reaction will be in the economic sphere, or in unwillingness to allow Israel to expand its self-capacity to produce advanced weapons systems-- a move which also carries strong economic aspects.

Another important conclusion refers to new U.S. arms deals with the Arab states. Israel's military superiority, as displayed for everybody to see by the IDF and the utterances of its leaders, provides the U.S. administration with an opening to carry out such arms deals with less internal opposition than in the past. Israel's claims in the past that a U.S. arms deal with an Arab state would endanger Israel's security will be greeted with far more skepticism now. Israel, currently seen as strong or perhaps too strong, cannot easily convince people that a few more modern aircraft or surface-to-air missiles in the hands of the Arabs would endanger its existence.

This is not an abstract possibility. On the agenda now is the possibility of a new U.S. package deal with Israel and an Arab state. Just as such a deal was made in the past through the sale of F-15's and F-16's to Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel so a new arms deal is currently feasible: Announcing the sale of F-16's to Jordan once the sale of F-16's to Israel, which was formally put off due to the war in Lebanon, is finally approved. Such a package deal can certainly have another character and instead of selling F-16's, the U.S. administration may approve the sale of mobile hawk missile batteries to Jordan. It will then be explained that simultaneously with the sale of additional F-16's to Israel, Jordan's air defense ability must be strengthened by modern hawk missiles.

All signs indicate that the U.S. administration is currently engaged in an argument over the new arms deal with Jordan. The question is not whether to sell additional modern weapons to Jordan, but when this deal should be carried out. This time, those favoring the deal are not particularly worried by Israel's objection. Since the status of Israel has declined both in U.S. public opinion and in Congress, those supporting the deal believe that they will overcome Israel's opposition. The question is whether to sign the deal with Husayn before he has made another move in the peace process. The deal's detractors demand that King Husayn take a more significant step in acceding to Reagan's peace initiative. Those favoring an earlier deal, particularly in the Pentagon, regard this deal as a means to seduce and encourage Husayn. They claim that Husayn has in effect joined the peace initiative through the very fact that he did not reject President Reagan's initiative and the things he told PLO leader Yawir 'Arafat.

This argument has not yet been settled and proof of this can be found in the interest revealed by the Jordanian foreign minister during his visit in Washington on the question of whether the time was due to renew the Jordanian request for F-16's and mobile hawk missiles. His friends in Washington advised him that he should hold on for the time being, on the assumption that conditions favorable to Jordan will ultimately ripen.

ISRAEL

RABIN ON LEBANON, SETTLEMENT FREEZE, REAGAN PLAN

TA101726 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1410 GMT 10 Nov 82

[Interview with Mk Yitzhaq Rabin on news conference program by Yitzhaq Golan, Razi Barqay and Yosef Harif--live in Jerusalem studio]

[Excerpts] [Question] When the Lebanese war broke out, you had three noes because of which you said that you would not recommend starting out on that campaign. One of those noes was not to go to war in order to bring about [peace] in Lebanon. Apparently nobody listened to your advice and today we are in Lebanon, and quite deep into it, and one of the goals that the government has adopted for itself has been a new order in Lebanon. Are we not taking the risk of complications such that, let us say, we will even be accused of responsibility for what is happening to the Druze?

[Answer] I do not, for the moment, want to go into that basic argument about what the IDF's mission is and what limitations Israel has in using its military force in order to obtain political solutions solely through the IDF. I would like to hope that the government has learned a lesson and, at least with regard to one issue, it seems to me that the argument has come to an end and the objectives have been--and I am phrasing this nicely--scaled down.

[Question] At least cautiously.

[Answer] That is, signing a peace treaty is no longer a goal as a condition for the IDF forces' withdrawal. According to the press, and I cannot say that I have received full reports as I should have by virtue of my position in the Knesset, there is still a political goal; that is, normalization of relations. It appears to me that today the government ought to set two goals, and only two goals, as a condition for the IDF's withdrawal from Lebanon: The first goal is the security issue: That is, an effective, efficient guarantee that terrorists will not return to the 40-50 km area. The second thing, the second goal, is a parallel withdrawal, and I am not going into a timetable for the moment, by the other foreign forces, that is the PLO and the Syrians, from all of Lebanon. I think that any attempt to keep the IDF in Lebanon or objectives that go beyond these two goals would be an error, and would prolong the negotiations, with all the complications this would involve, over our military presence in Lebanon. I think that in the area under IDF control, Israel in any case bears responsibility for everything that will or will not happen, and so I accept



the fact that the IDF does have to be involved in stopping clashes between Christians and Druze in those villages or hills where this has occurred, just as I think that, to the same extent, the IDF does have to be involved, or the state of Israel has to be involved, in guaranteeing suitable rehabilitation for the refugees in the camps. As soon as the IDF is present in the field and controls it, the responsibility for what does or does not happen there falls on Israel. I would therefore want the negotiations to be speeded up, and that less time be spent on procedural matters, who participates, who does not participate, just where they are conducted. It is enough as long as they are tripartite negotiations among the representatives of the governments of Israel, Lebanon and the United States and their goals are those I have described: To guarantee the first, main goal of the peace for Galilee campaign as it began--security for the settlements and a parallel evacuation of all foreign forces.

[Question] Mr Rabin, Prime Minister Menahem Begin is going to the United States at the end of this week, tomorrow morning, and as we have learned, he will hear from President Reagan of a demand [derisha] to freeze the settlements. If you were prime minister, would you accept such a U.S. demand today?

[Answer] I would not accept such a demand. As prime minister, I never accepted it. On the contrary, I also had a certain experience on this. At a certain stage during my period in office as prime minister, it was after the UN General Assembly defined Zionism as a racist movement, the government decided upon the establishment of five new settlements in the Golan Heights. A message from President Ford was sent to me through the U.S. ambassador to Israel, Malcolm Toon. The message contained a section in which Israel, and I as prime minister, were asked to stop all settlements. Since the meeting was *tete-a-tete*, I informed the ambassador that if he insisted on this, that the message should be given to me in full; that was on Friday. I would bring it to the cabinet session and I would recommend answering President Ford in the negative. Therefore I advised him to reapply to Washington and ask for that section to be erased. The ambassador was surprised by my appeal, that is, he said that it was inconceivable that a U.S. president should change something he had sent in an official message. I am telling you about this in order to say that I am opposed to a unilateral freeze of settlements. There are all the arguments between the Alignment and the government about where to settle, but not about the right to settle.

[Question] Would you also be against what was at least published, what Ambassador Arens recommended, that this should be a temporary freeze?

[Answer] Without referring to what Ambassador Arens suggested or not, this belongs more to how I see the peace process being restarted, and because I am convinced that without Jordan's participation in the peace process on the basis of the Camp David agreements, the chances for the process to continue are almost nil. I would announce today that if Jordan joins the talks and the talks are begun, I would be prepared for a freeze on establishing new settlements for 4 to 6 months. I would not say for the duration of the talks, because such talks could last for a very long time; but as one of the components permitting King Husayn to join the talks, he has to overcome the UN resolution that prevents him from joining. He must take upon himself the risk of isolation

in the Arab world and a clash with the PLO. And, since I prefer him to the PLO as someone with whom to talk about peace--I do not see anyone else with whom to talk, other than Husayn, in everything involving peace on our eastern border--I think that it is in Israel's interest to help him, though not at any cost, since we also have a precedent for this. After the Camp David agreements, in principle, the government of Israel agreed to a freeze, for a defined period of time, on the establishment of new settlements. Therefore there is no reason not to make an announcement about this in advance, that if Husayn joins, we are prepared to freeze the establishment of new settlements for 6 months and, during the negotiations, we will reexamine this as the end of the 6 months approaches.

[Question] Mr Rabin, we have discussed how to bring Husayn to the Camp David talks [as received] and you are very much a supporter of that process. Do you regard the Reagan plan as having any chance of bringing Husayn in?

[Answer] As soon as the Americans said that what is called the Reagan plan is not a substitute for the Camp David agreements, its acceptance is not a condition for a resumption of the talks. The plan's position is the U.S. view which, by the way, is no different from at least what I have heard from four previous U.S. presidents, the basic U.S. positions, and if it remains as the U.S. position and in the end, in its wake, Husayn joins the peace process. [As heard] I disagree with and oppose various components of this plan, but it is worth remembering that it has several most important things in it that not a single country in the world accepts, other than Israel. First, nonsupport for the establishment of a Palestinian state; nonsupport for granting the Palestinians the right to self-determination, because Reagan himself says that in the concepts of the Middle East, the significance of this would be to lead to a Palestinian state. There is also the continuation of the U.S. stand--about which, even in Israel, I can find all sorts of elements who are prepared to be softer than this toward the PLO--that as long as the PLO does not recognize Israel's right to exist and does not accept UN resolutions 242 and 338, the United States will not recognize it and will not conduct negotiations with it. All of these are tailored to isolate the PLO and to bring Husayn into the negotiations, or to lead the PLO to the fact that it will have no alternative and will recognize or give a green light to Husayn to join in.

CSO: 4400/98

## PENTAGON SAID OPPOSING COOPERATION ON LAVI

TA111356 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 11 Nov 82 pp 1-2

["Exclusive" report from Washington by U.S. correspondent Yosef Pri'el]

[Text] The view that the Israeli "Lavi" aircraft project is not lucrative for the United States is slowly being consolidated in the U.S. Defense Department. Hence the department finds that there is no room for U.S. aid in planning the aircraft, or for cooperation with U.S. firms in manufacturing it.

Senior Pentagon officials examining the project told me that they cannot support the idea of U.S. funds providing employment in Israel while precluding jobs in the United States. "It would be more worthwhile to sell Israel ready-made aircraft than to enter into the expensive 'Lavi' adventure with it," the officials said. In reaction to these remarks, officials in the Israeli Embassy in Washington and in the Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) confirmed that "the Lavi project is stuck," as they called it, and that the final decision now lies with the highest political echelon.

The planned visit of the air force's "Lavi" project head, Maj Gen 'Amon Lapidot (who will be the next commander of the air force), has been postponed week after week, as has the visit of the deputy director general of the IAI, Mikha'el Na'aman, who is the IAI project head.

The Pentagon sources with whom I spoke said that one of the main reasons Israel gave in its attempts to promote the production of the Lavi in Israel was that this would prevent the brain drain of aircraft engineers from Israel. "Is that a reason for the American taxpayer to pay money?" the officials queried.

The Pentagon officials disclosed that there are sharp differences of opinion between Israel and the United States over the cost of the research and development for the Lavi aircraft. While the IAI and Defense Ministry predict a cost of \$1.25 billion, Defense Department experts believe the cost will actually be double that amount: \$2.5 billion. In their opinion, this is such a huge amount that Israel would not be able to sustain it, which is why they believe it is not at all beneficial to start drowning in it, as they put it.

They also revealed that during Defense Minister Ari'el Sharon's latest visit to Washington, he asked his U.S. counterpart, Caspar Weinberger, to have the United States immediately transfer to Israel an initial sum of about \$150 million to finance the planning of the Lavi in Israel. The United States rejected the request and has so far avoided transferring any money to Israel for that project.

The Pentagon officials also added that Israel predicts the manufacture of 400 "Lavi" aircraft by the IAI for the Israeli Air Force. Beyond that, Israel intends to produce aircraft for export to various countries all over the world.

The officials said that in this case, when a U.S.-made engine and electronic equipment are mounted on the "Lavi," its marketing throughout the world would require the U.S. Government's approval. "In view of our experience with the 'F-16,' which competed with our combat aircraft in South American countries, it is doubtful whether we should place such an obstacle in front of the U.S. industry," the officials said. "It would be better for us to sell those 400 aircraft to the IAF and to continue to control the market with no competitors," the Pentagon officials noted.

This DAVAR correspondent points out that these evaluations by U.S. experts are admittedly not the final word on this issue, but they constitute a clear indication of where the wind is blowing regarding this project.

CSG: 4/6/84/98



## ISRAEL

### U.S.-PLO INDIRECT CONTACTS CLAIMED

TA101052 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 10 Nov 82 pp 1-2

[Report by Arab affairs correspondent 'Oded Zaray and the political correspondent]

[Excerpt] The U.S. administration is in effect conducting indirect negotiations with the PLO through Morocco and Saudi Arabia. In these negotiations, the PLO is urged to grant King Husayn a mandate to represent the Palestinians in the autonomy talks and to recognize Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, while in exchange the United States would open direct talks with the PLO and would even contemplate inviting 'Arafat to Washington.

According to Arab sources reporting on this, most PLO organizations have rejected these demands out of hand while some of the PLO leaders, led by 'Arafat, have formulated counterdemands, as was first reported by HA'ARETZ 2 days ago in the wake of the meeting in Paris between 'Arafat's envoys and Egyptian Foreign Minister Kamal Hasan 'Ali.

At the beginning, the indirect contacts with the PLO had been scheduled to take place in Washington until the arrival of King Husayn on 21 December in order to examine the possibility of expanding the autonomy talks based on President Reagan's proposals. According to these sources, President Reagan promised King Husayn II, who headed the Arab League delegation that conferred with him at the White House about 2 weeks ago, that he would exercise his influence on the Israeli prime minister whom he would meet on 19 November to get Israel to freeze settlement in the territories, even if only temporarily, as part of the efforts to resume the autonomy talks.

This is why the possibility of resuming Ambassador Philip Habib's mission in the region is also being examined.

The sources added that the United States did not assign any role to Egypt regarding contacts with the PLO and that the mediation task was entrusted to Kings Husayn and Fatah who undertook to persuade 'Arafat to accept the U.S. demands. Therefore, 'Arafat decided to send two envoys to Paris on Saturday (his adviser, Habib al-Sha'ib), and the PLO representative in Saudi Arabia, Rafiq al-Batshah) to convey through Egyptian Foreign Minister General 'Ali the

PLO's counterdemands, the gist of which is a U.S. undertaking for coopting the PLO in future talks as the sole representative of the Palestinians and rejecting the demand about a mandate to King Husayn, on the basis of the right of the Palestinians to self-determination.

The HA'ARETZ political correspondent adds: Elements closely following U.S. contacts in the Middle East last night said that the possibility should not be ruled out that Saudi Arabia and Morocco maintain regular contacts with and exert pressure on the PLO and then relay their impressions to U.S. representatives in order to bring about a rapprochement between the United States and the PLO, ultimately leading to direct contacts between them.

These elements noted that, in their assessment, the United States is not contemplating an invitation to Yasir 'Arafat or any other PLO personality to Washington in the foreseeable future. They also said that several Arab countries, particularly Morocco and Saudi Arabia, are now investing "immense" efforts in bringing about a rapprochement and more understanding between the United States and the PLO but have so far failed in their efforts.

CSO: 4406/98

## SCHIFF COMMENTS ON ISRAELI-U.S. RELATIONS

1A091140 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 9 Nov 82 p 11

[Commentary from Washington by Ze'ev Schiff: "A Question of Trust"]

[Text] Israeli-U.S. military relations are currently weighed down by a number of obstacles, but it looks as though the immediate and most pressing problem is essentially psychological and can be described as lack of trust. To be more precise: distrust. There is a certain common denominator running through the arguments raised by representatives in the various U.S. administration branches, and it is lack of trust in certain high-ranking Israeli representatives.

In the past, too, there has been disagreement and anger, which occasionally resulted in suspending the sale of arms to Israel, but this is the first time we have had a case of deep suspicion that there is someone in the Israeli Cabinet who is trying to mislead the U.S. administration time and time again. The suspicion is that he is not telling the truth; that senior Israeli representatives often lie in their contacts with U.S. representatives. This is not a case of Israeli "surprises" in the style of the prewar times, such as bombing the Iraqi nuclear reactor or applying Israeli law to the Golan Heights, but of little lies in the course of the war in Lebanon and also after it, as well as in a series of incidents which, added up, have created distrust.

This problem arose even in the course of the negotiations for security arrangements in southern Lebanon. The Israeli representative from the defense establishment argued that the measures Israel demands in southern Lebanon are all intended to prevent terrorist acts. Yet now the Americans have found out that Israel wants to station a radar system in Lebanon directed at the Syrians. This can change the basic components of the arrangement. This demand could have been perceived to be legitimate, but the method employed was one of suspect behavior, of trying to be clever. "There are some Israelis who believe that they are always confronted with innocent, naive and inexperienced Americans, and then instead of telling the truth, they choose mysterious ways," a U.S. representative said in this context.

During the war there were more serious cases of official Israeli reports to the United States that were distorted and created the impression that they were false. Many members of the administration think that the "fog of war" policy imposed by Sharon in the course of the war was not only aimed at Israel's

enemies, but also against its friend, the United States, whose help Israel requested (a similar charge was made against Israel regarding the "fog of war" policy vis-a-vis the public, and sometimes also in regard to the Cabinet).

The story about the sound of artillery fire passed from Beirut to the State Department over the telephone also shows the lack of faith in the statements made by Israel's representatives. Apparently our representatives argued at the time that there were no exchanges of fire in Beirut at all, and that all the charges on exchanges of fire were false and untrue. The U.S. diplomats in Beirut, who wanted to have their State Department superiors hear the noise made by the exploding shells over the telephone, did not wish to thus determine who was the aggressor and cease-fire violator; they only wanted to prove that fire was continuing in Beirut. The interesting thing is that none of the U.S. representatives ever tried to contend that the Israeli Foreign Ministry representatives had tried to lie about this; they merely hinted that those who reported to the Israeli Foreign Ministry that the fire in Beirut had subsided were misleading Minister Shamir and his staff, too.

It does not take much to comprehend that when misleading and faulty reports are at issue the finger is pointed at Defense Minister Ari'el Sharon.

In this context, I have heard in Washington that on Saturday night, after the massacre in the refugee camps had already become public knowledge, a U.S. representative approached Minister Sharon with an official question on whether Israel had allowed the Phalangists to enter the camps or not. Minister Sharon then replied with a firm negative, and this is how things were passed on to the highest echelons in Washington. But since then, some other, conflicting, facts have been uncovered, and still Minister Sharon never bothered to correct this denial, and the bad taste of lack of faith in him--and subsequently also in Israel--deepened as a result.

Two days before that, when U.S. envoy Morris Draper complained about the IDF entry into West Beirut, Minister Sharon and Chief of Staff Eytan explained that the IDF entry was intended to defend the inhabitants of West Beirut, since it transpired that the Phalangists were out for revenge following the murder of their leader, Bashir al-Jumayyil.

This case contradicts the argument often raised in the Israeli Defense Ministry that the Israeli press was the source of reports to the foreign press. Apparently, foreign diplomatic representatives had no need at all for reports from the Israeli press. They were nourished by statements made by Israeli ministers and their personal experience. The foreign press, and especially the U.S. press, dealt with those subjects with as much detail as the Israeli press.

When the matter at hand is lack of faith in Israeli representatives, the impression is that Messrs Sharon and Begin are in the same boat. This approach sounds familiar with regard to other countries as well, that is to say that there is a clear dividing line between the people and the government. The people are good, and only the government is bad. This notion was already known from the Bolshevik glossary. When it appears that the popularity of the prime minister in Israel is high, people try to differentiate between Begin and Sharon.



The fact of the matter is that only one charge is raised against the prime minister, and it has to do with his pledge to the U.S. President that the military operation would not go beyond the 40-km boundary. All the other charges refer to the "surprises" that preceded the war (such as the Golan Heights Law and the bombing of the Iraqi reactor).

Incidentally, a similar distinction to the one made between Begin and Sharon is being drawn by the prime minister's supporters in the U.S. Jewish community. These people maintain that Sharon has already exhausted his job, and is presently conceived of as being a burden to the prime minister, who would be well advised to appoint another defense minister. Some even go further and say that in entering West Beirut, Sharon wanted to make Begin falter and bring about his downfall in order to inherit Begin's position. At the same time, still others regard Sharon as the "liberator of Lebanon," believing that his contribution will be recognized some day.

The attitude of distrust must necessarily one day harm the fabric of relations between Israel and the United States. It is not merely a question of a suspicious atmosphere which, unless it dissipates, will ultimately affect practical ties, but some believe that as a result of the aggregate suspicion that also breeds bitterness, Israel has forfeited its immunity against negative steps the administration could take. Israel is today more vulnerable and exposed than ever before, and that is because of this atmosphere that has been created. Israel can thus be harmed even more by moves that could be taken against it. The most tangible, immediate example is the possibility that large-scale arms deals would be made with Arab countries. If, for instance, the administration decides to sell sophisticated offensive arms systems to Jordan in the near future, Israel would be unable to muster sufficient support against this, as it has in most previous cases.

The lack of faith has not yet hampered the fundamental essence of bilateral relations. The top U.S. administration officials who criticize Israel likewise do not contend that a shift has occurred in the interests of both countries. They only talk about the need to take U.S. interests into account and tie the lack of trust to the "methods and style" of some Israeli leaders. Clearly an abrasive style and methods that create an impression of lying ultimately have their effect, but in the past the U.S. administration was forced to accept certain exceptional leaders, and this is how Minister Sharon is being viewed. (He has recently been trying to correct the impression he created, and this was manifest especially in the pains he took during the visit of the U.S. secretary of defense to Israel.)

At the same time, clearly the atmosphere of suspicion and lack of trust has already made the administration more cautious toward Israel, particularly on military issues. The result is that in the future Israeli arguments will be looked into more scrupulously. Today, the suspiciousness finds expression not only in regard to issues pertaining to Lebanon, but also in regard to continued settlement activity in Judea and Samaria.

Senior administration figures believe that Israel is trying to mislead the U.S. administration about the Jewish settlement plans for the territories. The feeling is that Israel is not only talking about setting up settlements, foot-holds or small settlements [hitnahaluyot, ma'ahavim veyishuvim qetanim], but rather about setting up a broad military and civilian infrastructure to preclude a future political arrangement in Judaea and Samaria. This fear, further aggravated and provoked against the backdrop of the existing distrust, will in the future be transferred from the administration to both houses of Congress. As far as Israel's opponents are concerned, an option will thus be opened to cut economic aid to Israel based on the argument that U.S. funds enable a settlement scheme to be implemented, which conflicts with U.S. interests.

CR01 4400/98

## WEST BANKERS TALK OF NEW POLITICAL SIGNS IN TERRITORIES

TA120820 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 12 Nov 82 p 4 Weekend Supplement

[Commentary by David Richardson: "Signs of Change"]

[Text] The next few weeks are likely to produce some dramatic political developments among the Palestinians--both in the PLO-led Diaspora and in the still to be tested arena of the West Bank and Gaza.

Both moderate and radical circles here are still awaiting the outcome of the reluctant rapprochement between Yasir 'Arafat and Jordan's King Husayn, but noticeably less impassively than before.

Two months ago, one came away from talks in the West Bank with the overwhelming impression that local Palestinians were bystanders in the political developments likely to shape their future. Almost everyone pointed to 'Arafat, hoping that he would be able to reach an understanding with the king and bring the majority of the PLO with him in an arrangement that would get peace talks going. They were hesitant to commit themselves and were apparently content to be hesitant.

Since then 'Arafat has been in Amman, as have numerous West Bankers. Well-informed sources in east Jerusalem have reported that the king warned 'Arafat in plain language that if he did not play ball, Jordan would go it alone. 'Arafat was said to have assured the king and his close advisers that given some time, he could bring the majority of the PLO to support a marriage of convenience with the Hashemites.

This depends partly on how much independence the PLO will demand before endorsing the arrangement with Jordan, and how much veto power Syria and the rejectionist elements in the organization can still muster.

"Whatever happens, the role of the people here has suddenly increased," noted one West Bank lawyer this week. "'Arafat needs us to support him in joining the king. If he doesn't go along, the king will need us to endorse his representation of the interests of the people in the territories," he said.

The lawyer went on to say that if the PLO openly and absolutely refused to back 'Arafat, they would place their organization in an impossible position. It is more likely that they will simply avoid taking a decision.

Other sources report that there has been intensive lobbying by the Jordanians, the Saudis, the Egyptians and moderate Palestinians among the Palestinian communities both in the territories and abroad for new appraisals and for statements that would make possible a dialogue with the U.S.

And this, it seems, is the current aim of the Husayn-'Arafat strategy. Well-informed opinion here is that the king cannot use the element of surprise and declare his willingness to come to Jerusalem as did the late President Anwar al-Sadat. They acknowledge that al-Sadat's bold gesture changed the psychological climate and produced an atmosphere of goodwill, which was an effective source of pressure on the first Begin government. But that option is no longer open to Husayn.

What is hoped for is that Jordan, with the open-endorsement of the PLO, will meet the American conditions for a dialogue--formal recognition of Israel and the acceptance of UN resolutions 242 and 338. This would put off the more traumatic necessity of immediate negotiations with Israel, but would nonetheless place the Begin government in a position of either having to negotiate seriously or face strong dissent at home and direct confrontation with the Reagan administration.

During their recent pilgrimage to Mecca, some West Bank figures were received at the palace in Amman or by other Jordanian officials, and since then there has been a steadily increasing stream of visitors from the West Bank.

Among the most publicized was the visit of Basil Kin'an and Wahid al-Masri, both of Nabulus. Kin'an and a group of some 10 other professionals and land-owners from the Nabulus area met with Labour Party leader Shim'on Peres prior to this visit. News of this meeting caused a stir which in retrospect seems unjustified.

The group, all of whom are said to be supporters of the king, are not all known as political activists. They sent a report of their meeting with Peres to Jordanian Prime Minister Mudar Badran and to the senior PLO representative in Jordan, Khalil al-Wazir ("Abu Jihad"). But when Kin'an and al-Masri met with Husayn, the king avoided discussion of their meeting with the Labour leader.

The most significant visit that took place was that of Bethlehem Mayor Ilyas Frayj, who returned a week ago. East Jerusalem sources reported this week that the mayor, who has visited Jordan on numerous occasions in the past and has become increasingly outspoken about the urgency of finding a solution, was received with particular respect and honour in Amman. The significance of this was not missed here.

Frayj himself has only been willing to say that he found the king "determined" to pursue peace, and that he himself returned encouraged, expecting some movement before January.

But other sources have noted a flurry of activity among the moderate circles with whom the mayor is associated, and stress that the king, who is due to visit Washington next month, will be under pressure to have something concrete to discuss with President Reagan.



Perez and other Labour leaders also met [Fray] prior to his visit to Jordan, but the impression in the West Bank is that the king is reconciled to dealing for the time being with a Likud government led by Menahem Begin.

"True, dealing with Begin will be very difficult--it would be much easier with Labour. But if the Americans are serious, they will pressure Begin," said the lawyer.

Husayn is said to be deeply concerned about Ariel Sharon's statement that "Jordan is Palestine," and some West Bankers reiterate that his primary concern is with the future of his own regime. Some even say that the pace of Israeli settlements is forcing increased Palestinian emigration to Jordan, which could threaten that country's stability.

Others say that the king and his close associates are aware of the danger that the pace of Israeli settlement poses to the physical integrity and existence of the West Bank and the Palestinians who live here. Dr Meron Benvenisti's study of the changes the Likud government has brought about in the area and his characterization of the situation as "five minutes to midnight," has introduced a sense of urgency. Also, the aftermath of the war in Lebanon, the shift in the concerns and fortunes of the PLO, and the Reagan peace initiative, suggest that Husayn and the Palestinians are perhaps facing their last chance for a solution.

It is this sense of urgency which is being reflected in the West Bank and Gaza. "This is the right moment for us to get active," said one of the moderates this week.

CSO: 4400/98

GUR ON POSITIONS FOR DIALOGUE WITH PALESTINIANS

TA121543 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 12 Nov 82 pp 1, 5, 28

[Commentary by Mota Gur: "What To Discuss With the Palestinians"]

[Excerpts] For some months now, but particularly in the last couple of weeks, new voices have been emanating from the Arab world, and flashes of new attempts to break out of the vicious circle in the Arab-Israeli relations can be spotted. True, for the time being these are merely weak mumblings, but only those who purposely shut their ears would fail to hear them. It is still difficult to tell whether this is real light or only a mirage, whether this is real sunlight that is rising, but only a self-imposed blind person would let these flashes pass unnoticed.

The initiators of the war in Lebanon, throughout all its stages, who regarded the dealing of the death-blow on the PLO in Beirut as a national political goal that justified such a comprehensive and prolonged war, should by any strategic logic have grabbed all such signs from the Arab world, real or imagined, since they added salt to the dish of the military campaign.

Yet the opposite is happening. The very people and bodies who believed in the liquidation of the PLO are likewise those who are not prepared to harken to other, different Arab voices. After all, the war was not aimed against the PLO, but against any political expression by the Palestinian Arabs, despite everything that was agreed upon in the Camp David agreement, and for the simple reason that there is fear of openly facing the binational Israeli-Palestinian reality. One cannot but feel that those who express such strong opposition to any kind of negotiation with the Palestinians do so out of a need to run away from looking themselves straight in the eye and giving an honest answer to the difficult, complex question: What are we prepared to discuss with Jordan and the Palestinians in negotiations?

The primary condition for any negotiations that involve a chance for achievement is to have a strong Israel, physically and spiritually. An Israel that is strong at home and outwardly, can only be a just Israel. Israel's justness must similarly be seen and accepted outside, nearly as much as it is accepted by us back home. Understanding for Israel's position and the justness of its cause would help it get world aid toward maintaining its power.

This will be the background against which Israel will present to Jordan, and the Palestinians who recognize it and are prepared to conduct negotiations with it devoid of terrorism, a series of yes's and nay's as the basis for deliberation and negotiation:

1. A separate, additional Palestinian state in the areas of Judea and Samaria--no; but a Jordanian-Palestinian country on both sides of the Jordan River and over territory agreed upon through negotiations--yes.
2. Israeli withdrawal from all of Judea, Samaria and Gaza--no; but a territorial arrangement taking Israel's security needs into account as well as the deployment of the Palestinian Arab population on those territories--yes.
3. The presence of any Arab military units, including Jordanian and Palestinian forces, west of the Jordan River--no; but the right for the Palestinian Arabs to serve and advance in the Jordanian-Palestinian Army--yes.
4. Full Israeli military presence in Judea, Samaria and Gaza--no; but agreed-upon security arrangements involving a necessary limited presence--yes.
5. Full political rights for the Palestinian Arabs as part of a Jordanian-Palestinian state--yes; but the negation and denial of political rights from Jews living in those areas--no.
6. Expanding the Arab settlements inside Palestine and Jordan--yes; but the removal of Jewish settlements and any limitation on their development--no.

The return of all the Palestinian refugees to Israel--no; but humanitarian aid to solve the refugee problem by a certain amount of family reunions in Israel, and through agreed-upon and combined Israeli, international and pan-Arab aid toward resettling them where they are currently living--yes.

7. The partitioning of Jerusalem--no; but honorable arrangements for conducting independent sectoral and religious life as part of a flexible municipal framework--yes.

Such principles and others similar to those, which will undoubtedly also be countered by the Arab party are what Israel, Jordan and Palestinian representatives will hold talks about for the duration of the autonomy period and according to what was agreed upon and accepted in the Camp David accords. None of the principles that will be presented will serve as a precondition for negotiations, but their sum-total will display to all the partners the wide spectrum of chances and risks that should be expected by anyone who is prepared to act on these principles out of concern for himself and understanding for others.

If this policy brings a change in the PLO's positions, good.

If the PLO remains stubborn and an alternative Palestinian Arab leadership grows--certainly this is good.

At any rate, both Israelis and Palestinian Arabs should realize that there is something to talk about in the negotiations, and there are chances for a solution in which each side would receive what is most important for it in terms of its future.

PAPER INTERVIEWS PLO-HELD ISRAELI CAPTIVES

TA140750 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0505 GMT 14 Nov 82

[Text] The condition of the Israeli captives held by the PLO is good. They receive treatment according to the Geneva convention and except for being restricted to the house where they are detained they do not feel as captives. This is reported today by the AL-FAJR AL-'ARABI which appears in Hebrew in east Jerusalem. The paper publishes the full interview held by the paper's owner, Paul 'Ajluni, with six of the Israelis captured by the PLO. Our correspondent in Judaea and Samaria Arye Gus brings more details.

[Begin Gus recording] The interview with the Israeli captives was held about 2 weeks ago in a certain place in the Lebanese al-Biq'a'. Paul 'Ajluni, the paper's publisher who lives in the United States, reported after meeting them that they feel well, are held under very reasonable conditions, live with their captors and share the same food.

The story of their capture is known already. They were surprised by three Palestinians, one of them a speaker of Hebrew. They were smuggled beyond the Syrian lines so that their identity would not be discovered.

We felt relieved when we learned that we fell captive in the hands of the Palestinians and not of the Syrians--one of the captives said--since we remembered the remarks of pilot Aharon Ahl'az about the good treatment he received during his period of captivity.

One of the captives was shot during the movement into the al-Biq'a' area but the escorts apologized saying this was an accident. According to the paper, another captive confirms this fact.

The six Israelis were asked how their captivity would end? Their answer: We hope we will be exchanged for Palestinian captives. They noted that 300,000 people demonstrated in Israel against the Sabra and Shatila massacre saying that there is awareness in Israel of the wrongs suffered by the Palestinians. We all desire peace, they said, and believe it is possible, that there is enough room for both peoples to exist peacefully.



A LE MONDE journalist, Dina, the ex-Jordanian queen and Fatimah Barnawi, a female terrorist who served a prison term in Israel were present during the interview. According to the paper Paul 'Ajluni recorded regards from the captives and these were transmitted to the IDF authorities. Colorful pictures of the captives are also available in the paper's offices and they will be given to the families if requested. [End recording]

The paper adds that the condition of another two captives is good although Paul 'Ajluni was unable to see them that day.

CSO: 4400/98

## EDITORIAL QUESTIONS BEGIN'S ALERTNESS

TA101202 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 10 Nov 82 p 7

[Editorial: "Flaws in the Prime Minister's Performance"]

[Text] It is not every day that the prime minister is interrogated by a statutory commission of inquiry, and at an open session at that. Through its actions, the commission of inquiry, which was set up by the government in the wake of vast public pressure and explicitly against its will, proves that the State of Israel remains faithful to the principles on which every democratic regime must be founded; one of them being that the executive branch must under certain circumstances report on its actions to an independent institution set up by law. The performance of the commission established to look into the complex of problems that emerged in the wake of the massacre in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps does honor to its members and to the State of Israel generally.

It cannot be said that the prime minister's performance, as evidenced in his appearance before the committee on Monday, does him any honor. A prime minister is expected to preside over Cabinet sessions with utmost alertness. However, it emerges from Mr Begin's testimony that on two occasions during the Cabinet session of Thursday 16 September he was only half listening to the things being said. Otherwise, it is hard to explain why he looked surprised when Justice Barak read a paragraph from the minutes of that session that implied that the chief of staff had predicted an unprecedented outbreak of revenge: "I can already see in their eyes what they are waiting for... They are already sharpening knives," Lt Gen Refa'el Eytan said. If the prime minister does not remember these illustrative and blatant utterances, his hearing during the Cabinet session must have been at fault.

Regarding the well-known remark of Deputy Prime Minister David Levi, Begin pointed out that he had caught it although at that time he had been busy formulating an announcement concluding the Cabinet session. It also emerged in this case that he had not been paying attention to the debate as he should have done.

It is no less surprising and perhaps more so that for 2 days the prime minister did not receive any report about what had been happening in the refugee camps in West Beirut and had not even asked for information on the matter. He does

not have any notes ~~--- recordings~~ of a telephone conversation with the chief of staff on Friday 17 September: "Perhaps the chief of staff has, I do not," he said in reply to Justice Barak's question. This is also a bizarre and surprising phenomenon in light of the large amount of sophisticated electronic equipment the senior echelons of power have been using for a long time. However, it is very difficult to understand the prime minister's passivity regarding the entry of the Phalangists into the refugee camps, especially in light of the fact that Begin had earlier justified the IDF's entry into West Beirut for fear lest Christian elements commit atrocities on the Muslims following the murder of Bashir al-Jumayyil.

It is only natural that people should feel fatigued and tired at times. However, more efforts and physical ability are required of a prime minister, all the more so in times of war or high tension. From Begin's testimony about the days in question it emerges that he did not have the required alertness. Now that we have learned what happened in one instance, it is difficult not to wonder whether similar cases did not occur before and whether certain moves in the course of the war in Lebanon should not be attributed to insufficient alertness on the part of the prime minister.

CSO: 4400/98

## IDF COMMANDERS DISCUSS WAR GOALS, ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 17, 26 Sep 82

[17 Sep 82 pp 1-3, 20]

[Text] They all sat around the table at the General Staff, all the generals who directed the war. They were headed by the chief of the General Staff Lt Gen Rafael ("Rafal") Eytan. All of them were there except for one general, the air force commander, Maj Gen David 'Ivri. At that early hour of the morning when the General Staff met in order to host the editorial board of YEDI'OT AHARONOT at a conference on the occasion of the upcoming Rosh Hashana, Maj Gen 'Ivri was somewhere in the command center conducting the powerful air action over the al-Biqa' in Lebanon.

Around the table in the conference room next to the office of the chief of the General Staff were: the chief of the General Staff, Lt Gen Rafael Eytan; the deputy chief of the General Staff, Maj Gen Moshe Levi; Controller of the Defense Establishment Maj Gen (Res) Meir ("Zoro") Zore'a; director-general of the Ministry of Defense Brig Gen (Res) Aharon Bet-Halahmi; Maj Gen Yehoshua Sagi, chief of the Intelligence Branch; Maj Gen Moshe Netiv, chief of the Manpower Branch; Maj Gen Yohanan Gur, chief of the Quartermaster Branch; Rear Adm Ze'ev Almog, navy commander; Maj Gen Moshe Bar-Kokhva, commander of the Armored Corps; Maj Gen Ehud Barak, chief of the Planning Branch; Maj Gen Ya'aqov (Jackie) Even, commander of the National Security College; Maj Gen Uri Simhoni, chief of the Training Department; Maj Gen Hayim Erez, commander of the Southern Command; Maj Gen Uri Or, commander of the Central Command; Maj Gen Amir Drori, commander of the Northern Command; Maj Gen Dan Shomron; Maj Gen Avigdor ("Yanush") Ben-Gal; Brig Gen Amos Yaron, Chief Infantry and Paratroop Officer; Brig Gen Ya'aqov Even, IDF Spokesman; Brig Gen Yitzhaq Sheni, Chief Censor; and Ben-Tziyon Naveh, director of the Planning and Development Branch of the General Staff.

The members of the editorial board of YEDI'OT AHARONOT who participated in the conference were Editor Herzl Rosenblum; Managing Editor Noah Moses; News Editor Moshe Vardi; and members of the editorial board Ya'ir Amikam and Aharon Bekher. The moderator was Yeshayahu Ben-Porat. Our military correspondent, Eytan Haber, was out of the country. Because of its length--the conference, which was held before the assassination of Bashir Jumayyil, lasted 3 hours--the second part will be published in the Yom Kippur edition.



[Question] What is happening on the front line with the Syrians? Have they rebuilt their strength since the war?

Chief of the Intelligence Branch Maj Gen Yehoshua Sagi: The question as to what is happening with the Syrians is a very general and indefinite one. I assume that the question is inspired by the war--have the Syrians been defeated? Have they regrouped? As a general observation I would say that the Syrians have not been substantively weakened militarily. The Syrians have another problem, one of redeployment and/or lessons learned in this war. If we talk about numbers, equipment and weapons, the Syrians have not been defeated. Moreover, they have been strengthened.

In regard to air defense and the air force, there has been an extensive realignment. In regard to the air defense missiles, in my opinion, there has been puzzlement and uncertainty as to which direction to take. Syria has SS8 units in addition to those which have already been destroyed. When I speak about SS8, I am speaking about the weapon itself which is the launcher, the radar, and the missile. Therefore, every such vehicle is a danger. In my opinion, we are not seeing the end because on the subject of surface-to-air missiles the Syrians must come up with a substantive response, and this is a problem of the first rank because there is no unequivocal response on this issue in the hands of the Soviets at the moment.

It seems to me that the Syrians are making a very great effort to build a modern and dense deployment on the one hand and are attempting to improve the air force on the other hand.

[Question] What is known about Syrian intentions? What do they actually want?

Maj Gen Sagi: When one speaks about the Syrians, it is necessary to see who is Syria. Is Syria also the PLO? To the extent that we can read President 'Assad, the perception is very simple, I would say, and precise. Syria has an interest in Lebanon, and Syria must remain dominant toward Lebanon also in the future--whether this is done by means of a defense pact between Syria and Lebanon, and not by the presence of forces, or by the presence of Syrian forces in al-Biqa' and on the mountain crest. Or perhaps matters will be reduced to such an extent that Syria will have a problem that for its own defense, that is the defense of the gates to Damascus from the west, it will have to remain in the area of al-Biqa' between Zahlah, Shtawrah, and the western suburbs of Damascus. It is important for Syria to leave forces in Lebanon because of these reasons.

Syria does not believe in any peaceful solution with Israel. In its world-view, peace or the solution to the conflict in its terms will come by military means. And if necessary, they have political measures, and these will come in order to fill the gap between the wars. In effect, here matters are very unsophisticated. We see here the return to the same views with no change even after Operation Peace for Galilee. In Syria, incidentally, they do not feel that they were beaten. They claim that they were beaten by an Israeli-American conspiracy, American weapons, and massive American aid. On the other

hand, they were abandoned by all the Arab countries to conduct their own war. Moreover, they were also betrayed, in their view, by the Palestinians who assured them that the strength and weapons that they would give them would be sufficient for them to defend the area under their control, that is all the area between the coast and the mountain ridge running the length of Lebanon.

Commander of the Armored Corps Maj Gen Moshe Bar-Kokhva: Since the Syrian Army is maintaining about one-half of its operational armor in Lebanon, it is fortifying itself there, and its deployment is very massive with all possible weapons, with first-line formations, and with the best divisions and brigades now located in Lebanon or at the gates to Lebanon. I believe that we must recognize reality, that the Syrians are not planning to leave Lebanon by means of political negotiations. They are strengthening their position by means of the deployment of massive forces, their concept of war, and a build-up. In my opinion, it is clear that barring an unexpected turning point, the Syrians will fight to maintain their hold in Lebanon.

Deputy chief of the General Staff Maj Gen Moshe Levi: I agree specifically with what the chief of the Intelligence Branch has said, but I would want to emphasize two points. The first point is related to the defeat which the Syrians suffered. It is true that they are trying to rationalize this by claiming American weapons, a conspiracy, and their abandonment by the Arab countries, but there is no doubt that the defeat which they suffered this time is having a stronger effect, in my estimation, than the other defeats which they sustained even though it is impossible to measure this in the number of tanks which were destroyed or the number of casualties. It seems to me that the Syrians now have a greater problem in the use of their force and in their confidence in the use of the force.

The second point is that I agree regarding Syria's basic perception, but I estimate that there are possibilities that the Syrians will try to maintain their interests in Lebanon. If we say that this is the problem which is now on the agenda, there are also other arrangements and not necessarily for sitting and fighting for every area in which they are currently located in Lebanon.

[Question] Does this mean that they will remain in Lebanon?

Maj Gen Levi: On the contrary. I am saying that they can try and maintain these interests not necessarily in the way that they will state because everywhere a Syrian soldier sits today, he must remain there.

Chief of the General Staff Lt Gen Rafael Eytan: I will summarize this issue. From my point of view, I agree with what has been said. We must accept that which those who are involved in this matter on a daily basis are saying because in the final analysis, what will be is an estimate. What was are facts. Everyone can have his own estimate, at times slightly different, but provided that it is based on facts. A similar process takes place after every war in every country. To procure quickly many weapons, many new weapons, to organize formations and structures, or to compensate for losses. This is actually the only route they can take for a certain period of time. I infer from this

premise that even if the Syrians do not lack tanks despite the fact that such and such a number of tanks were destroyed and captured, the actual process of absorption, of organization does not add as much to the total as it ~~changes~~ the organization. Although this does not have the equivalent value of strength, it is, however, a process.

If I look at their mentality from ~~their~~ point of view, it says: Okay, let's organize. We will gain time, and in the meantime there will be a summit conference, there will be pressures, we will try from ~~among~~ the Arab countries, we will try with the Soviet Union, with the Palestinians, and we will see what will happen. If we are interpreting correctly what they are doing, and in light of their past conduct, this is how I see their actions for the future.

In my opinion, the Syrians will not leave Lebanon willingly as part of a settlement. And I stress willingly because it is possible that there will be heavy pressure from the Arab countries, primarily Saudi Arabia, so that the Syrians will find an honorable pretext for leaving Lebanon.

For example, the Saudis will not give them money, and the entire "moderate" Arab world will oppose them and call upon them to leave Lebanon, and additionally, there will be pressure from the United States. Then the Syrians will say okay. In this situation all of us will leave.

Perhaps we will leave last, we will try to preserve our honor and so forth, but to leave willingly in a settlement which will satisfy us such as the departure of the terrorists from Beirut--this they will not do. In my opinion this will be a very lengthy and grudging process. During this time they will work vigorously in the rebuilding of their army, in the drawing of lessons, in the absorption of very large quantities of modern equipment which they will not even be able to absorb. They have received many tanks, many aircraft, and many weapons which they have not had in the past, but the quality of their absorption of the weapons is lower than the quantity which they have received. If they would absorb at the same rate that they receive, it would be very bad, but this hasn't happened in any Arab country and is also not happening with the Syrians.

The Syrians, in my opinion, will focus their efforts in a number of areas. In the political area, they will aspire to remain in Lebanon and to influence events. Even here there are all kinds of estimates: They will use force, they will not use force, they will do everything to cause trouble for Bashir so that he will lead a country which confronts the State of Israel. I am not saying that Lebanon will sign a peace treaty or will tie its hands with pacts or something like that, but they can cause trouble.

#### The Tradition of Harassment

The second level is the build-up. To receive much quickly, and this is directed both internally and to the army which was hit hard. In my opinion, the Syrians will make every effort--and when I say every effort, this is relative to us--to activate the terrorists against us in every possible place, outside of the Golan Heights. They can give vent to their feelings, through the terrorists, they are angry because of the war, and there is this tradition

of harassing us by the terrorists who are their lackeys in every way and in every place. They will penetrate from Jordan, we will skip over the Golan Heights, and there will be a kind of empty area like this in Lebanon, and there is also action abroad.

These are the levels on which the Syrians will operate in the future, in my estimation. When I say will operate, it is not that I know that they will do exactly this, but from everything that is happening, I can estimate that this will be their direction in the near future.

They will exert every effort to remain in Lebanon. The moment they leave Lebanon, they will have an internal problem, within the country, and also a problem of defeat as well as a reduction in their capability to influence events in Lebanon in the future. They are very concerned that a Syrian-free Lebanon will turn toward the State of Israel after they all leave and will request the State of Israel to maintain a force for protection, security, and support. The Syrians are very worried about this, and from their point of view this extends the dangerous border with us by many more kilometers just as we were worried when they entered Lebanon and extended the front to Rosh Haniqra. This is a very difficult border for us.

[Question] What was the IDF's most important lesson in the Peace for Galilee war? Is it correct to say that this was the first time that in terms of the balance of forces we were like Goliath against David? The chief of the General Staff said at the time that there is also a military solution to the problem of the terrorists, but don't 40 km and another 40 km bring us to a friction point at which time they fire bazookas and Katyushas?

[Answer] Lt Gen Eytan: With your permission I will address part of the question and then the others will be able to address the same issue. We don't know what exactly happened between David and Goliath. Did David stand alone and Goliath stand alone? Did Goliath sleep the previous night or not? Was he perhaps half groggy? The story has become the symbol of the weak against the strong or the small against the large. However, it is not necessary to make such a comparison here because I intentionally began with a question, who was standing in back of whom? It is possible that David stood alone but that in back of him were 1,000 shepherds with "slingshots", and Goliath, who saw such a small boy, came alone and did not imagine what could happen here, and suddenly was hit by a rain of stones and not only one stone.

We went into Lebanon in order to solve a very complex problem. We had never faced such a problem: both a difficult terrain and two types of enemies--the Syrians, an army with which we made very effort to avoid a clash and the terrorists, whom we knew, but we didn't know how and where they would fight. We did not know if they would be able to use everything they had in terms of weapons, deployments, depots, and dumps. And in such a situation, the plan had to be such, and it was such, to get there faster, and to bring in more troops in order to reach more key points which would not permit the terrorists to regroup and would not permit or would not compel us to fight step by step for every house, for every wadi, and for every shrub.



~~...told the Syrians that we did not want to clash with them but if they~~  
attacked, we had a ready force. Now this Goliath ~~did not~~ mobilize his entire army. We mobilized half of the army, only that which was immediately vital to the war. Not all of the armored divisions were mobilized, the entire logistics apparatus was not mobilized, and there are many more examples of this partial mobilization. The principle in this action was fighting in the territory, that is to say to exploit all the possible means of getting there deeper, at a greater distance. We wanted to create a shock in the entire terrorist system to prevent or at least to defer the clash with the Syrians as long as possible--and we succeeded in both of these matters.

Several days ago I said that we do not have to conduct ourselves as if it were the Middle Ages when two knights confronted each other and one waited until the other scratched him under the armor, and he did not take advantage of the opportunity. In the modern wars this time has passed, and everyone endeavors to exploit his advantages to the best of his ability. We were the initiators in this war. We took the initiative, we prepared the plan beforehand, we set the date beforehand, and we also determined the forces. We had to exploit the opportunity, and therefore, we also surprised them. It is necessary to exploit the advantages and to take the initiative whenever possible.

This is the first war in which the objectives of the war were determined from the beginning to the end in the master plans of the General Staff, subject of course to the decisions of the government. In no war were the objectives determined from the opening moment until the declaration or the recognition of the end of the war. It is possible today to argue when the war ended, but this is a different matter. We can mobilize and bring in more troops, however the effect of a larger force in the conditions of Lebanon would become counter-productive and would not provide tactical advantages in the area. We do not have to be ashamed of this or to castigate ourselves, for we exploited everything available to us or virtually everything available to us in order to hit them hard. And perhaps even here we achieved all the objectives, and we did not move in piecemeal fashion and we did not move at their pace. If we had to hit the Syrians, we hit them with all our force. And if we had to hit the terrorists, we hit them with all our force so that matters would not be left for clarification after the fact. There had to be no doubt. And the result was that the Arabs surrendered. They left Beirut and surrendered.

This was the first time in the history of the wars of Israel that the Arabs accepted a dictate and were compelled to fulfill it to the end. It is possible that they deceived us and that there are terrorists here and there, however I speak about the principle and the essence of this principle.

The Arabs surrendered and accepted the dictate thanks to the use of optimum force. We could have used a little more force, but the marginal benefit from this increment would not have had a decisive effect, if any at all.

In regard to the Syrians, we activated a relatively large force against them because we had an advantage over them. They lost their air defense, and they lost their air force. They lost 25 percent of their aircraft, and they lost over 10 percent of their pilots. They also lost confidence in their air force and in the surface-to-air missile batteries, and this was much more important

—than another 10 MIG's. Then we do not have to be ashamed to be Goliath in this instance. If you go to solve a problem, solve it with all the force you think that you have to use in order to achieve your objective.

We could have had a problem if we had gone in piecemeal: 20 km in the first stage of the war, another 20 km in the second stage of the war, still farther in the third stage of the war. The second stage would be dependent on political problems, the third stage dependent on I don't know what. Had we used this method, we would have had a serious problem.

In Operation Litani we moved in a similar manner. Not exactly like this but similarly. This is to say that the operation began with a mission of 10 km and there was at the time no mission to reach the Litani. And there was no mission defined regarding the Tyre enclave, but after we had completed the first absorption and had moved ahead 10 km, we found out that everything was empty. They then said let's move to one village, and another village, and a third village until we reach the Litani. This was not the case in this war. Here it was to the end. It is not true that there was a mission of 40 km. There was no such mission assigned by our political echelon.

[Question] Was the encirclement of Beirut planned from the beginning?

[Answer] Lt Gen Eytan: The arrival at Beirut was planned in accordance with H-hour plus such and such. We had to reach Beirut and not enter it. We prepared ourselves carefully for such a possibility so that in the event that there was a government decision, we would be prepared to implement it.

Commander of the Northern Command Amir Drori: In regard to the comparison with David and Goliath, I think that this is an error from the beginning. This does not express only a matter of a mission and the balance of forces but also one of moral effect, resourcefulness, and many more factors so that anyone who makes implications in this matter is, in my opinion, making a mistake. I would in general remove this from the agenda. We used force in accordance with what we thought was necessary for the various missions. We activated only a part of the force available to us, a limited force since the war was a limited one. We also prepared a force for the possibility that the war would be expanded, and we did not use it because it was not necessary to do so. The encounters themselves, the balance of forces, were definitely ordinary or less than ordinary in the balance of forces in combat and this also must be considered.

In regard to the fighting and the preparations for Beirut, an army prepares operational plans for various contingencies, and there were plans for all kinds of contingencies like the ones that occurred also in this war. It was possible to stop beforehand. It was possible to reach the point that we did, and it was possible to move ahead to various places as was natural for each army to prepare itself in this war. In this respect, it was not an unusual war.

#### The Syrians in Confusion

Defense Establishment Controller Maj Gen (Res) Meir Zore'a: I believe that this comparison between David and Goliath is irrelevant. The art of war is

expressed in the center of gravity in which you concentrate sufficient forces in order to achieve a sure decision. We did this also in the War of Liberation at a time when we were a very small David, and we also did this here. I want to add a comment about the weakening of the Syrian military power--if it is to be measured in quantitative terms, then another plan is needed. But one of the two factors on which the Syrian army is dependent is actually an artificial limb, and this is the air force and all the anti-aircraft systems. In this respect, the Syrian army is now in confusion as are those in back of it. If this is not called weakening, then I don't know what weakening is.

It Gen Eytan: I wanted to add a sentence on this subject because tomorrow the papers will surely report that we are Goliath and these unfortunate Arabs are David. But the truth is that it is the opposite because we are David and the Arabs are Goliath. Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, the Palestinians, Libya, Algeria, and all these countries. So you should be careful about this comparison because American foreign [correspondents] will say: Oh, finally the Jews are also saying that they are Goliath and now they can take care of themselves. We must be very cautious about this. We remain David, but as we said before, it is possible that behind this David stand 1,000 Jews with slingshots and each one can propel a stone. A thousand stones from such slingshots is a very serious matter.

[Question] Three months after the beginning of the war the situation can be summed up as follows: The PLO is strengthening its position in the world, not militarily but politically; President Reagan came out with his own plan; Lebanon does not want to sign a formal treaty with Israel. Then with all of this, how should one view the achievements of the war?

Maj Gen Sagi: Three months after the war the situation can be summed up by saying that the cup is half full and half empty, depending how one wants to pose the question. If the cup is half full, it can be said that the central and organized infrastructure of the terrorists has been expelled from Beirut. There is no doubt about this. The headquarters of the terrorists have been evacuated from Beirut, and all that remains from this Beirut is actually a kind of "rear collector of property" who remains in order to protect interests or at least to defend a situation in which there is a political and military nucleus in the rear. If the situation changes it will be possible to return to Beirut because a return to Beirut is in any event foremost in the minds of the terrorists.

The Syrians have been expelled from the Beirut area, and they will no longer be able to influence the Lebanese political processes. They have always maintained in the past that if the Lebanese were left to themselves without Palestinians and without Syrians they would be able to solve their own problems. This is in spite of the fact that it appears very complicated and unsolvable and despite the fact that for the past 200 or 300 years there have been battles between the Druse and the Christians and between Amal and the Shi'ites and between Amal and the Sunnites and so on. This is despite the fact that any evening the Lebanese sects and religious groups in themselves would be able to solve the problem. Today the Syrians do not have a military solution, and this must be kept in mind.

I am saying that there does not appear to be on the horizon, or there is not apparent to the naked eye, any kind of possible, stable Arab coalition with which Syria can launch an offensive in the area. And it will apparently take -- years until matters will come to a build-up of adequate military strength in order to answer force with force.

I would not go so far as to say unequivocally that there will not be peace with Lebanon. I see the difficulties. I see the problems, but I think that we have already seen such things in the past after the peace with Egypt. Not one of us, at least not I, believed that this would lead to the signing of a peace treaty. And the proof is that a peace treaty was signed with Egypt which is in effect to this very day, and it has also withstood a difficult test.

[Question] Persons who were not authorized to do so by those at this table claimed that the press in the rear disturbed the IDF at the front during the war in Lebanon. Did we disturb you?

[Answer] Meir Zore'a: It depends on which paper and which views were presented in it. Articles of a certain kind definitely were disturbing. There were articles which shook the morale of the fighters. It is not that I am against the expression of opinions and it is not that I am against freedom of the press. The converse is true. Then what is the problem? One must know when to publicize them. During the fighting there are things which should not be publicized even if they are accurate. All the more is this true when they have no basis in fact.

Chief of the Intelligence Branch Maj Gen Yehoshua Sagi: My view is slightly different than the others. The press did not bother the Intelligence Branch. But I can estimate that from the material available to me that that which appeared in the press influenced the decisions in the area. Both the Palestinians and the Arab countries scrutinize every word which we write. At times it is astounding. I find this article or another only after I read in the paper what 'Arafat is reacting to in his speech. The press did influence the course of the war in terms of the enemy's reactions.

It had a rather serious effect also on the actions and perceptions involving the battle for Beirut. They said that Israel was in a deep internal crisis and was afraid of losses and therefore it would not enter Beirut. This attitude which was expressed in the press definitely had an effect on the terrorists and the world. I know that I cannot come to the press and say let's coordinate what you are writing with what we intend to do, that is say how can we jointly serve the people of Israel. You would certainly say to me: Dear friend, we are not an instrument for your psychological warfare. Find yourself other instruments. I am not denying the concept of a free press, but you must know how your words influence the enemy's attitude.

Chief of the Manpower Branch Maj Gen Moshe Netiv: You do have an effect, and I am referring to all the communications media. In the first week of the fighting very few soldiers saw a newspaper, but they certainly listened to the radio because there was no vehicle which did not have a transistor. In general this did not disturb the fighting even though there were arguments at the front



just as there were in the rear. There were arguments both among the troops and among the commanders because we all belong to the same people and we have the same differences of opinion as in the rear. So, I would go so far as to say that the actual argument strengthened our faith that there is something to fight for, including that very freedom of expression, and that strengthened the men.

As usual, I don't think that everything written in the newspaper is accurate, certainly not every estimate of a journalist. But we are adult enough, including the 19-year old soldiers, to distinguish between the essential and the peripheral. Look for example at the adult manner in which the IDF accepted the Eli Geva case. They understood that this was a one-time occurrence, and in some, the incident did not win sympathy and also not in the press.

Maj Gen Yohanan Gur: I was also born a democrat, but I must say that the communications media created confusion and we must not hide this. During the fighting we were involved in explanations, information sessions, and meetings, and this is very democratic. But this also created much confusion at the time when we were fighting and men were getting killed. The press also has a national responsibility, and it must distinguish between what to do and what not to do and when to do it and when not to do it.

#### Self-restraint

Maj Gen Bar-Kokhva: Every outstanding fighter has two components: professional knowledge and personal strength, that is to say his readiness to fight and sacrifice that which is most precious of all, life. The readiness to fight even in the IDF is a composition of influence, information, understanding of the objective, and identification with it. The communications media constitute an extremely important component in the emphasis of the identification or the non-identification of the fighter. This is more important than a weapon. An army ready to cope with any difficulty is preferable to a modern tank, aircraft, or artillery piece. Our communications media this time did not, as it should have, pass the national test of encouraging the army in an unprecedentedly justifiable war. In all the wars of the world there has never been a more humane and careful approach than that of the IDF in regard to cities and civilians. And how our communications media attacked the IDF! This was one of the negative aspects of the press in this war. An army must be ready for criticism. The question is the timing. Let the war end and you can do everything you have to do in order to determine if the government achieved its objective. But as long as the battle is continuing, you must serve as a support for the fighter. This time the communications media did not do this.

Maj Gen Ehud Barak: None of us would want to live in a country in which the communications media did not enjoy the freedom to reflect and at times also to shape public opinion. In these conditions it is clear that the press influences. Where would you hide if this entire forum would say that you do not influence? But one thing is clear: All the missions were carried out without any connection with what the company commander or platoon commander read in the newspaper and without any connection with what he read or heard on the transistor radio. But beyond this, it is not correct to say that there were no

press items that contributed considerably to the confusion and aroused hesitations among those who had to fight and carry out the mission. There is no body external to the press that can restrain you. But to the best of my understanding, you yourselves must impose on yourselves during a time of fighting a certain measure of self-restraint.

Chief Censor Brig Gen Yitzhaq Sheni: In this war the press drew conclusions from the press during, before, and after the Yom Kippur War. Therefore, one perhaps does have the feeling that the press in this war exaggerated. This came as a result of the fact that the press this time took certain measures which it had not taken in previous wars. It is true that the battles were not affected by the positions presented in the press. I am convinced that it is a certificate of honor for the State of Israel that we conducted the war as we did when it was accompanied by the press as it was. I consider this a joint achievement of the army and the press. Had the press conducted itself otherwise, it would not have forgiven the army, and perhaps the army also in certain areas would not have forgiven the press.

Chief Paratroop Officer Amos Yaron: The press did have an influence. The press must be free, and everyone can express his views. But it must be remembered that there were men fighting in the area and not all of them were strong. There are those who are influenced by what is written in the newspaper. The journalist must remember this. This is a responsibility imposed also on him, and there were incidents of irresponsibility in the war. There were things which had to be written about and stated but not during the time of battle.

Maj Gen Ya'aqov Even, Commander of the National Security College: If there is a crack in our social unity, it must not be blamed only on the press. But it is definitely one of the instruments which influences everyone. The press is not a technical instrument. The press is an instrument of the first rank which must meet the criteria of professional ethics. Therefore, the real question is directed to the press itself: Does it have criteria for professional ethics for various situations and for a wartime situation in particular? Regarding the question as to whether or not it met the criteria, it itself must respond.

Commander of the Central Command Uri Or: The big difference between this war and the previous wars is that this time we went out without a national consensus, without unanimity of opinion. Then what do you want? That the difference should not be expressed in the press? It was expressed, and I think that it was a good thing. We are a free country, and the soldier who is fighting wants that the variety of public views be made known also to him. We do not want a press of a totalitarian country which only serves as a yes-man. This is not the State of Israel! The soldiers were good also in this war as they were in the previous wars. And why? Because we are a free country. It is not important if one disagrees with things that I like or another soldier likes. The press fulfilled its function in the manner it deemed necessary, and this led to the expression of the public mood. If, heaven forbid, we come to a situation in which the press will not express the public mood, the soldiers will not fight as well.

## Two Poles

Deputy Chief of the General Staff Maj Gen Moshe Levi: We are speaking about two poles. One pole is a free press; the other is related to the essence of the war. In war there is a requirement to sacrifice one's life, and this is the most difficult demand that one can impose on a person. In regard to the tension between these two poles, it must be said that the communications media have a power which must be considered as one of the components of power in war, and a national effort is required so that antagonism is not created between these two poles. I do not have a solution, but I have no doubt that we will have to come to an arrangement not by one kind of formal agreement or another but rather through education for an integrated and cooperative effort.

Chief of the General Staff Lt Gen Rafael Eytan: I have several questions for you. For example: the press expresses public opinion, true or false? Does the press express the opinion of the public or the journalist? This is an open question, and I will not answer it. I am only asking questions, and I leave them open. Another question. The schools have now been opened for the new school year. For the first time since the establishment of Qiryat Shemona, there has been no talk there about shelters and security measures. Every year they had to practice going down into the shelters with these children, and there was nervousness. And now, with the opening of the school year, this activity was not on the agenda at all. Did this get some kind of a headline in some newspaper? Remember, we are talking also about your newspaper. Why didn't this happen? Hasn't the situation changed? What brought about a change in the situation? How do those who live along the border feel now? Is the newspaper then reflecting public opinion?

We now have a very interesting figure for losses caused in Beirut, a figure which was provided by the Lebanese, and no one can know better than they. And so, they say that in Beirut there were about 100,000 casualties in the entire war. But in Lebanon, before the beginning of Operation Peace for Galilee, 70,000 had disappeared. Did anyone make the comparison? Did any of you make such a comparison? Seventy thousand people were killed, and some say 100,000, then even if we take the lower number, did any one make the comparison? The country is involved in a war, and this harms it in its struggle, when they use our press as a weapon. In America they don't know the number of refugees, but they see 600,000 refugees in our newspaper, and even members of the Knesset say this, and who is more authoritative than members of the Knesset to make such statements? Then the world makes use of this.

Or, for example, the attacks in Beirut. In Beirut we attacked terrorists, not once did we attack "just like that." The targets were always terrorists. When there was no target we did not attack. If it was next to a foreign embassy, we did not attack. If it was in a civilian quarter, we did not attack. But how did our press treat this? They are bombing Beirut as the British bombed Dresden or as the Germans bombed Coventry. So were we bombing Beirut! And again they put weapons in the hands of the enemy. They are bombing Beirut! Why are they bombing Beirut? It was as if they did not know that all the headquarters, all the commanders, most of the dumps, the leaders, the

actual nucleus of all the Palestinians in Lebanon were located there. And this is just another example. And another example--and this is the no-solution byword: You will not succeed in driving them out, and there will be much bloodshed on both sides. But we did succeed in driving them out, and the expected bloodshed did not occur. And the chief of the Intelligence Branch has already said regarding this that this strengthened them internally. We know how this strengthened them. They said, "We will hold out, the world is against them, and they have internal dissension. They will not attack because they have internal problems, and Eli Geva has become a hero also in a demonstration in Nazerat." And this also was an attempt to drive a wedge between the army and the government.

Eli Geva appeared in several newspapers as a hero. When a newspaper reported on a conversation with his officers and they said what they thought, an article appeared the following day calling the officers "informers." Are these officers "informers?" I know in which paper this was written and who wrote it. Then what does the soldier read in this newspaper? That his commanders can abandon him before a decisive battle. By chance, it was not the decisive battle, and we knew that it would not be. We felt reasonably certain that it would not be, that the problem would be solved anyway. But this appeared in a newspaper. These officers were "informers." In these words.

What did they inform about? On whom did they inform? Were they prohibited according to that newspaper or that journalist from saying that Eli Geva abandoned his brigade? Is this the norm of conduct for an army officer, to abandon his troops at precisely the time when they need him most?

And I will give you another example. It is not related to the war, it happened before the war. You recall the case of the Civil Rights Commission on the conduct of the IDF in the Golan Heights: a child died in a siege, and all the great tumult in the world and in Israel, and the big headlines in the newspapers. And so an investigative commission was appointed, and it stated that it never happened. Did this appear in the newspaper headlines? No. In one newspaper it appeared in three lines on page 4, and in one newspaper not at all. But the storm, both internally and externally, had had its effect.

At times you report things which have not been checked out. We don't know why there is such a hurry to publish them. The journalists know this better than . . . However, when it became evident that the thing was unfounded, you were ashamed to say that "we were in error, we were hasty, we did not check it out, we are very sorry." I am for the expression of opinions, but these opinions must be based on facts. It is not necessary to close the newspapers, and it is not necessary to say to them, "Now you will write this or that." The public is mature enough to know what the national requirements are and what is more important and less important. You must also look outward to see what can serve as a weapon in the hands of our enemies. But when someone comes and says to a newspaper that there is no solution, you must ask him what the alternative is, what should be talked about, with whom should we talk, when should we talk, and if we have never tried to talk.

I want to say that it is the obligation of the communications media to present the maximum number of views, and if you say that there is no solution, then



please tell us the alternative, what you would do, how you would do it, for example driving the terrorists from Beirut. On this matter someone said: "I would have solved it a month earlier." You should have asked him: "How? By a meeting in Rosh Hanigra?" This is the role of a responsible press. Not to be satisfied with a headline: Why didn't they do this a month ago? But to add the question: How do you believe this should have been done? Then everything, the question and the answer, should be printed on the front page and in the same size print.

I will return to something that caused us terrible damage, and this is the refugees, the dead, and the destruction in Lebanon. The press jumped on this as if it had found a great treasure. It published facts, as it were, and did not check them out. It did not exercise restraint and disseminated them, and they were used against us throughout the world. This was a poison which we had never faced before. The Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee also used these figures. I said to them: Go and see for yourselves. In all of Lebanon there are not 600,000 Palestinians. How could they all be refugees? They went, they saw, they returned and said that it was not true. And subsequently the figure of 600,000 refugees did not appear in the press again. In a little while you will also be able to enter Beirut and see with your own eyes what was destroyed in Beirut, what was destroyed in this war, and what was destroyed in the 7 years of shelling of Beirut by the Syrians and the terrorists on both sides of the line.

You asked if this had an effect on our ability to fight. I think not. This is the greatness of our people and our army: Although I think this way, I will do what they tell me. It is true that there are also those who say no. I will not do what they tell me because my conscience will not permit me. This was Gadi Algazi, this was Eli Geva, and there were several other examples in all of the periods in which we had to fight. But I don't think that there was any unit that did not carry out its mission because of what it read the day before in the newspaper or heard that morning on the radio. This was the same as those who say to this very day that it was not necessary to occupy Jerusalem, but we did because they told us to go and occupy it. It has always been and will always be this way. Woe to us on the day that everyone will be of one mold or an ideological collective when everyone says and thinks the same thing. For the freedom of the individual in all respects, there is no substitute.

[Question] We thank you for your answers. Under other circumstances it would be desirable to open this up for debate because it goes without saying that we do not agree on this subject. However, since this time we have come only to listen and not to be heard, we will refrain from expressing our opposition as journalists to your position on the subject of the press in wartime.

[26 Sep 82 pp 10-11]

[Question] Three months after the beginning of the war the situation can be summed up as follows: The PLO is strengthening itself throughout the world, not militarily but politically; President Reagan has come out with his own plan; Lebanon does not want to sign a formal treaty with Israel. Then with all of this, how does one view the achievements of the war?

[Answer] Director-General of the Ministry of Defense Aharon Bet-Halahmi: The question implies that it has already been 3 months. In my opinion, you should have asked: Has it been only 3 months? During this time we have come very much closer to the prospect of one form or another of a settlement with the Lebanese. During the 3 months we hit the terrorists hard, and I do not believe that their situation in the world has improved in any serious respect. Regarding the position of the United States, here it is necessary to call on those who examine the small print and ask them to see if we are in a situation of a loss of positions or perhaps even their improvement. Even in the past the Americans did not present us with more sympathetic plans in their view of the region. At times it is good in relations such as those between the United States and us that long-range intentions are presented and you know what you must cope with. And it is also possible in regard to our relations with the United States to take a definitely optimistic position.

Chief of the Intelligence Branch Maj Gen Sagi: Here also one must perhaps realize that there is a consistency in the American position. What is new in the Reagan plan is not its substance and content but more its timing and its being presented in time to exploit his success. Because that which concerns the talk about Israel in its 1967 borders has been expressed in this form or in other forms, including at Camp David, in the analysis of the American position versus the Israeli position. Here I don't think the terrorists achieved any political gain in the United States. They succeeded in increasing the urgency of the problem, but the Americans did not come, for example, and say that they wanted to establish a Palestinian state in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. This they didn't say.

Commander of the National Security College Maj Gen Jackie Even: The near-term objectives are actually the same war objectives that have been discussed, and they have been achieved. If the Galilee has not become a hostage of the terrorists and the Syrians, this is a very great achievement. If the headquarters of the terrorists and their infrastructures have been destroyed, this is a very great achievement. I do not accept the estimate that the Syrians have strengthened themselves. I accept the estimate that the Syrians have been defeated. They have been weakened primarily because of the total strategic surprise in which they lost their only technological advantage, and I believe that it will take a long time for them to recover from this. The reason is that it was perhaps one of the strongest components in the strategy that gave them backing and protected them.

The deterrent element of the IDF managed to double its strength as a result of the technological defeat which the Syrians suffered in addition to all the other blows on the ground.

And now to the long-term objectives. These are the questions that you are now raising, and in my opinion, there is not enough perspective to respond to these questions. Therefore, they are not to be accepted on a basic assumption that the PLO has been strengthened, that the Reagan plan is a threat, and that Lebanon will not make peace. We do not have sufficient data to deal with this question, and it definitely relates to the longer-term objectives.

[Question] Even when 'Arafat goes to the Pope?

Maj Gen Even: I definitely agree that additional political pressures have been created, but between seeing the additional political pressures and coping with them in the coming political struggle and seeing results, there is still no perspective.

Deputy Chief of the General Staff Maj Gen Moshe Levi: I have the impression that we view Peace for Galilee as the answer to everything. The war has taken place and it has ended, then why is there still a debate over the future of Judea and Samaria? I think that this is an absurd question. The debate over Judea and Samaria began long before the Peace for Galilee war, and it will certainly continue because it did not begin even with the establishment of the state. Therefore, the only response that can be stated concisely here is that this war had certain objectives. It can have achievements beyond the objectives that were planned beforehand, but it must not be expected that it will solve all the problems confronting the people of Israel in the Land of Israel.

[Question] How was the last war different from the previous wars?

Maj Gen Levi: One of the elements of the last war was that it was fought in a limited area. This time the main enemy in this war was the terrorists in terms of the objective, not in terms of the number of battles and the difficulties of the war but rather in terms of the objective. And it continued with the Syrian Army. I don't know if this is different from the previous wars, but I would consider one of the indirect achievements to be the fact that the IDF in this war regained its deterrence unequivocally. And if I made this comment before regarding the Syrian Army, it is mainly reflected in the fact that the Syrian Army is deterred today from going to war in one way or another against the IDF.

Armored Corps Commander Maj Gen Moshe Bar-Kokhva: I do not think that this was a war against a coalition. The Yom Kippur War was fought on two fronts. In the Six-Day War we had to fight three Arab countries in order to achieve the defense objective. This time it was a war on one front. One of the conclusions of the political leadership was to see to it that the army would fight on one front and not on a number of fronts simultaneously. In my opinion, one of the achievements of the government of Israel was that with all the pain in the abandonment of Pithat Rafiah, it managed to provide the army with the conditions of a one-front war. Moreover, I think that the timing was excellent. It permitted us to conduct a war without becoming involved with Arab armies. The Iraqis are today one of the dominant factors in the reinforcement of our region. In the Yom Kippur War they sent about 700 tanks and 20,000 men. They now have the potential capability to send 1,500 tanks and 60,000 men from all their military branches. This army has been involved in a war with the Iranians, and there is no doubt that this gave the IDF freedom of action.

Another achievement was an open timetable for the army. There were various kinds of interventions by the political echelon, but in sum, the army had sufficient time to show its strength. They did not impose cease-fires on it

from a situation in which it would have been unable to achieve the objectives as they were specified in the military plan. In sum, I am not satisfied with our achievements. I am on the side of those who maintain that the Syrian Army has not been jolted and has not been defeated and that its self-confidence has still not been shaken. We see that despite our statement that we will not become involved in a war of attrition, it is beginning such a war. It is giving us to understand that it is prepared to continue the struggle.

I think that also the terrorists--15,000 of whose soldiers left Lebanon via the highway--are a point which in the course of time will have a moral effect of rebuilding and becoming a symbol with which we will have to cope. As such, I think that the main problems are still facing us. I think that we could have ended the war as of today with the Syrian Army out of Lebanon. We also would have had to make certain that the terrorists would be evacuated and disarmed as a defeated army deserves and not as they did in making it a victorious army. I do not think that we should fight another war because of this, but I do say that we should complete the attainment of the objectives. If the Syrians provoke us and engage in a kind of war of attrition, then we must complete the attainment of the objective with an overall strategic view.

I believe that the IDF must take advantage of its opportunity and hit the Syrians hard. We are all interested in seeing a return of the IDF's deterrence that it had after the Six-Day War. We know what happened after the Six-Day War. There was a kind of collapse in the military strength for deterrence. In my opinion, we have not restored the posture we had after the Six-Day War. We had the capability to do this, but I believe we did not do it wholeheartedly in Peace for Galilee. As a military man, as an army commander, when I make a self-appraisal, I regret that we did not exploit this point completely.

Chief Infantry and Paratroop Officer Maj Gen Amos Yaron: If the question concerned the difference, the response has several parts. The first two points are the nature of the territory and the nature of the enemy. The build-up territory in this war was something which we had never before encountered on such a massive scale. It is not that we were surprised by it because things worked out, but if we are talking about a difference, then this was a difference.

Regarding the nature of the enemy, the terrorists were an irregular army with the advantages and limitations in fighting against such a terrorist entity that is not a regular army. This creates a considerable number of limitations for a military force to operate against it. For example, its intermingling among the general population and the limitations which this creates for operating against it. In the IDF's readiness for this war, I think there is a difference from the previous wars.

Director-General of the Armament Development Authority Ben-Tziyon Naveh: The main difference was that after the Yom Kippur War we developed many new weapons systems. We also had a self-development effort which accomplished its mission. Virtually all of the new systems without exception that were introduced into the battlefield functioned in accordance with, and at times even beyond, expectations.



Navy Commander Rear Adm Ze'ev Almog: In the naval area this was the first time in the wars of Israel that the navy carried out one of its key missions --support for a decisive ground action by a naval flanking movement. In all of the operations surrounding this mission there was a first both in scope and intensity, in methods of operation and in maintenance.

We carried out the landing with all that that involved--siezing a beachhead, setting up ambushes along the coastal road in the rear of the enemy, and landing infantry, paratroopers, and armored vehicles. What was achieved here for the first time was a result that matched expectations. At the beginning of the fighting for a road that was crucial, the coastal road, we pulled a surprise in place, timing, and scope. The terrorists' positions in Sidon found themselves surrounded at the very outset of the fighting. The landing as an opening action was something unusual in this type of combat. We generally expect to have naval freedom of action so that it will be possible to carry out an amphibious operation. This time it was done, as I said, as an opening action.

The second thing that was reflected in scope and intensity was the massive fire support primarily by the missile boats from the sea to the beach. There is another fact that is less known, but I think that it is noteworthy in that it was also a first--the extent of our use of submarines. It was the first time in the wars of Israel that submarines were used on such a scale and with such intensity and with such great success. We also had a force that was prepared to engage in a battle of destruction with the Syrian fleet had it intervened. The Syrian fleet did not intervene, and I estimate that it did not do so because it was not interested in a conflict with our fleet. What was apparently at work here was a deterrence which stemmed from the heavy blow that it sustained in the Yom Kippur War and subsequently from our actions in 1979-80 against the terrorists along the Lebanese coast. There were more than 50 attacks which actually led to the fact that for the past 3 and 1/2 years there have been no penetrations from the sea.

[Question] In regard to this integration and all of these subjects, is this something you had trained for? Had you considered the possibility of such an operation?

Rear Adm Almog: Yes. The landing operations and everything related to them had been planned during the 2 years previous to the operation itself. I must point out that the chief of the General Staff believed in this the entire time and supported it. We also conducted major training exercises together with the paratroopers and the armor, and this capability passed the test. However, we built this capability so that it was possible to transport a very large number of armored vehicles which were in addition to the over 400 that also came across from Israel. Also at the Sidon "bottleneck" from its northern to its southern side, we assisted in the rapid advance of the paratroopers along the coastal road. These things were explicitly prepared beforehand.

Chief of the Quartermaster Branch Maj Gen Yohanan Gur: In the logistical area war does not begin the moment it is declared. In order to go to war in an orderly manner we must prepare the army. Here I want to speak about preparing

emergency depot units. The preparation of emergency depot units, in my opinion, is the lesson of the Yom Kippur War. This lesson was learned and the units were prepared properly. All of the equipment went out from the units, and not even one tank remained behind because of unserviceability. I am not in error if I say that during the Yom Kippur War we left behind no less than 100 tanks at the emergency depot units at the time of mobilization. This is to say that despite our putting into operation here the equivalent of an armored force, not even one tank did not depart with the entire force and had to remain at the emergency depot unit. They all left the unit in an orderly manner, even those that went out on chains to the combat zone. All of them arrived and not one got stuck en route. There was no instance of someone not reaching the operations area. I think that the trauma of the emergency depot units has passed. The fact that the equipment went out in such a manner had an effect throughout the war. Serviceable equipment which goes out in an orderly manner requires less investment in the war and causes us less problems. Another difference was in the operations area. We knew where they were going to fight, but in general this area was characterized by difficult mountainous roads. To get there with equipment, ammunition, and fuel was a problem. This was the first time that supply alternatives were used. The alternatives were air supply and tank landing craft, and they were fully implemented in a very effective manner. This is to say that also in this area there was a difference between the wars.

Aharon Bet-Halahmi: Regarding the use of original weapons systems, I wanted to add that before the war only the navy had original weapons systems that were developed in Israel. These included missile and electronic warfare systems which were employed with great success in the Yom Kippur War. In the air and on the ground we depended then only on imported weapons systems. In this war for the first time there were also original systems in tanks, aircraft armament, and operations that had a decisive impact on the war. We used weapons systems that were specified, developed, and produced independently by us. All of these systems were successful.

Maj Gen Jackie Even: What characterized the war was the use of a strategy of initiative. In this war there was an operational concept that functioned with two main parameters. One was the threat and deterrence to the Syrians, and when the threat did not materialize, then it was implemented gradually with more massive military means, that is war. The second was the main part of the war against the terrorists. In this there was a full operational concept, not a partial one, for a certain range or a certain ground target. It was a concept that was reflected in the outskirts of Beirut, including what happened in Beirut. This means that it was something that had a beginning and an end. Another parameter was anchored in the technological backing. It was the fruit of extracting lessons since the Yom Kippur War, and it was brilliantly reflected in the area. The advantage in the area, in the air, at sea, and on the ground resulted from the IDF's understanding of the technological issue and its lessons and putting them to use in various battles. This includes the full logistical backing that was provided to the combat forces.

It was most unfortunate that this war had one crack--in the extremely important area of national preparedness or unity. If there was something special for me, it was that crack in national unity. I hope that this will not have an effect in the future.

Maj Gen Ehud Barak: What did not change in this war is, in my opinion, the most important thing. Thousands of young soldiers who had never had a bullet fired at them and had never seen an enemy and the older ones for whom this war was fought under conditions more difficult perhaps than most of the wars since the War of Liberation, in terms of length and thoughts surrounding the objectives of the war, the young and the old, continued to carry their missions. Goliath or no Goliath, no comparison changes the fact of an infantry company having to enter some street. They are alone, eyes reddened from lack of sleep, uncertain in the face of an enemy, and feeling that they can also be hit. This also did not change this time. They carried out their missions. In my opinion, this is the important thing, and it ultimately decided this war.

One comment about David. David was not weaker than Goliath, he was lighter. Goliath was heavy because of his large armor. David was victorious because the critical point in this incident was Goliath's forehead, and he concentrated the requisite balance of forces in order to hit the forehead and score a decisive victory.

Chief of the Manpower Branch Maj Gen Moshe Netiv: For the first time since the War of Liberation, the IDF went out to fight the Palestinian terrorists. This was a substantive difference.

The substantive military differences were: a) The infantry was completely armored. b) We introduced protective measures for the soldiers which saved us many casualties, and the wounds were lighter. This includes fireproof clothing, flak jackets, or protective glasses. c) The mobilization system which we built after the Yom Kippur War worked just as the logistical system worked. Both were interconnected. The brigades reached a stabilization status of over 100 percent. d) Over 90 percent of the casualties were evacuated by air directly to civilian hospitals, and this saved many lives.

Maj Gen Moshe Levi: This war was the first one fought under conditions of complete exposure. It actually fulfilled the expectations of the people to see in their homes every evening a filmed report, precise, in color if possible, on what was happening. In this war new directions were opened with which we will all have to cope. A kind of new standard for wars was created, and in this respect it will be impossible to make comparisons with the previous wars. Everything involved with public information must consider the meaning of exposed wars.

[Question] In light of the lessons of the war, is there or can there be a military solution to a confrontation between a regular army such as the IDF and the irregular one such as the terrorists' organizations? Is there or can there be a military solution to the problem of the relations between Israel and the Palestinians?

Lt Gen Eytan: This has actually been the basic problem of the Arab-Jewish conflict since the beginning of the establishment of the Jewish settlement in the Land of Israel. All of the contacts, all of the confrontations between these two peoples have been violent. All of them, without exception. The Arabs have always tried to obstruct the Jewish settlement, and the Jews have

succeeded in holding their own. Their very success in holding their own has permitted them to expand, bring in more immigrants, establish more settlements, purchase more land, create a State of Israel, and move ahead.

The basic conduct of the Palestinians has not changed to this very day. They want to obstruct the State of Israel as before, block immigration, and stop the settlement. This desire has remained, only the balance of forces has changed. The situation has changed, and the nature of the struggle has changed because the balance of forces has changed. Our control over the Land of Israel is different, and there is no other, foreign regime. If we now picture the situation of today, the eighties, it is impossible to discern a change in the conduct of the Arabs. I am speaking about the Palestinians because the Egyptians changed their conduct. However, the Egyptians have been in the struggle only since 1948 whereas the Palestinians and the Syrians have been fighting with us for many years since the previous century. There is today no sign, not even one, that the Palestinians are changing their direction.

Now the question is--till when? What can change their conduct? I have expressed my personal opinion many times. It may not be accepted, but I believe we must not ignore the facts. We have succeeded in maintaining the Zionist enterprise to this very day and in consolidating it thanks to our strength to the outside world and to our adversaries and thanks to our ideological strength to come, fight, build and live under difficult conditions, and create the state. These are the two things on which we stood and are standing.

Not once was an agreement signed with the Arabs. Not in the thirties on partition and settlement, not with the various commissions that came, not after the United Nations partition plan of 1947. Even though we agreed to partition the Land of Israel and agreed to an international Jerusalem, and as such, actually agreed to a binational Land of Israel, the Arabs did not concur in this, and it was against this background that the war broke out. Why haven't they agreed? It is because the basis for their conduct with us has always been violence. To try and overcome us by force. Had they succeeded even once, there would have been no one here with whom to speak. But this has not changed their conduct. On the contrary, they say that we have not succeeded once. We have not succeeded 10 times. We will move ahead and reorganize, go out, fight, undermine, set off explosions, and kill until we overcome them. This will stop when they no longer have any hope of overcoming us by force, not alone, not with the Arab countries, not with the eastern bloc, and not with the non-aligned world. When they no longer have any hope, when someone like a Sadat who was the first rises up and thinks differently, only then will there be quiet. The Syrians have an interest in the Land of Israel to this very day. Greater Syria is Lebanon, the Land of Israel, and Jordan. They have not changed their attitude.

Therefore, a military solution will not permit them to overcome us. This does not mean that we must take the initiative all the time, but we must build the force for such an objective, and we must make certain that they will not be able to put us in a situation similar to that which we faced on Yom Kippur. An Arab initiative can end up as a mortal danger to our very existence, especially when weapons continue to be improved and the significance of the distances does not decline.



## BRIEFS

INVESTMENTS IN LEBANON ROADS--Israel has invested 215 million Israeli shekels in developing the road network in southern and eastern Lebanon. Our correspondent Yo'el Dar has learned that 220 kilometers of road have been paved, expanded and repaired during this given period. Our correspondent points out that this sum is a great deal larger than the funds allocated for similar purposes within the boundaries of the green line. [Text] [TA221152 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1100 GMT 22 Nov 82]

FUNDING FOR W. BANK LAND--The Finance Ministry wants to allocate 30 million Israeli shekels to hold onto state-owned land in Judaea and Samaria. These funds would be transferred to the Israeli land authority and, at the latter's suggestion, would mostly be devoted to foresting and maintaining the land with the help of a field patrol. Our correspondent notes that this request was submitted to the Knesset Finance Committee along with the request that another 470 million shekels be allocated for new settlements in those areas. The Finance Committee will discuss both requests tomorrow. [Text] [TA221147 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1100 GMT 22 Nov 82]

TYRE COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS--The commission investigating the Tyre disaster has recommended that an investigation be made as to who was responsible for having gas tanks in the military headquarters building. These tanks, whose leakage caused the explosion, were put in the building contrary to instructions. The committee reported that eight intact gas tanks were found outside the building--these were placed according to regulations--and an additional three tanks were placed inside the building, contrary to regulations. Our military correspondent Shmu'el Tal reports that the commission has gathered testimony from people who said they smelled gas, and this reinforced the conclusion that the building collapsed due to a gas explosion. The committee has also recommended that the IDF carry out an engineering check on all buildings in Lebanon where IDF soldiers are located and evacuate unsafe buildings. Checks of gas installations will also now be made in all IDF units. [Text] [TA211745 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1700 GMT 21 Nov 82]

ARCHBISHOP OF TYRE VISITS--Today Yusuf Khuri, the archbishop of Tyre, went to the Maronite Gush Halav church in Galilee for prayers of commemoration for the fallen of all faiths in his town's tragedy. After the prayers, he went to Julis to offer condolences to Shaykh Amin al-Tarif, the spiritual leader of the Drize, for the tragedy to his sect's brethren when the military government building in Tyre collapsed. [Text] [TA152019 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 2000 GMT 15 Nov 82]

ARAB ISRAELIS MISSING IN LEBANON--Two Arab Israelis who went to Lebanon to visit relatives have been reported missing. (Georgette Khuri) and her son, Yusuf, left their home 2 weeks ago to visit relatives near al-Damur. Their families have now reported them missing. Our correspondent Yo'el Dar reports that so far six Arab Israelis have been reported missing, and that only one was found and returned home. [Text] [TA171339 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1200 GMT 17 Nov 82]

FORMER W. BANK MAYOR DISCUSSES PROBLEMS--Former Ramallah Mayor Nadim Zaru has said that Jordan has a main role in the peace process, but the PLO is the representative of the Palestinians. In a conversation with our correspondent Pinhas 'Inbari, Zaru said that he favored mutual recognition between the PLO and Israel. He supports the Reagan plan and the Fes conference resolutions and says that separate administrations should be established for Jerusalem, for both sections of the city. But the border between the two sections must remain open. A common administration could be appointed for the sacred sites. [Text] [TA091533 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1500 GMT 9 Nov 82]

NO SETTLEMENTS ALONG JORDAN RIVER BED--"There are large areas of land owned by the government along the Jordan River bed, but no settlements will be allowed on these lands. The lands were given to the settlers for cultivation on a temporary basis only." This was revealed by Pli'a Albeck, the director of civil matters in the state attorney's office who is handling state lands for the attorney general, in a special talk with MA'ARIV. Pli'a Albeck confirmed that in the last few months state lands south of Hebron were determined for establishing new settlements. [Excerpts] [TA091313 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 9 Nov 82 p 8]

TWO SETTLEMENTS VIRTUALLY UNPOPULATED--In the last few days the Defense Ministry completed paving a 2.5-km road leading to the new communal settlement of 'Anatot northeast of Jerusalem. Our correspondent Shalom Oren reports in an aside that two other settlements established 2 months ago, Eldavid near Teqo'a and Daniyyel near Gush 'Ezyon are nearly uninhabited, and that even though the Construction Ministry agreed to help establish the settlements, only one family lives in Daniyyel and only a few individuals live in Eldavid. [Text] [TA081313 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1000 GMT 8 Nov 82]

IDF COMPLETES MANEUVERS--The IDF today completed two-sided formation maneuvers, the first of their kind after the war. Infantry, armor artillery and engineering forces and attack helicopters took part. The exercises combined penetration, passing obstacles and fighting in mountainous areas night and day. Planes attacked targets from the air. The commander of the central command, Maj Gen Ori Or, told our military correspondent that many of the lessons learned in the war in Lebanon were utilized in the maneuvers, and that this symbolizes the return of the IDF to routine after the war. [Text] [TA101745 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1700 GMT 10 Nov 82]

PAYMENTS ON FOREIGN DEBT--This year Israel will pay off \$1.5 billion of previous debts it incurred. Data published yesterday indicates that the country's foreign currency debts in June reached \$18.680 billion, or a rise of \$260 million since the beginning of the year. The rise in the external debts stems from the

payment of interest to foreign countries, a slump in exports and a drop in the number of tourists who came to Israel. The members of the Knesset Economics Committee who dealt with this debt yesterday expressed their estimate that it would be impossible to maintain such large negative balances in Israel's balance of payments for a long period of time so that greater efforts should be made to encourage growth. [Text] [TA100711 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0700 GMT 10 Nov 82]

RESTRICTION OF CROPS IN W. BANK--The Agriculture Ministry, in coordination with the supervising authorities, will this week put up roadblocks to ban the transfer of agriculture produce by Arab inhabitants of Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza district into the areas within the green line without permission. The Agriculture Ministry has decided to issue decrees restricting the scope of agricultural crops in Judaea, Samaria and Gaza to guarantee fair competition between Israeli farmers and farmers from the territories. It has been reported from the Agriculture Ministry that Arab farmers in Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza district who will be issued restricting orders will be compensated along the same lines applying to Israeli farmers. According to an agreement reached between Prime Minister Menahem Begin and Agriculture Minister Simha Ehrlich, upon Begin's return from the United States a special debate will be held on a new master plan for the Jordan Rift Valley in view of the difficulties the Jewish settlements in that area have in marketing their produce. The settlers complain about an "almost absolute" preference in the allocation of funds for the development of Judaea and Samaria compared to funds funneled to them. The Agriculture Ministry claims that at present it is unable to allot additional amounts and the Jordan Rift Valley settlements can only be developed by creating alternative sources of employment. [Text] [TA111112 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 11 Nov 82 p 9]

CSO: 4400/98

JORDAN

OFFICIAL DENIES ISRAELI CLAIMS ON DEFICITS

JN212028 Amman Domestic Service in Arabic 1900 GMT 21 Nov 82

[Text] Replying to a question by a Jordanian News Agency correspondent regarding claims made by Israeli television that the Jordanian Government had borrowed money from the Arab Bank in order to pay the salaries of its employees because of what it termed the suspension of the Arab oil countries' aid to Jordan, Governor of the Central Bank Dr Muhammad Sa'id al-Nabulsi said that Jordan had borrowed from European markets several times and that it was well known that most of its loans were completely settled before the due date. He said that this made the international monetary markets trust Jordan and rush to finance it. Thus, the issue of borrowing was a natural consequence of the expansion of developmental loans and dealing with the international monetary markets on a larger scale.

The governor added that it was not unusual for Jordan to borrow in order to confront certain external temporary commitments resulting from a delay in the arrival of Arab aid. He said, however, to say that Jordan borrowed to pay salaries is a ridiculous talk and is unworthy of being mentioned because Jordan, as everyone knows, is strong and healthy financially, not like the Israeli economy. The Israeli Government covers the salaries by issuing currency without any control under its record-breaking inflationary conditions or by obtaining foreign loans which it cannot settle leaving, on some occasions, some administrative organs without salaries.

He said that what is strange is that the Israeli media find the report of the borrowing interesting and suitable for their cheap propaganda.

He concluded by saying that what is really wonderful is that Jordan can use its immense borrowing potential at the best international conditions available and at a time when its balance of payment is very strong. He said that this does not resemble the conditions of others who are not granted money by the international monetary markets which would be allocated for military campaigns and for settling in other people's land.

CSO: 4400/99



AL-MANAKH STOCK MARKET CRISIS EXAMINED

Market Transformation

Beirut AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL in Arabic No 40, Oct 82 p 25

[Article by Dr Yusuf Shibl: "Al-Manakh Market Crisis: New Experience for Old Phenomenon"]

[Text] The fact that the Kuwaiti Government has been compelled to intervene in al-Manakh Market crisis through an 8-point plan aimed at protecting the Kuwaiti investor is the most prominent Arab event this month. It is no surprise that this crisis is the subject of interest and discussion in the various Kuwaiti and Gulf circles, considering the volume of the monies invested in the circulated stocks of the Kuwaiti companies and, subsequently, the volume of the losses which will be incurred by the investors now that the stock prices have begun to fall, and that a large number of post-dated checks are coming due for payment.

The fact is that the al-Manakh Market crisis can be described as a new experience for an old phenomenon. The famous New York Stock Market went through a similar experience in the 1921-1929 period when U.S. investors rushed into an enormous wave of speculation which led to a constant and persistent rise in the price levels of the stocks in circulation--a rise which did not stop until 1929, the year in which the "great depression" began to hit the U.S. economy. The stock market was called during that period the Bull Market and the phrase has become popular when speaking of similar periods. The chairman of the New York Stock Exchange Control Commission described that period and that market as being "characterized by a strong demand on the part of investors to buy the stocks of companies about which they knew little and for goods produced by these companies which they could not define. The future potential of these companies was engulfed in numerous risks." Perhaps this description applies in a large degree to the behavior of the investors in and to the actual situation of al-Manakh Market where the link between gathering data on the background of the stock and taking the decision to buy it is missing.

Some observers were at a loss as to how to interpret the phenomenon of interest in al-Manakh Stock Market when stock circulation reached its peak, especially since some of the shares circulated were for companies that had not yet seen the

light. Some of those observers went so far as to assert that what was happening in this market could not be explained by any economic logic. The fact is that what has happened can be explained economically, even predicted, though determining the time of the start of the crisis is the difficult part of the issue. The al-Manakh Market has relied on a work machine consisting of three main elements:

- A. A wave of sweeping optimism on the investors' part regarding the future of the Kuwaiti stock prices--optimism reflected in a steep rise in the prices of these stocks.
- B. An almost severed relationship between gathering information on stock background and the decision to buy it.
- C. Easy and soft financing through post-dated checks supported by large-scale banking credits.

As a result of these elements, the al-Manakh Market turned into a futures market. It is well known that futures markets depend on speculation as their basis, with the contract for the purchase of a commodity or a foreign currency made at present and with the delivery due at a set future time. Contrary to the common belief, speculation in the price of a share, a commodity or a currency does not always lead to a big difference between the spot price and the future price. The opposite is true, meaning that the difference between the two prices is less in the presence of speculation than in its absence, except in one specific case, namely when the expectations and wagering on the part of the investors flow in the same direction, i.e., when they are wagering on rising prices or on falling prices. In this case, speculation increases the difference between the two prices. When the investors' futuristic view begins to change and when the wave of optimism begins to recede, stock prices begin to decline rapidly to settle at levels where the stock's market value is close to its intrinsic value. This is what has happened recently in the al-Manakh Market.

Therefore, it can be said that the Kuwaiti al-Manakh Market has entered a new phase in its march and has actually begun to turn from a bull market into a bear market where the choice of stocks by the investors is founded more on facts, figures and data on the financial position of every company with shares in circulation, on the company's past performance, on its present position and on its future potentials, as well as the interest rates prevalent in the international markets--all this within the framework of a calm and objective view of Kuwait's future economic situation and of the political situation in the Gulf area.

#### Causes, Development of Crisis

Beirut AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL in Arabic No 40, Oct 82 pp 28-29, 31, 33

[Article: "Collapse of al-Manakh Market; Closure of al-Manakh Market and Disappearance of 'Companies on Paper'"]

[Text] In the May 1982 edition, when the al-Manakh Market was still "at its peak," AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL published a study, prepared by the magazine's research

section, which contained a clear warning that a number of speculators may not be able to meet their commitments in light of the changes in liquidity in Kuwait and the change in the banking policy. The study warned at the time that the coming months would be tantamount to a test of the al-Manakh Market, to its credibility and to how soundly founded it is. Hardly a few weeks passed after the warning when the early signs of the crisis leading to the almost total collapse of the market--a collapse which has had its repercussions throughout the Gulf and which has not ended yet--appeared.

This new study by the research section offers a condensed review of the developments and causes of the collapse and of the expected repercussion at both the local and Gulf levels, as well as the repercussions to Kuwait's financial reputation, and, finally, of some expectations regarding the likely tendencies of the market after the crisis.

Basically, the al-Manakh Market rose and developed as a collateral market for circulation of the shares of Gulf companies founded mostly by Kuwaitis and registered in Bahrain or the UAE in particular. Hardly any time passed before this market became the favorite "pastime" of many Kuwaiti and Gulf citizens, as well as some foreign speculators who entered the market under Kuwaiti names.

The early signs of an upsurge in this market's activities appeared in May 1981 due to a combination of several local and international factors.

At the international level, the Eurodollar market was experiencing a drop in interest rates and a state of instability and ambiguity whereas the Kuwait market was experiencing ample liquidity. The appointment of a new minister of finance under that circumstance came to reinforce confidence in the local money market. Because of the limited scope of the local investment opportunities, Kuwaiti investors with high liquidity turned to the stock market, first to the official stock market and then gradually to the al-Manakh Market. This market's stock prices were low in comparison to the shares of the registered Kuwaiti companies. Due specifically to this reason, the al-Manakh Market offered the promise of the possibility of big and quick profits.

Thus, the al-Manakh Market became hot in a short time and began to attract broader and broader sectors of speculators. Its activities multiplied at amazing rates particularly in the summer of 1981 and in the following periods. Numerous factors and new elements were behind this development, especially:

1. The increased use of the system of term deals in accordance with which ownership of shares is transferred to the buyer immediately in return for payment with a post-dated check to be cashed at a later date. In this case, an "extra" sum, supposed to be primarily the interest price and ranging from 20 percent to 300 percent, is added to the price of the share circulated in the market. Considering that the Kuwaiti law permits the bearer of any post-dated check to present and cash such a check from banks, a fundamental part of the deal was the understanding between the contracting parties that post-dated checks would not be collected before their due date, thus relying on personal trust in post-dated transactions.

2. The increase in the liquidity available in the local markets as a result of expanded bank loans which rose in the first quarter of 1981 at the rate of 30 percent.
3. The increase in liquidity as a result of the government's pumping of monies into the market through the expropriation of real estate and through development projects.
4. The flow of foreign capital, whether in the form of Kuwaiti capital reintroduced into the local market by Kuwaiti investors or in the form of new capital from Saudi citizens of the other Gulf countries and through financial establishments investing in Kuwait.
5. Increased use of loans advanced by foreign banking units and other financial establishments, either in the form of loans or the form of discounted checks.

#### Value and Maturity of Term Deals

In 1981 and in the first 6 months of 1982, the Kuwaiti stock market underwent what may be considered normal development, with some fluctuations in the exchange volume and in the price averages. In the term deals market, in particular, the volume of the contracts was growing, but without the emergence of cases of failure to pay for previous term deals which had begun to mature gradually. However, the main interest of observers has been focused on the months of May and June and on the last 4 months of 1982 because a large number of the term deals concluded in 1981 are expected to be due for payment this period.

It must be stated that it is difficult to estimate the total value of the term deals concluded in the official stock market or in the al-Manakh Market due to the disorganized nature of the al-Manakh Market. A report recently issued by the National Bank of Kuwait says that the total value of these contracts ranged from 10-15 billion Kuwaiti dinars and that the post-dated checks due to be cashed between May and December 1982 amounts to 1,554,000,000 dinars insofar as the official market is concerned and that a similar sum will be due to be cashed in the same period insofar as the unofficial al-Manakh Market is concerned. The report also shows that there is the danger of the emergence of a crisis particularly in the period between December 1982 and January 1983 when a large sum in post-dated checks is due to be collected, unless of course certain measures are taken to avert such a possibility before the given date. The graph published with this article shows the set value of most of the mature term deals registered in the official stock market month by month.

#### How Did Warnings of Collapse Begin?

Doubts began to surround al-Manakh Market's future when the market started to feel the pressure of three closely connected factors:

1. The Iraqi-Iranian war and Iran's endeavors to penetrate the Iraqi borders and perhaps advance southward to a number of other Gulf states. The presence of this kind of fear has led not only to stemming the flow of capital to Kuwait but also motivated a large number of investors to reduce liquidity they maintain in Kuwait and to divert it to other safer places.



2. At the level of the local market, the banks' reduction of the loans and credit they advance and the drop in the flow of government money to the market led to a liquidity crisis which motivated numerous speculators to refinance the post-dated checks by issuing new post-dated checks at exorbitant interest rates often ranging from 200-300 percent.

3. The scope of participants in the market has expanded to include an increasing number of inexperienced dealers and this has led to reduced trust between the dealers, keeping in mind that personal trust is vital for transactions involving post-dated checks because the signatory of a post-dated check depends on the goodwill of the person to whom the check is endorsed not to present the check for cashing before the due date.

All these factors combined together and interacted with each other ultimately to create an abnormal climate in the financial apparatus--a climate which recently led to the relatively large-scale liquidity crisis. This state of "lack of liquidity" was worsened by the fact that the number of speculators borrowing from the Kuwaiti and Gulf financial establishments had already reached the maximum. The crisis motivated a number of local investment companies to arrange joint loans for some speculators and to attract small investors by offering interest rates amounting to 15 percent monthly through a subscription certificate, with a minimum value of 5,000 Kuwaiti dinars, to the joint loan.

But gradually as soon as an increasing number of post-dated checks matured and when a large number of speculators became unable to find any new funding sources, regardless of the cost, the only thing left to them was to simply declare their inability to pay for the post-dated checks they had signed. This immediately created a wave of panic among the speculators who rushed to the banks to cash their checks before the due date, which is permitted by the law. This led to the collapse of the exchange system and of the network of obligations and due payments which had been scheduled carefully for all dealers in the market.

As a result of the rapid deterioration of the share prices, numerous speculators became unable even to liquidate their shares and use their value to cover the post-dated checks due against them.

#### Consequences and Repercussions of Crisis

It is somewhat difficult to predict accurately the consequences the crisis will have for Kuwait and its financial system, considering that some time will pass before the long-range consequences of this crisis become clear. As for the immediate consequences and repercussions, they can be summed up in the following:

1. At the level of the local market, the crisis has led to a state of total paralysis in the commercial and financial markets because a negative climate is dominating all the economic activities.

2. The real estate market has experienced a sharp decline in prices and in its customary activity as a result of the fact that a large number of speculators have been compelled to sell their real estate property to get cash in order to meet their obligations.

3. Stock prices have dropped sharply in the official stock market but have declined more steeply in the al-Manakh Market, falling by more than 50 percent for some shares.

4. The primary market has completely stopped issuing bonds in Kuwaiti dinars and the circulation of any new issues has been postponed until the end of 1982. In the subsidiary bonds and securities exchange market, the activity has declined to almost negligible rates.

5. The crisis has created a state of financial hardship for a large number of not just Kuwaiti citizens and establishments but also non-Kuwaitis who have speculated under Kuwaiti names.

6. The financial system has witnessed the transfer of large sums of money to the outside world.

7. The use of checks between those dealing in all of the market's financial operations has declined because of the collapse of the element of trust. Transactions are now confined to cash money and to certified cashier's checks. The supply for this type of check cannot be disposed of under any circumstances.

8. One of the most serious consequences of the al-Manakh crisis is its strong impact on the financial establishments that have engaged extensively in discounting post-dated checks and, consequently, in financing various kinds of speculation. As a result, the depositors have withdrawn large sums of money from these establishments and redeposited them in other establishments in Kuwait that have maintained a better reputation.

9. At the regional and international levels: In view of the involvement of a large number of Gulf financial establishments in the al-Manakh Market, a large part of the tension in the Kuwaiti market has reached some local Gulf markets, thus intensifying the attention and anxiety of the monetary authorities.

10. Even though some of the monetary authorities ban banks and financial establishments from discounting [cashing] post-dated checks, many of these establishments have continued to cash such checks and to advance financial credit to speculators and it has been found out that they are experiencing serious financial difficulties.

11. As a result of this, a number of international banks have stopped granting any facilities or credit to the financial establishments that are now known to be heavily involved in the stock market.

#### Conclusion and Expectations

1. Even though the Kuwaiti Government has moved recently to face the stock market problem, its delay in adopting any precautionary measure has undoubtedly affected Kuwait's reputation in the international financial markets.

2. As a result of the crisis, a number of international banks and financial establishments are now more careful, not to say hesitant, than before in dealing with a large number of Kuwaiti financial establishments. This means that the damage has already been done.
3. The temporary ban on deals in post-dated checks and on the foundation of closed companies has been just a transient short-term measures to stop the deterioration.
4. The formation of an arbitration committee and giving this committee judiciary powers and the requirements that all post-dated checks be registered before 22 October 1982 are an important step aimed at knowing the real volume of the post-dated checks in circulation (see text of decree forming the arbitration committee and the accounting committees in another part).
5. There is a common belief that the Kuwaiti Government will exert efforts to save the small investors and will do its utmost to restore confidence in the financial system. But at the same time, it seems that it wants to let the judiciary take their course insofar as those speculators who have been tantamount to the "bad apple" and who ignited the market with their feverish speculation are concerned.
6. It is expected that the crisis will generate pressure on a number of investment firms operating in Kuwait, especially firms with a limited capital base.
7. On the other hand, the commercial banks will be able to overcome the crisis with no significant losses to their reputation and their position in the local and international markets, considering that these banks have accumulated over the past 15 years large reserves which will enable them to cover any losses they may face as a result of the loss of a part of their loans.
8. The crisis must ultimately end up with the closure of the al-Manakh Market and with the disappearance of numerous "companies on paper" with the speed with which they had emerged.
9. Some of the productive, and more established firms, registered in the al-Manakh Market will escape the danger of disappearance and will later try to improve their conditions to the degree which will qualify them to be registered in the official stock market and, consequently, to have their shares circulated among the public.
10. Within the framework of dealing with the consequences of the crisis and of preventing its recurrence, the government is expected to come up with strict laws and regulations governing the stock market activity and speculation transactions. The efforts will focus on eliminating the likely causes of any future crisis instead of focusing on the consequences and, at the same time, will focus on establishing an actual and realistic connection between the companies' productivity and their profits on the one hand and the fluctuations in the prices of their shares on the other.

CAMILLE SHAM'UN DISCUSSES RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL, SYRIA, POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1357, 5 Nov 82 pp 12-14

[Interview with former President Camille Sham'un by AL-HAWADITH: "Camille Sham'un to AL-HAWADITH in London: Americans Have Assured Me That Israel Will Withdraw; I will Stand Against Partition to Last Breath; We are Prepared To Conclude Security Treaty With Each of Syria and Israel"; date and place not specified]

[Text] When [former] President Camille Sham'un entered AL-HAWADITH premises in London on Tuesday, the 26th of last month, he thanked Mrs Umayyah al-Lawzi, the board of directors chairwoman, for the efforts she exerts and for the enormous burdens of the journalistic message she shoulders. The former Lebanese president then looked at a large picture of Salim al-Lawzi and said: I repeat my heartfelt condolences on the loss of Salim al-Lawzi, the founder of AL-HAWADITH. An interview with the Lebanese Front chairman is gratifying because of the man's long experience with the political life of Lebanon and the Middle East from the time before an independent Lebanon and until the present. The man has lived with major events in the Middle East arena and was a bridge for the Palestinian issue to the West and has expressed his readiness to rebuild this bridge despite what has happened in Lebanon. President Sham'un's statements have not been confined to this point because he has said a lot of things in this interview.

[Question] In the statement in which you declared your withdrawal from the candidacy for president of the republic you said that the new president would be controlled by Israel and compelled to make concessions, including the conclusion of a peace treaty. You were thus saying that you reject these conditions. Then Your Excellency went to Washington to declare to the NEW YORK TIMES on 13 October that you have absolutely no objection to the conclusion of a security treaty between Lebanon and Israel and to the formation of a joint Israeli-Lebanese commission. Is this a change of opinion on your part, is it a political tactics or was your first statement meant to embarrass the other candidate?

[Answer] From the first moment the issue of a peace treaty with Israel was brought up, I opposed the idea, considering that Lebanon is a member of the Arab League and must shoulder with utter responsibility the obligations



imposed on it by the provisions of the Arab League constitution and charters, as they have imposed them on every Arab state. It is a point of honor to Lebanon that it has always respected the constitution and the charters more than any other Arab country. This is why I totally excluded the idea of the conclusion of a separate peace treaty between Lebanon and Israel.

When it was said that Israel might not withdraw from Lebanon if there is no peace treaty, I said that the most we can accept is a "security treaty." A security treaty is somewhat similar to the truce that has regulated relations between us and Israel since 1949. According to the security treaty I have mentioned, Israel is required to pledge not to attack Lebanon in the future and to respect fully Lebanese sovereignty, especially in the border areas. On its part, Lebanon pledges not to accept the return of the military and political organizations posing a danger to Israel's security. Most of these points are included in the previous truce agreement.

Therefore, I beg you to correct what has been reported, whether in the U.S. press or other press, about my proposing a peace treaty with Israel. I have not at all said anything of the sort.

[Question] What is the difference between the 1949 truce agreement and the security treaty they are talking about at present?

[Answer] There isn't a big difference. This treaty revives the truce and the provisions neglected to the point where nobody knew any longer of the presence of the truce, since Israel entered Lebanon any time it wanted and the Palestinian forces infiltrated into Israel any time they wanted. Consequently, the truce was no longer in the picture. This [security treaty] revives the truce and adds to it Israel's full respect for Lebanon's sovereignty and for the safety of the Lebanese borders, especially in the wake of the latest war.

In any case, if Israel is required to withdraw from the Lebanese territories, then this withdrawal is also required of the Syrians.

I have no objection of simultaneously concluding a peace treaty with the Syrians, even though the provisions of the Arab League charters make such a treaty unnecessary. However, I have no objection if such a security agreement reassures the Syrians.

[Question] So in what phase is Lebanon at present, especially since the Israeli element is now present as a basic element in the Lebanese issue? How would Your Excellency describe this Lebanese phase: Is it the final phase of a war that has lasted 7 years or is it just a resting station?

[Answer] I hope it is the final phase of the war. If it isn't, then this means that we have done nothing. I hope that international pressure will be exerted on Israel for full withdrawal. I also ask the Syrians with a spirit of full fraternity and understanding to withdraw from our land, considering that Lebanon is an independent state, that we are neighbors and that Syria is a

member of the Arab League. Syria must respect the sovereignty of a country with which it sits at summit and other meetings within the Arab League as two independent states with full sovereignty over their territories. Moreover, no Arab country may occupy the territories of another Arab country.

[Question] You said in the United States that all the military and political organizations hostile to Israel must be abolished. Does the question of the political organizations apply to the question of the Lebanese parties and establishments hostile to Israel? And what is meant by the political organizations?

[Answer] Those organizations that have armed militias for combat and that pose a danger. In any case, we will abolish these organizations, of course. Nothing hostile to Lebanon must exist on Lebanese territories. Only the Lebanese should be free to engage in politics, regardless of whether they agree or disagree with the government. But they should have no right to establish parties hostile to Lebanon or the Lebanese entity.

[Question] Do they have the right to form parties opposed to Israel?

[Answer] Of course. Politically opposed to Israel, of course.

[Question] Concerning the treaty, Israel is demanding security guarantees from Lebanon. Why doesn't Lebanon demand security guarantees from Israel? Who demands: the strong from the weak or vice versa?

[Answer] All these points are mentioned. The treaty I have proposed covers all these points. The guarantees which will be demanded in this treaty will be recorded in the United Nations. Moreover, within all these circumstances, you must have an army to defend yourself. It is not permissible not to have a strong army. In the past, we have been excessively reassured until matters reached the present situation--a situation which started in 1968-69.

Our borders were open, with the Palestinian, the Israeli and the Syrian entering and exiting whenever they wish. Everything we had was open and "we trusted matters to the Arabs in every sense of the word." Now, we will trust to the Arabs major matters of concern to the Arab world. As for our borders, our sovereignty and the safety to our territories, we must safeguard them and must have an adequately strong army to protect Lebanon's territorial sanctity.

[Question] Mr President, during your visit to the United States, did you feel the possibility of a quick withdrawal of the foreign forces from Lebanon --from Al-Biqa', the north, the south and Mount Lebanon?

[Answer] There is some sort of assertion that the foreign forces will withdraw. The Israelis and the Americans have pledged this.

[Question] After the U.S. pledge, fighting broke out in Al-Shuf and this is a serious sign.

[Answer] Al-Shuf battle has ended. The Israelis will withdraw in 2 days and will be replaced by international forces. I believe that the withdrawal of the Israelis and the arrival of the international forces will be countered by a Syrian withdrawal from Al-'Arabaniyah, Bsailima and Qarnayil. This is supposed to take place within a week.

[Question] What is the official status of the PLO office in Lebanon now that the Palestinians have departed from Lebanon?

[Answer] By God, we have had enough of states within a state. The organization's office on Al-Mazra'ah Corniche is still open and has not been closed. The office tends the affairs of Palestinian civilians, without the presence of an accompanying military establishment.

We were defending the Palestinian issue before the organization came into existence. We have been defending the Palestinian issue since 1945. After 36 years of life spent in defending the issue, the 1st house demolished by the Palestinians in Al-Sa'diyat was my house. There is no Arab who has served the Palestinian cause as much as I have served it.

[Question] This is what we say, Mr President. At one time, you built a bridge between the Palestinian issue and the West. Can you rebuild this bridge?

[Answer] I have no objection whatsoever. I differentiate between the Palestinian cause and the actions perpetrated by the Palestinians in Lebanon--actions that are tantamount to an enormous mistake on their part and to ingratitude for all that Lebanon has given their cause.

The Palestinian cause is one thing and the actions of the Palestinians are another. My opposition to the Palestinian action in the form it assumed in Lebanon does not blind me and does not make me view the Palestinian cause as anything other than a rightful cause.

[Question] Mr President, some say that the danger of partition and of resettlement is still prevailing over Lebanon, especially since Israel has issued instructions, yesterday to be specific, for rebuilding homes, not tents, for the Palestinians in the south. Israel has also said that it will protect the Palestinians from any measures that the Lebanese Government may take. Moreover, Israel has formed a Druze militia comprised of Lebanese citizens, has armed them with weapons and has supplied them with Israeli army uniforms.

[Answer] Not at all. This is wrong. Not in Al-Shuf and not in 'Alayh. Some arming is taking place in the south only. I have no knowledge whatsoever of this....

[Question] But the Israeli press has reported this.

[Answer] This is wrong, and more than wrong. If the press has reported this, then it is out of utter ill will, because it would contribute to touching off a civil war. I believe that this is unlikely.

[Question] Let us talk about partition. Don't you think Lebanon's partition will begin with the establishment of a Druze state, for example?

[Answer] The partition of Lebanon is out of the question and the fragmentation of Lebanon is out of the question.

[Question] Has Washington asserted this?

[Answer] Yes, and I stress it to myself and to all the Lebanese, and I will struggle to the last drop of my blood to prevent partition.

[Question] In your statements in Washington, you noted that the Lebanese Army needs 2 years of training and armament to be able to carry out its tasks. We thought that it needed a shorter period.

[Answer] This is a technical opinion. Your technical opinion might be right, and so might mine. I believe that 2 years are enough to form the nucleus of a strong army. This nucleus can preserve internal security and the people's safety until the entire army is reorganized.

[Question] Did President Ilyas Sarkis not build the nucleus of this army and put it in Al-Yarzah and B'abda barracks?

[Answer] What barracks! We don't want to discuss what Ilyas Sarkis did or didn't do. It suffices to say that nobody has done anything for the army or has supplied it with equipment.

[Question] The foreign countries did not cooperate.

[Answer] Let us not blame everything on foreign countries. Foreign countries were willing to sell us, had we had the determination to buy. But we wasted our time in meaningless arguments and debates. The Americans supplied us with artillery and wanted to give us munitions. We turned them down and said we will buy. We received eighteen 105-mm guns without ammunition and decided to purchase the ammunition on our own. The reason they were not purchased were the "commission," brokers' fees and bribes. This is the tragedy that has obstructed arming the army.

[Question] You have noted that the presence of the armed organizations constitutes an obstacle in the face of the legal authority's impregnability, or a state within a state. Now numerous Palestinian and leftist organizations have departed and ended....

[Answer] They have not departed yet.

[Question] Let us talk of those who have not departed yet. Two days ago, the Lebanese forces issued a statement saying that they will keep their weapons due to the country's conditions and the presence of occupation. Don't you think that this continued armed presence is a state within a state?

[Answer] They must disappear and we should have no armed authority other than the state.



[Question] Then how do you interpret the failure to deploy the army in East Beirut, keeping in mind that it had been said that this deployment would take place before President Jumayyil's visits to the outside world?

[Answer] When I left Beirut, I had been informed that the army would be deployed. I don't know why this hasn't happened during my absence. But the army is supposed to be deployed.

[Question] But Your Excellency stated in Washington that the Lebanese forces must maintain their weapons as long as there are aliens on Lebanon's soil.

[Answer] Yes, of course.

[Question] Then how will the army be deployed without confiscating the weapons?

[Answer] God willing, the three withdrawals [Israeli, Syrian and international forces] will take place by the end of the year. We will then tell the Lebanese forces they must give up their weapons and if they wish, they are welcome to join the army.

[Question] Don't you think that the continued control of power by one Lebanese faction poses a danger to the Muslim Lebanese faction?

[Answer] No, there is no fear. I believe that the climate prevailing at present, and which I hope will continue to prevail in the future, is a good climate. Moreover, no thought whatsoever will be given to attacking the other Lebanese side or to even undermining its military or political rights.

[Question] But the signs in Mount Lebanon do not indicate the absence of such a thought.

[Answer] Those are different battles. No battles have erupted between the Druzes and the Christians in Al-Shuf or 'Alayh. The battles took place between militias and did not go beyond that. No attacks have been committed by the citizens. Besides, I have said that the militias must be disarmed anyway. I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the Socialist Party forces in Al-Shuf area have not been disarmed. Moreover, there are no problems in Al-Shuf. What has happened in Kafr Matta is connected with something else and comes within the framework of Israel's reaction to attacks against members of its army.

[Question] It is being circulated that the political parties and organizations in Lebanon must be purely Lebanese. Does this mean that the formation of a communist, leftist or socialist party is banned?

[Answer] No, why are you taking me to the left. I said that if the source of any party is another country, then this party must not exist in Lebanon.

The Communist Party is dangerous and every country that has communists following Moscow is in danger.

[Question] Is there an understanding among the Lebanese on a new Lebanon after an 8-year war? Moreover, we would like to learn from you the true situation within the Lebanese forces, especially since a lot is being said about the presence of a radical group and another group that urges dialogue?

[Answer] What do you mean by the presence of a group urging dialogue?

[Question] We mean that there is a group that supports the present president of the republic in opening up to the other parties and another group that says no dialogue and no leniency with other Lebanese or non-Lebanese parties and that clings to a certain line. Is this true within the Lebanese forces?

[Answer] I don't believe it to be true. Moreover, wasn't martyr Bashir himself more open in the last period? Bashir was not that radical or intransigent.

[Question] How is the phenomenon of Sa'd Haddad to be dealt with?

[Answer] After the Lebanese Army splintered from within, Sa'd Haddad was instructed to take command of whatever was left of the Lebanese Army in Marj'uyun area. He did so in accordance with the instructions issued to him by the command. But because of the prevalent conditions, Sa'd Haddad's communication with the command and with the other Lebanese provinces was cut off. Despite being cut off, he asked the government to continue to ensure his salary and the salary of the army he had with him but the government stopped paying.

[Question] Did the army command ask Sa'd Haddad to hold contacts with Israel?

[Answer] No, he was compelled to do so. In any case, Sa'd Haddad has never at any time allowed removal of the Lebanese flag from Al-Qulay'ah and Marj'uyun and he has persistently asked the Lebanese Government to keep the Lebanese schools and hospitals [open].

[Question] Mr President, were there contacts between you and Haddad for consultation or for complaint, for example?

[Answer] Of course, yes.

[Question] Was he complaining to you of the Lebanese Government's failure or of the excessive Israeli actions?

[Answer] No, he used to complain of the Lebanese Government's failure to respond to supplying the necessities of life in the south. In any case, there are security matters that are a lot more important than Sa'd Haddad's story. So why do you focus on him? He is a small issue and we have other issues we are eager to deal with, issues that concern the entire country. We will rebuild the country, not just in terms of reconstruction but also in terms of rebuilding politically, administratively, militarily, socially and in terms of security. All this is much more important than Sa'd Haddad or Ahmad al-Khatib.

[Question] Mr President, but Israel has accused Sa'd Haddad of perpetrating the massacre in the two camps?

[Answer] No, Israel reversed its statement afterwards and has accused the Phalanges.

[Question] Mr President, who, in your opinion, is the main culprit in this massacre?

[Answer] Haven't you read Sharon's statements in the press?

[Question] Are we to rely on Sharon's statements?

[Answer] Of course, because he is the one responsible and he has explained all the details in his statements.

[Question] Don't you think that he wants to implicate only the Lebanese in the massacre?

[Answer] He has actually implicated the Lebanese.

[Question] This means that the Israeli Army which was stationed at the gates of the camps just stood watching?

[Answer] The Israelis are also responsible for this massacre. They are the ones who ensured the entry of the other parties.

[Question] Mr President, I have a question concerning the future. The future competition between Israel and Lebanon will revolve around who will better serve the U.S. interests in the area. Israel is a strategic military asset for the United States in the area and Lebanon cannot compete in this role, not even in the future.

[Answer] Do you want my answer? Let the relations between the Arab countries be sound, with each country respecting itself and respecting the Arab League charters, then we will not need to compete at all with Israel in serving the United States and will not even think of serving the United States.

In and outside power, we have been engaging in politics from 1948 and until the present. We have at no time tried to compete with Israel or any other country in serving the United States or its strategy.

Now, let the relations between the Arab countries be as sound as they were from 1946 and through 1952, 1953 and 1954, i.e. in the 1950s, then we will not need anybody at all. In the past, we were always in the vanguard. Our presence in the United Nations had a special significance. Our international positions were influential. We were seven or eight Arab states functioning like a single heart. When we became 21 states, we were supposed to exert greater efforts and our international influence was supposed to get stronger but unfortunately....

Tell me of one Arab state that is on speaking terms with another Arab state. Where is the Arab state that is in agreement with another Arab state? Where is the Arab state that does not harbor ill will toward another Arab state? So why do they blame Lebanon and the Lebanese people?

As an official, and I may be greatly responsible for the Lebanese policy, I tell you: Give me back the Arab League as it used to be and the relations between the Arab states as they used to be and we will ask the Americans for nothing other than the normal friendship that binds all countries of the world to each other.

This is the reality. I said in a recent press conference I held that one of the programs Lebanon will work to achieve is a program to restore mutual trust and firm cooperation among the Arab countries to what they used to be. This is a must if the Arab world is to restore its international status.

[Question] With or without Egypt? And with the presence of a link with Israel....

[Answer] With Egypt. Besides, there is no link with Israel, now that a satisfactory mentality has prevailed among us. Israel...Israel! Now, encourage the present regime in Egypt to resume performing its role in the Arab policy and I believe that if it does not then revoke the peace treaty with Israel, this treaty will turn into a very "superficial" thing.

We must not permit the ghost--Israel, Israel, Israel--to materialize before us in every thing we do and to afflict us with a madness that prevents us from achieving any rational or positive solution and that impels us to continue to view matters in a completely negative way because of the presence of the ghost.

[Question] But Mr President, you have noted in the conversation that unfortunately, if Israel insists on something it achieves it.

[Answer] This is insofar as the U.S. policy is concerned, meaning that the U.S. policy does not pressure Israel as it should in order to settle some matters. But this does not apply to the Arab world, if the Arab world acts in solidarity and unity. For God's sake, 20 Arab states with 150 million people and yet they cannot have a voice equalling that of Zanzibar's!

[Question] Many people have said that certain circles have killed Bashir Jumayyil, mentioning Israel specifically. But what the Lebanese Front has said points in the direction of others, thus causing confusion among the Lebanese. What is your opinion?

[Answer] I have heard the first report which was circulated in Beirut and in which it was said that it is possible that Israel is behind Bashir's assassination. But we cannot make a judgment of course because the investigation conducted by the Lebanese forces themselves indicates otherwise.



I will answer frankly. I wish a judicial investigation would be conducted into Bashir's assassination because a judicial inquiry is the only thing that will produce the truth. Can you imagine the head of state being murdered without a judicial inquiry being conducted! This shows that we are still in an erratic state.

[Question] Why hasn't the state demanded that it conduct the inquiry and who has prevented it from doing so?

[Answer] I empower you to ask this question on my behalf on the pages of AL-HAWADITH and to say that I wish that the state would undertake the inquiry.

[Question] We have read a lot about the princes of Lebanese politics, meaning the traditionalists. Does the new generation want to dispense with the wisdom and experience of the generation preceding it and is this a struggle between two generations concealing behind it other things.

[Answer] This is the first time I have heard the phrase "princes of politics." Anyway, this is a natural ambition. The youth want to work and to assume responsibilities. In any case, the princes you are talking about are tired and they should withdraw gradually.

[Question] Nearly 2 years ago, they asked a Lebanese woman on Lebanon's television....

[Answer] Was she a pretty woman?

[Question] Very pretty. They asked her who will solve Lebanon's issue and she said: "Nobody other than Camille Sham'un will solve it." How does Your Excellency want to solve the Lebanese issue?

[Answer] I attest to this lady's good sense and my gratitude makes my testimony serious. There isn't a single individual who can claim that he is able to solve the Lebanese issue. Each of us should put all the opinions, wisdom and experience he has in the service of Lebanon. This is the truth. I am talking about the people from my generation, meaning Sa'ib Salam, Pierre Jumayyil, myself and others. We all still have a little strength and we put it in the service of Lebanon.

[Question] Why did you withdraw as a candidate for the presidency?

[Answer] Because, basically, the nomination did not emanate from me personally. The party made the nomination and "got me involved" in the issue. But I then found that I would be a cause of division and dissention and thus withdrew.

[Question] After the long years of the war and the great experience you gained from this tragedy, what is your advice to the future generations so that they may not fall into the same quagmire?

[Answer] I will say what I have always demanded, namely that sectarianism be eliminated, that we establish public interest, not sectarianism, as the more important thing and that we formulate development and reconstruction programs in every sense of the word so that we may face the year 2000 when Lebanon's population will amount to 5 million. Therefore, we must prepare Lebanon and not just build an administration, a judiciary, an army and whatever else the Lebanese demand. No, we must know the future needs and must start planning for this as of this moment. Let me cite the water issue as an example. We don't have enough water to meet the population needs in the year 2000. As for roads, the coastal roads are first class roads but all the mountain roads are still dangerous. Lebanon is a tourist country. Consequently, we must build first class roads, regardless of the cost.

Then there is education. We can no longer afford to let students choose what they want because they will choose all the easy disciplines, such as law, political and economic sciences and arts. If we want an advanced country that keeps up pace with civilization, then we need technology so that we may achieve the level of the most advanced country, whether in the West or the East. This means that we need a complete program to be able to achieve the level of progress in the East and the West.

[Question] Regarding the social issue, before the war the Lebanese grew up with freedom and democracy. Their country was open and flourishing. Then came the war generation which has grown up with a ferocious war. Do you think that a gap will develop between the two generations?

[Answer] We hope that the feeling of freedom will never vanish from Lebanon, else there is no need for its existence. Lebanon's society will continue to be a free and democratic society in every sense of the word, meaning sound democracy and not the democracy of words.

[Question] Mr President, do you think that President Amin Jumayyil can lay the foundations of the Lebanon of the year 2000?

[Answer] I hope so and I believe that this is the important thing. Moreover, we should not forget that throughout the past 8 years, not only destruction and ruination have been wreaked on the country but we were not able to equip the country with anything.

Preparation is missing in every sense of the word. It is true that we have the Beirut-Tripoli highway and the Beirut-Sidon highway, both of which are excellent. But there is nothing else.

[Question] A final question, Mr President: When you visited your palace in Dayr al-Qamar....

[Answer] It is a house and not a palace.

[Question] Some people were afraid that you would leave Al-Ashrafiyah and reside finally in Dayr al-Qamar.

[Answer] The house in Bayt al-Qamar is a summer home. It is certain that I will spend the summer and some weekends in Bayt al-Qamar but I will not leave Al-Ashrafiyah. I have developed a strange pleasure in living in Al-Ashrafiyah, having "tasted" all kinds of big, small and medium-size bombs. I no longer have the desire to leave my home, located in the second floor of one of Al-Ashrafiyah apartment buildings.

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CSO: 4404/96

REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES CONFERENCE MAKE-UP

Tripoli AL-FAJR AL-JADID in Arabic 27 Aug 82 p 4

[Article: "What About the Fifth Conference? Report of the Administrative Committee Overseeing the Conference"]

[Text] Members of the revolutionary committees participating in the fifth conference of the revolutionary committees began to be received the evening of 25 August, 1982 according to the specified locations, which were prepared for each revolutionary committee or municipality.

The total number of revolutionary committee members arriving at the conference from all the people and localities in the Jamahiriyah exceeds 8,000.

The number of members of the women's revolutionary committees was 1,267.

The number of members of the revolutionary committees for the armed forces was about 1,100.

The preparatory committee for the conference devoted itself to providing all necessities and took all steps necessary for the success of the conference. Several other committees branched off from the preparatory committee: The communications committee, the rooms committee, the food committee, the information committee, and the supervisory committee for the convention center and the operations room. Each committee conducts its business and its special functions in light of its assignment.

The members of the revolutionary localities are received in accordance with the lists prepared by the office for communication with the revolutionary committees. There is a registration form filled in by the members of the revolutionary committees. A daily program will be drawn up for those who are participating in the conference. It will be determined in light of the chairman's meeting on the opening day.

The necessary steps have been taken to determine the schedules and meeting places, in the following manner:



\* Al-Fatih University--embraces about 20 of the Jamahiriyah's municipalities as well as members of the revolutionary committees at the two universities and the petroleum sector. They number about 3000 revolutionary committee members.

\* Institute of Financial Studies--This center was prepared for the members of the following revolutionary committees: Al-Zawiyah, Al-Nuqat Al-Khamas, Al-'Aziziyah, and Yafran. They number 650.

\* Al-Fatih Institute for Girls--It was designated for members of the women's revolutionary committees and those of the educational foundations for girls' schools and institutes. They number 1,267.

\* Salah-al-Din al-Ayubi School--It has been prepared [for] about 1000 revolutionary committee members.

\* Al-Majd Institute for Women Teachers--It has been prepared to take in about 500 members from the city of Tripoli.

\* Ibn Manzur Institute--It has been designated for the Armed Forces branch, which numbers 1,100 members.

The necessary steps have been taken to provide the food needed for the members participating in the conference.

The revolutionary force which prepared the conference was organized and distributed among 135 [people], and also formed a drafting committee.

The halls and auditoriums where the lectures will be given have been determined. Among them are: The public hall at Al-Farusiyah Field, Airport Road; the Al-Fatih University auditorium; and the hall of Al-Fatih Institute for Girls.

9605

CSO: 4504/528

## NEW DAM, ROAD INAUGURATED ON ANNIVERSARY OF REVOLUTION

Tripoli AL-FAJR AL-JADID in Arabic 3 Sep 82 p 1

[Article: "Leader of the Revolution Opens Gharyan-Abu Ghilan Two-Lane Road, Wadi Zarat Dam and Wadi Ghan Dam"]

[Text] In the profusion of celebrations on the thirteenth anniversary of the great Al-Fatih revolution, the Libyan Arab people added tremendous new accomplishments to the series of accomplishments and cultural transformations which have been achieved because of the great Al-Fatih revolution and because of the direct returns from the people wielding their power and controlling their revolution.

Yesterday the leader of the revolution opened the Gharyan-Abu Chilan two-lane road. It crosses rugged, mountainous areas, stretching for 17.5 kilometers with a width of 22 meters in both directions. Thus, with the extension of this distance which crosses the mountainous area, the Tripoli-Al-'Aziziyah-Abu Ghilan road is linked to the Gharyan-Nalut, Gharyan-Birak road of the south of the Jamahiriayah.

The ceremony which was held at the opening of this project, which is part of the new modern network of roads in the Jamahiriyah, was attended by the Secretary of the Popular Committee for Communications and Maritime Transport and several secretaries of the conferences and the popular committees.

The National Foundation for Roads carried out this vital project.

The leader also opened two other projects yesterday, among the productivity transition projects. They were achieved within the framework of the agricultural revolution and achieving high rates of production. [One] was the Wadi Zarat Dam, which is 2728 meters long, one of the longest dams in the Jamahiriyah. This dam's reservoir will feed the Wadi al-Hayy agricultural project with a quantity of water estimated at 4.3 million cubic meters annually, by means of a network of pipelines.

Construction of this dam lasted 45 months. The maximum water storage capacity of the reservoir is 28.1 million cubic meters, and the maximum area of this reservoir is 294 hectares. The area of the watershed which feeds this reservoir was determined to be 175 square kilometers.

At the peak of our people's celebration's on the thirteenth anniversary of the Al-Fatih revolution, the revolution of gigantic accomplishments and transformations, the Leader of the revolution opened the Wadi Ghan Dam yesterday. It is one of the most important of the vital projects which are aimed at controlling the Wadi Ghan flood waters.

The watershed area which feeds this dam amounts to 650 square kilometers, while the total volume of this reservoir's water is 29.5 million cubic meters.

The probable annual storage quantity for this dam's reservoir is estimated at 21 million cubic meters, while the area of the reservoir is 102 hectares, whereas the height of the Wadi Ghan Dam is 84 meters.

The purpose of this dam is to control the Wadi Ghan floodwaters, to protect the Wadi Al-Hayrah agricultural project, and to use the water stored in the dam's reservoir to irrigate the Wadi al-Hayrah agricultural project by means of a pipeline.

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CSO: 4504/528

AGRICULTURE PLAN OUTLINED FOR 1981-1985, ANIMAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT

Tripoli AL-FAJR AL-JADID in Arabic 5 Sep 82 p 6

[Article: "Reclamation of Vast Areas of Fertile and Unirrigated Arable Land; Projects for Livestock Resources in Several Areas of the Jamahiriyah"]

[Text] Sources from the General Popular Committee for Planning stated that projects to reclaim vast areas of fertile and unirrigated arable land are approaching completion, in addition to the projects pertaining to livestock resources, which will actually help raise agricultural and livestock production to achieve self-sufficiency in agricultural and animal products.

The sources reported that the current 1981-1985 plan is also aimed at developing 66,331 hectares of fertile land and 355,233 hectares of unirrigated land. It will also increase the overall grazing land capacity by reclaiming and developing 1,318,709 hectares to ensure and effect the growth of fodder sources in the grazing lands and organize the herding areas to increase meat production. In addition, a project will be carried out to develop and promote the coastal belt so as to achieve ideal use of the arable lands on the coastal belt.

The sources added that the total number of palm trees will be increased from 4.6 million to 5.2 million by the end of 1985. The number of fruit producing trees of various types will be increased from 3.1 million to 4.1 million.

Production of forest seedlings will also be increased to more than 5 million during the years of the plan, and the number of nurseries associated with forests will be increased from 22 to 28 by the end of the current plan.

It has been decided to plant forest trees on 165,405 hectares and to plant 63,443 hectares with windbreaks to prevent sand from creeping onto arable land, so that by the end of the plan the total area will reach 228,848 hectares of land. The number of cattle stations in the various areas from all parts of the Jamahiriyah will also be expanded, so that at the end of the plan years it will have increased from 64 to 92 stations,



with a total estimated capacity of 46,000 head of cattle. This is in addition to establishing hen farms for producign meat fowl with a capacity of 162,000 hens, increasing the number of he farms for producing eggs to a capacity of 24,000 hens, setting up four hatcheries with a production capacity of 15.9 million chicks per year, setting up farms for egg production with a capacity of 113.4 million eggs per year, setting up two integrated farms with a capacity of 7.5 million birds and two fattening farms with a capacity of 225,000 birds per year, and setting up 16 automated slaughterhouses in various areas of the Jamahiriyah.

The sources from the Popular Committee for Planning also reported that the central area of the Jamahiriyah will be provided with about 700 million cubic meters of water suitable for agriculture annually, to irrigate about 50,000 hectares of farmland.

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CSO: 4504/528

## MAURITANIA

### BRIEFS

FRENCH RURAL DEVELOPMENT AID--Nouakchott, 19 Nov (AFP)--France has granted Mauritania 3.6 million francs (\$514,000) in financial aid for several rural development projects, it was announced here on Thursday. Mauritania's planning minister, Lieutenant-Colonel Amadou Babaly, and French Ambassador Bernard Lopinot signed the three conventions under a cooperation accord between the two countries. [Text] [AB190735 Paris AFP in English 0713 GMT 19 Nov 82]

CSO: 4500/30

## MOROCCO

### BRIEFS

COOPERATION WITH FINLAND--Rabat, 13 Nov (MAP)--Mr Mahjoubi Aherdan, Moroccan state minister of cooperation, presided over the signing ceremony of a cooperation agreement between Morocco and Finland. The agreement, concluded Friday, was reached at the end of the second meeting of the Moroccan-Finnish Joint Commission. It is related to cooperation in the areas of information, tourism, energy and mines, fisheries, handicrafts and equipment. The agreement was signed on the Moroccan side by Mr Ahmed Rahmani [spelling of name as received], director of bilateral cooperation of the State Ministry of Cooperation, and on the Finnish side by Mr Jan Groop [spelling of name as received], ambassador-advisor of the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The signing ceremony was attended by the members of the Moroccan-Finnish Joint Commission and other officials. [Text] [LD140244 Rabat MAP in English 1220 GMT 13 Nov 82]

CSO: 4500/30

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

HISTORY OF CURRENT POLITICAL SYSTEM, UNIFICATION ISSUE DISCUSSED

Paris LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE in French No 343, Oct 82 pp 22-23

[Article by Chris Kutschera: "Is The Red Star Waning?"]

[Text] Since the declaration of independence 15 years ago (30 November 1967) after a bitter struggle against British forces, several palace revolutions and coups d'etat have marked the power struggle which has pitted various political factions of the FNL [National Liberation Front] against the PSY [Yemeni Socialist Party].

After the "corrective movement" of 22 June 1969 and the removal of President Qahtan al-Sha'da, the leftist wing of the FNL came to power. It consolidated its hold on 2 August 1971 by removing Mr Muhammad 'Ali Haythan as head of government and setting up a triumverate which governed the country for 7 years with Messrs Salim Rubay'ah as president of the republic, 'Abd al-Fatah Isma'il as party secretary general and 'Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani as president of the council.

Salim Rubay'ah was eliminated--and executed--on 26 June 1978.<sup>1</sup> According to the current terminology, the "opportunists of the left" were then excluded from the party: Salim Rubay'ah had veered too sharply toward North Yemen and Saudi Arabia.

Mr 'Abd al-Fatah Isma'il then accumulated the functions of party secretary general and head of state and Mr 'Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani remained as head of the government.

During the following period, South Yemen practically became an Arab Cuba. After joining Comecon in June 1979, the government signed a treaty of friendship with the USSR on 2 October 1979. Domestically, the country has been closely governed by the PSY--which, except for its name, is indistinguishable from a communist party--created on 14 October 1978.

Then 2 years later, on 22 April 1980, a palace revolution put an end--without bloodshed--to the power of Mr 'Abd al-Fatah Isma'il. Named

president of the party (a position created for the occasion), he left for Moscow on 27 June 1980 and is still there. "I am still nonplussed about it," said a Western diplomat who knows the Middle East well, "the system appeared to be locked up completely."

The extraordinary congress of the PSY which met from 12 to 14 October 1980 reinforced the authority of Mr 'Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani, who henceforth acquired the three positions of party secretary general, head of state and prime minister. While restating his fidelity to the struggle against imperialism and Zionism, the party is emphasizing a policy of peaceful coexistence; improvement in the people's standard of living has priority and the new government is aiming to double at least the average per capita income during this decade. It was the beginning of an opening whose effects are being felt in all areas.

In some respects, life in Aden still is similar to what one sees in Moscow: foreigners are totally isolated from the people. The article in the penal code dating from 1975 calling for severe punishment for Yemenis having contacts with foreigners has apparently been repealed but the climate has not changed very much. This isolation does not only affect Europeans. One Palestinian militant connected with the PLO who has lived in Aden for several years said, "I lived in a building with Yemenis for 3 years without knowing my neighbors on the same stairway." Diplomats cannot leave the city of Aden without authorization from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Yemenis do not have the right to enter embassies--so much so that an ambassador must submit a written request to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for a glazier to replace a window. The cultural centers operate in a closed circle, for the exclusive use of foreign communities. Foreign businessmen and technicians authorized to travel to remote provinces can only travel by plane; they are forbidden to make long trips overland. Yet imperceptibly, South Yemen is opening to Western countries.

Contracts with Western companies are increasing: French companies are doing seismic research, building hotels, office buildings, cold storage compartments and renovating the Aden hospital. A Belgian company is developing the port of Mukalla; West German firms are building a brewery, the control tower at Mukalla Airport and a power plant in Aden; the Japanese will be responsible for electric power plants in Aden and in Hadhramaout and a telecommunications system; several British consulting companies almost have the monopoly on feasibility studies. Finally, an Italian company discovered petroleum off Mukalla.

The statistics are clear: the OECD countries have benefited from the almost 50 percent increase in imports to South Yemen between 1979 (123.3 million dinars) and 1980 (177.8 million dinars).<sup>2</sup> The four largest commercial suppliers of the PDRY [People's Democratic Republic of Yemen] are Japan, Great Britain, Australia and France--China and the USSR are only in sixth and seventh places.



In 1970, the first 3-year plan, for a sum of 42 million pounds sterling, was two-thirds financed by socialist countries: the USSR, China, North Korea, East Germany, Bulgaria and Romania. Today, it is absolutely impossible to determine the contribution of socialist countries to the most recent plan (1982-1985) which is budgeted at 580 million dinars--this is almost a state secret--but certainly it will be secondary and the slack will be picked up by institutions like the development funds of Kuwait or the Emirates and the World Bank whose soft loans South Yemen greatly appreciates.<sup>3</sup>

When asked about this breakthrough by Westerners, a member of the Central Committee of the PSY only noted that in 1970 local companies could satisfy basic needs which was no longer possible when investments increased. "Moreover," he emphasized, "the special conditions for bids on World Bank loans--which have been adopted by organizations like the Kuwaiti Development Fund, the Abu-Dhabi fund, etc--almost exclude the countries of the East."<sup>4</sup>

Western diplomats in Aden think that the new attitude of the leaders might be motivated by a certain disillusionment with the results of the industrial techniques of socialist countries: there is the example of the power plant connected with a desalinization plant that the Soviets are scheduled to build in Aden. It has still not gotten off the ground 2 years after the contract was signed.

In Mukalla, it took the Russians 4 years to finish a fish preserving plant which should not have taken more than 10 months. Despite the presence of many Soviet technicians, this factory's production is still very low. One Yemeni technician noted that the textile plant at Aden built by the Chinese in late 1975 was equipped from the outset with outdated equipment and he added: "We had no choice, the Chinese told us: 'With this loan, you get this equipment.'"

The Yemenis reportedly are also disillusioned with the lack of results from the petroleum prospecting done by the Soviets in the Sanaw region, near the border of Saudi Arabia and Oman, while AGIP [National Italian Oil Company] discovered a deposit in March 1982. In all probability, Soviet petroleum prospecting was part of their technical assistance--in other words, it is a loan, not a gift. "While the Yemenis did not pay a penny for the prospecting by AGIP which assumed all financial risks, they must pay the Russians who found nothing," remarked a Western diplomat.

According to the same diplomatic sources, there may have been a financial disagreement between Aden and Moscow, with the Yemeni leaders requesting debt rescheduling and a 5-year moratorium.

Finally, the catastrophic results of the March 1982 floods, the amount of damages estimated at approximately \$1 billion, or the total investments

for the last 4 years of the plan, must have exacerbated the financial situation in Yemen and forced the leaders of Aden to seek more aid from Western countries.

#### Modification of the Agricultural Policy

The Aden authorities are changing their agricultural policy which shows the same pragmatism, the same desire to increase production and even abandon excessively rigid programs closely modeled on the Russian system.

Promulgated in two stages in 1968 and 1970, agrarian reform was limited to private properties up to 8 hectares of irrigated land and up to 16 hectares of nonirrigated land and established a system of state farms and cooperatives based on the models of sovkhozes and kolkhozes.<sup>5</sup>

State farms are from 200 to 400 hectares, according to the region and type of crop and, because of mechanization, have a small staff of from 40 to 100 wage earners, considered workers. Their monthly wage is relatively low, from 37 to 45 dinars and can amount to 50 dinars with overtime. In addition to employment security, these farm workers have many employee benefits: health, accident and life insurance and a pension.

Forming autonomous financial entities with their own budget, state farms, when set up, obtain a loan of about 80,000 dinars from the government which they begin to repay as soon as they make a profit. At the end of each year, the profits (after various deductions) are divided between the state (75 percent) and the farm workers (25 percent): practically, the distribution of these profits equals an extra month's wage.

Rather complex, the system of production cooperatives is based on bringing together various types of production units: centered around a well and a pump, the production unit includes several plots of land most often worked by two or three peasants and occasionally, five or six for the largest. Collective owners of the means of production, these peasants in theory work collectively but often they share water from a well and work their own plot individually. There are many individual production units, formerly private property which after the agrarian reform became the property of the cooperative: these peasants own their pump and are responsible for its maintenance; to a great extent, they determine their work plan and as much as possible sell their crop on the open market. They receive a minimum of services from the cooperative. Although integrated into a system of cooperatives, many former owners retain a measure of autonomy: in some cooperatives, in Hadhramaut mainly, they farm 30 percent of the land.

In addition to these production cooperatives, there are SLMA [Farm Equipment Rental Stations] which, with aid from the USSR, Bulgaria and East Germany, are equipped with tractors and harvester-threshers rented at subsidized prices (4 dinars an hour per tractor).

In all, this forms a rather cumbersome system: 35 state farms employing about 3,000 workers, 44 production cooperatives with 36,000 peasants and 31 service cooperatives with 16,000 people. Productivity is not thought to be satisfactory.

Other than purely technical reasons--shortage of water, fertilizers and farm equipment--the low productivity of Yemeni agriculture is caused by the sum of the conditions. On one hand, the government each year deducts 23 percent from the production of each cooperative (state tax: 10 percent; cooperative operating expenses: 5 percent; employee benefits: 3 percent and tax for the maintenance of the pump: 5 percent). To stop penalizing the best peasants, the government is considering taxing cooperatives on the basis of their size (not their production) and services really rendered: for example, the 5 percent tax for pumps would be replaced by actual maintenance fees, plus a modest service tax.

On the other hand, all peasants in the cooperatives and state farms complain about the low price for farm products set by the government. These prices were, however, raised recently but the peasants want another increase.

Moreover, farm products are distributed by two state companies, the National Company for Domestic Trade (for cereals) and the People's Company for the Distribution of Fruits and Vegetables. Until Mr 'Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani became president, these two companies had the monopoly on distribution but a new law promulgated in late 1980 allows peasants to sell 40 percent of their fruits and vegetables on the local markets for prices up to 150 percent of the official prices.

Finally, the services of the SLMA leave something to be desired. Under-supplied with tractors, lacking spare parts and drivers because of very low wages, poorly managed, the SLMA only fulfilled 65 percent to 70 percent of their work plan in recent years.

The often excessively large cooperatives (generally, they have 900 to 1,000 members who, despite the election of an advisory board, ultimately have little control over the management) seem like a government institution which controls everything and collects taxes without always supplying the expected services.

Determined to increase the productivity of the cooperatives, the new government is considering modifying its agricultural policy by creating

small units of collective production with more flexible management; they would own their tractors and pumps, have some financial autonomy and could borrow from the agricultural bank to be set up.

#### Diplomatic Opening on All Sides

We see a very definite diplomatic opening to Western Europe and the Arab countries. After the spring 1981 visit to Aden by Mr John Moberley, deputy undersecretary of the Foreign Office, Mr Salim Salih Muhammad, foreign affairs minister of South Yemen, made an official visit to London in late November 1981 and went on in December to France, the only Western country with which Yemen has cooperation agreements. Very recently, the government accredited ambassadors from some Western European countries: Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Belgium and Switzerland.

Likewise, South Yemen has normal relations with almost all Arab countries while it practically became an outlaw in July 1978 when the 15 moderate members of the Arab League suspended all their economic and cultural relations with Aden and froze diplomatic relations.

The country now has cordial relations with the Gulf Emirates even though South Yemen refused to recognize its independence and opposed their entry into the Arab League because it then considered them puppet states. Relations are so cordial now that Yemen accepted the mediation of the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait in the historic conflict between Aden and Muscat.

These two countries, which have never had diplomatic relations, were on the verge of war in the early 70's when South Yemen completely supported the FPLO [Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman] which was only crushed after the massive intervention of Iranian forces at Dhufar. Today, although it still has offices in Aden and Mukalla and the Voice of the Revolution of Oman still broadcasts long distance from Radio Aden, the front no longer has in the eyes of Aden's leaders, the importance it once had and, without any passion, the Yemeni rulers analyze the three components of their conflict with the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman.

After marking out one border in 1965 when they were still at Aden, the British drew another in 1968 which gave Muscat several hundred square km belonging to Aden. The rulers of Aden also claim the island of Kuria-Muria and want indemnity for the damages suffered by several Yemeni villages bombed during the Dhufar war;

Although Aden's leaders consider that the problem of the FPLO and its relations with the government of Muscat is Oman's domestic matter, it nevertheless is among the problems which must be solved to settle the dispute between Aden and Muscat;

Yet it is the political policies of Sultan Qaboos bin Said, his support for the Camp David agreements, his entire foreign policy and the removal of bases for American forces which are the main obstacles to a settlement. Rejecting in advance the parallel which might be drawn with the Soviet presence in Aden, one member of the Central Committee of the PSY who is very close to President 'Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani, stated, "Where did you see Soviet bases in the PDRY, in Aden or in Socotra? Of course, we have Russian experts because we have Russian weapons, as the Saudis have thousands of American and Pakistani technicians. Experts are not bases."<sup>6</sup>

On 4 May 1982, Sheik Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir Al Sabah, Kuwaiti minister of foreign affairs, and Mr Rashid 'Abdallah 'Ali al-Nu'aymi, minister of state of foreign affairs of the United Arab Emirates, met in Aden with President 'Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani, after seeing King Khalid in Riyadh and talking in Muscat with Sultan Qaboos bin Said. According to the Kuwaiti newspaper AL ANBA, diplomats of the Gulf Emirates reportedly submitted a six-point plan including a high-level meeting between representatives of Aden and Muscat, a pledge not to use the territory of one against the other and finally, the establishment of diplomatic relations.

On 18 May 1982, 2 weeks later, President 'Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani met with a delegation from the FPLO headed by Mr Muhammad Ahmed al-Ghasinim a member of the front's executive committee. Did he raise objections which convinced President 'Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani to postpone the scheduled contacts. The meeting planned for 5 May 1982 in Kuwait between the secretaries of state of the ministries of foreign affairs of Aden and Muscat was canceled at the last moment. Yet no one in Aden disputes that "someday the two sides must meet and talk," and President 'Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani himself stated that he was "ready to meet Sultan Qaboos, if he does not take a position against the Yemeni or Palestinian people."<sup>7</sup>

The dispute with Saudi Arabia is more serious: "Since the beginning, Saudi Arabia has opposed our independent policy," explained one PSY Central Committee member, "they have welcomed the groups of Makkawi<sup>8</sup> and Muhammad 'Ali Haythan."<sup>9</sup>

Early this year, Aden's government had to deal with a very serious subversion attempt: the authorities arrested a group of about 12 saboteurs who were to blow up the Aden refinery and the refueling terminal for cargo ships at the port of Aden. A total of 300,000 Yemenis work in Saudi Arabia and it would not be difficult, by offering a bribe of several thousand rials, to find some individuals ready to do anything. According to President 'Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani's entourage, the purpose was to create trouble and justify external intervention: "At the same time, two brigades were positioned on the Oman border. It was a joint operation," stated one of the president's close colleagues, who



stressed that these troops were withdrawn as soon as the saboteurs' arrest was publicized. In any event, the diplomats stationed in Aden state that the trial which followed with intensive television coverage was not a pure propaganda operation to regain control over the people: "The Yemeni leaders were obviously very frightened," said one Western diplomat, "they had an impressive deployment of tanks and troops on Aden's coast. Believe me, it was not a show."

In spite of everything, Aden's leaders coolly analyze their relations with Saudi Arabia: the problem is much more complex than with Oman because it does not just involve several hundred unjustly occupied square km but entire provinces which the Saudis annexed--Jizan and Asir (this closely concerns North Yemen, it is true, but the leaders of the South see the problem from the viewpoint of unity) and for the South, Khamis Mushayt and Shirq Ra'sas. "This matter will not be settled tomorrow or in the near future," admits one central committee party member, "this will take a long time and it is not for our generation."

He emphasized that South Yemen was able to establish normal relations with the Gulf Emirates, Kuwait and Abu Dhabi "because the Emirates respect us and we respect them; they do not interfere in our affairs." Mentioning relations with Saudi Arabia, President 'Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani said, "We have always been ready to have normal relations. We visited Saudi Arabia several times. These visits expressed our desire for healthy, normal relations. Their reaction was not the same; they did not have the same desire."

President 'Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani criticized the Saudis for their interference in the domestic affairs of South Yemen and in the relations between the two Yemens: "Saudi Arabia was behind the two wars of 1972 and 1979 between the North and the South; each time we became close to our brothers in the North, they created difficulties for us. We have, however, told them clearly that we believe that the unity of the two Yemens will diminish tensions and help create an atmosphere of security in the region."<sup>10</sup>

Aden's leaders understand very well why the Saudi princes are hostile to the unification of Yemen: "If we succeed in uniting," said one leader, "we would be a nation of 9 million inhabitants while the Saudis would not even have 4 million."

Aden's rulers consider unification inevitable. They realize that their sparsely inhabited (under 2 million inhabitants), extremely arid (area cultivated: .2 percent of the land) country without resources cannot hope to play an important role--even if it becomes an oil producer and finally escapes from abject poverty. North Yemen, they feel, has the same reasons to want unity: "Sana has no choice," people say readily in Aden, "either its leaders allow it to be completely absorbed by the Saudis or they opt for unity."

## Unification and the Virtues of Pragmatism

People in Aden speak a new language when discussing the problem of unity. Certainly, the agreement signed in Kuwait on 30 March 1979 is still in effect.<sup>11</sup> As arranged, the two presidents meet regularly--the last meeting was in Taz on 5 May 1982. But, as one of President 'Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani's close associates acknowledged, "It is obvious that unity will not be achieved tomorrow." In the meantime, the Aden rulers follow the advice of the East Germans who say: "The reunification of Germany will not be achieved tomorrow either, but specific measures help improve relations in the economic area, etc."

This "realistic" attitude was jeopardized by the violent fighting going on in North Yemen since the summer of 1981 between the FND [National Democratic Front] guerrillas<sup>12</sup> and the tribal forces and army of the leaders of Sana: on 28 April 1982, a few days before the meeting in Taz between the two presidents, violent fighting broke out on several fronts--one situated west of Ibb and Dhamar, extending from Raymah and Otoma to al Udain and the other, to the east of the Taz-Sana road. According to Sultan 'Umar, FND president, more than 13,000 soldiers and tribal warriors were committed to this offensive, as well as tanks, katyushas and heavy artillery which injured many civilians:

"It is a filthy war: there are more atrocities in North Yemen than in El Salvador," said the FND president who added: "We did not want this battle, if we had decided to fight, we would do it at Sana to take power. Saudi Arabia encouraged 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih (president of North Yemen) to take the offensive."<sup>13</sup>

According to the Sana authorities who have imposed total censorship on the guerrilla war, the front is only Aden's instrument.<sup>14</sup> The prime minister of North Yemen, Mr 'Abd al-Karim Iryani, even said that three leaders of the PUP [Party of Popular Unity]--among them Messrs Yahya al-Shami and Jaralla 'Umar--belong to the politburo of the ruling party in Aden--which is not true.

Of course, people emphasize in Aden that "the Yemenis are a single people;" the PSY statutes stipulate that party membership is "open to any Yemeni, man or woman," no matter what his place of residence, specified one official. As Mr Salah Hassan Muhammad, director of the school for scientific socialism in Aden, said, "the son of a minister from Sana can be an important member of our party." The historic ties between those who took part in the revolution against the Iman at Sana in 1962 and those who led the struggle against the British in Aden in 1967 are close, if only because some of them came from the same Arab nationalist movement where they came in contact with men like Messrs Nayif Hawathmah and George Habash in Beirut in the 50's. A man like Mr Sultan 'Umar, born

in Taz, now FND president, was an official of the FNL (of South Yemen) for the Aden sector before and after independence (1967).

No one would seriously deny how well established the front<sup>15</sup> is locally; in each governorate, it has a regional leadership group made up of representatives of various organizations and private citizens--merchants, tribal chiefs and religious leaders. To those who maintain that the front could not survive if the South Yemenis closed their border and suspended their aid, Mr Sultan 'Umar replied, "They cannot close their border because we are strong. No one can close the border, neither the people in the North nor those in the South. We have strong political bases among the people of the South. (In the event of conflict), they would fight with us."<sup>16</sup>

How ultimately will President 'Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani act if he has to choose between his pragmatism, his desire to avoid a third war between the two Yemens and faithfulness to a certain revolutionary past? One diplomat stationed in Aden underlined that the choice is even more difficult because the president's political base includes men like Minister of Defense Salih Muslih Qasim who favor union by force.

The signing of the tripartite treaty (South Yemen, Ethiopia and Libya) on 19 August 1981 was, for many observers, a sign that Aden's government had not changed under Mr 'Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani. The leaders of Sana and Mogadiscio, in particular, consider that the tripartite treaty is aimed directly at their countries: "This treaty is contrary to the spirit of the Arab League," said one Arab diplomat in Aden, "of course, cooperation agreements are possible in the context of the Arab League but this treaty associates two Arab countries with Ethiopia which is not an Arab country. Then, Libya is very far from South Yemen: this is not a local matter. Finally, the treaty refers to socialist forces:<sup>17</sup> this is no longer a regional affair, it introduces foreign forces into the region. This treaty is a destabilizing factor and that is serious."

Yet some European diplomats are much less alarmed: "Of course, as soon as people mention South Yemen, they immediately see Moscow's game," said one diplomat, "but we must go beyond this somewhat simplistic analysis." Stressing that the immediate advantages which South Yemen obtained from this treaty were first material--aid of \$400 million from Libya, of which \$100 million was in cash, this diplomat pointed out that Colonel Qadhdhafi, the man of the "Green Book," has never been particularly favorable to communist propaganda. "Did the Soviets have the initiative on this treaty or did the Arabs? Who is fooling whom? We may well ask," added this diplomat who termed the political position of President 'Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani an "enigma." The fact that this man, prime minister since 1971, has survived all the realignments that have shaken the country in 10 years indicates that he has a certain pragmatism. His determination to give priority to developing the country and improving the standard of living--without hesitating to reconsider certain rules of socialist dogma--is another sign of this pragmatism.

Power has never been so collegial in Aden, as the removal of former President 'Abd al-Fatah Isma'il by the Central Committee of the PSY in April 1980 showed. Only time will tell if President 'Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani can make this assembly accept his pragmatism fully.<sup>18</sup>

#### FOOTNOTES

1. In February 1975, the three organizations forming the National Liberation Front formed the National Front, a united political organization, the prelude to the formation of the Yemeni Socialist Party at the congress of October 1978.
2. One dinar equals approximately \$3.00.
3. Loans for 50 years without interest and a moratorium of 10 years.
4. Except for Romania, Yugoslavia and Hungary, the only socialist countries which belong to the World Bank.
5. On the "spontaneity" of this reform in the early 70's, see the reporting of Eric Rouleau, "La Revolution dans la revolution" [The Revolution in the Revolution], Paris, Le Monde, 28 May 1972.
6. Interview in Aden, 26 May 1982.
7. Interview in Aden, 26 May 1982.
8. Former leader of FLOSY, supported by Saudi Arabia.
9. Prime minister from 1969 to 1971, he took refuge in Cairo and headed an opposition movement with aid from Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
10. Interview in Aden, 26 May 1982.
11. This agreement calls for a commission to draft the constitution of the unified state, regular meetings by the two presidents and a committee to supervise the referendum on the text of the constitution and the election of the unified legislative assembly.
12. "La guerre civile oubliee" [The Forgotten Civil War] by Jean Gueyras, Paris, Le Monde, 18 November 1981.
13. Interview with the author, May 1982.
14. Eric Rouleau, "Le Yemen ecartele: la guerilla fraternele" [Yemen Quartered: The Fraternal Guerrilla War], Paris, Le Monde, 9 June 1982.

15. Founded in February 1976, the National Democratic Front is a rather weak organization which brings together pro Syrian Baathists, the 13 June Front (partisans of former president Ibrahim al-Hamdi), the "September Group" (officers who took part in the revolution of September 1982) and five small parties which regrouped since 1 March 1981 within the Party of Popular Unity.
16. Interview with the author, May 1982.
17. Article 7 of the treaty stipulates that the signing parties "will make every effort to meet and deepen their relations with the progressive governments of the region and with the socialist countries." "Documents d'actualite internationale" [International Current Events Documents], No 5, March 1982, Paris, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
18. Composed of 51 members and 12 alternates, the Central Committee of the PSY was elected at the last congress (October 1981) by 650 delegates.

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MANAGEMENT PROFESSORS DISCUSS ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM ISSUE

Riyadh AL-YAMAMAH in Arabic No 720, 6-12 Oct 82 pp 3-7

[Symposium with AL-YAMAMAH correspondent and Dr Abdallah 'Abd al-Qadir, Dr 'Ajnan al-Najjar, Dr 'Abdallah al-Qabba', professors at King Sa'ud University: "Administrative Reform"]

[Text] Dr 'Abdallah 'Abd al-Qadir: Administrative Reform Is Constantly Endeavoring To Find Best Means for Using Available Resources; We Must Abandon System of "Crisis Management" for System of "Goal Management"; There Is Job Inflation in Government Which Must Be Overcome Through Redistribution, Expanded Training, Internal Scholarships and Incentives Tied to Work;

Dr 'Adnan al-Najjar: We Employ Here Administrative Systems Used in Advanced Countries but Problem Is Execution; Employee's Production Must Be Measured by Actual Work He Performs Not by Number of Hours He Spends at His Office; If Man Is Most Important Element in Development, Then He Is Also Most Important Element in Administrative Reform;

Dr 'Abdallah al-Qabba': Administrative Reform Cannot Succeed Unless Tied to State's Development Philosophy; There Are Seven Serious Obstacles Impeding Administrative Reform and We Must Overcome Them Through Scientific System; I Demand So-Called 'Delegation of Authority,' Meaning Trusting Citizens and Employees So They Jointly May Shoulder Responsibility of Implementation."

In the national action guide in which His Majesty King Fahd ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz presented a complete picture for the plan to build the nation in the coming phase, his majesty said in an important paragraph on reforming the kingdom's administrative apparatus: "Our attention will be directed to raising the administrative efficiency of the state employees, to fighting redtape and to modifying the financial and administrative regulations to realize this goal." On these words and their scientific dimensions, the research agencies and the management experts must join together, through the university at times, through

the information media at others and, at yet other times, through the work sites, to draw up a scientific and practical picture of the kingdom's administrative reform plan the way it should be. To realize this goal and hope, AL-YAMAMAH reports on the issue of administrative reform this week.

In presenting the issue for discussion, AL-YAMAMAH does not wish to offer a theoretical article or a drab academic study which only a few readers may understand. Neither does AL-YAMAMAH wish to offer advice or recommendations, as at times, some people do. Rather, it has decided to present the issue through specialists first and second, in the form of an "open dialogue." Therefore, here the issue is presented in the form of "scientific symposium" which contains as much heated debate as profound specialization.

A number of King Sa'ud University professors specialized in management have participated in our symposium. They are: Dr 'Abdallah 'Abd al-'Aziz al-'Abd al-Qadir, the vice dean of the Managerial Sciences College; Dr 'Abdallah Sa'ud al-Qabba', assistant professor at the Managerial Sciences College, and Dr 'Adnan al-Najjar, associate professor at the Managerial Sciences College.

In this open dialogue, AL-YAMAMAH has not wished to embark upon lengthy discussions but has been content with asking the questions, leaving the first and last word in this dialogue to the specialists.

The symposium proceeded as follows, according to a predetermined plan:

AL-YAMAMAH: What does the phrase "administrative reform" mean?

Dr 'Abdallah 'Abd al-Qadir: Administrative reform does not mean the presence of a specific defect. Reforming something does not mean that it is failing, but may mean enhancing its effectiveness, correcting its course or raising its competence.

In its general sense, the administrative process means the achievement of certain goals inside or outside the public sector. These goals can be summed up as enhancing citizen prosperity by raising the production efficiency. The administrative process accompanying this goal requires regulations and personnel. But administrative reform means constant reassessment of the regulations that realize the desired goal. The selection of more than one means to realize a given goal and more than one individual to carry out this operation fall within the scope of this reassessment concept. All this means that administrative reform is a constant endeavor to find out the best means of using the available resources.

Dr 'Adnan al-Najjar: I want to add that the administrative process has numerous aspects. First is the action which includes planning and organization. Second is the State of society, such as the prevalent type of education and the customs and traditions in force. The third aspect is the man performing the work, in addition, of course, to the leadership which directs and supervises.

In this sense, the administrative process includes two fundamental sides: The material and the moral. The material side is connected with developing

management and its instruments. The moral side is the more important side because it is concerned with the human element and it seeks to utilize all the available factors to turn it into a more productive element.

Thus, the essence of the management process becomes the improvement of production and enhancement of the performance level.

Dr 'Abdallah al-Qabba': It seems to me that it is perhaps better to use the phrase "administrative development" instead of "administrative reform" because administrative reform has the connotation of something wrong. In a word, I would like to say that this administrative development cannot succeed unless tied to a broad philosophical concept, namely the general philosophy of the state itself. To put it simply, the administrative apparatus is the means intended to perform certain services for the citizen and to implement the state's development plans. This makes linkage of the administrative reform or development process with the general philosophy of the development plan a must.

Dr 'Abdallah 'Abd al-Qadir: You have spoken of man who is the basic foundation of everything. This is the point I wish to underline. I believe that any reform attempt will be doomed to failure unless it is linked to the development of a positive and sincere feeling of citizenship and a deep desire for better achievements.

It is easy to import machinery and bring in the people to operate it. But this is not development. Development means giving more than you take and asking yourself what you have offered society before asking what the state has given you. In some countries, this intense feeling of citizenship reaches such a degree that the worker will work for 9 hours and collect wages only for 8 hours. Therefore, what we really need is to remold the citizen and strengthen his identity. The desired reform will then be intrinsic and come from within ourselves.

AL-YAMAMAH: What are the fundamental obstacles impeding the administrative reform process?

Dr 'Abdallah al-Qabba': There are a number of fundamental obstacles which I may sum up as follows and in the following order:

First, the lack of qualified administrative cadres.

Second, the unavailability of the accurate data needed for the development process.

Third, the ambiguity of the administrative rules and regulations.

Fourth, the duality of jurisdiction.

Fifth, the failure to put the right man in the right place.

Sixth, favoritism and allowing personal whims to predominate in objective relations in public and private establishments.

Seventh, the absence of communication between the citizen and the establishments on top which lead the development operations. This results in a lack of confidence in the projected programs, considering that the citizen does not take part in formulating or choosing them.

These are the fundamental obstacles impeding the reform plan. They include important aspects, such as the citizen's participation and this participation's connection with his intense feeling of citizenship and the failure to put the right man in the right place--a failure we encounter at the various levels.

AL-YAMAMAH: Do you have examples?

Dr al-Qabba': Yes. I know an engineer who is managing a poultry farm and a political science professor who teaches the Hadith and jurisprudence.

Dr 'Abdallah 'Abd al-Qadir: The seven factors mentioned by Dr al-Qabba' can be applied generally to numerous aspects, such as education, services and development. But I will focus here on the second obstacle which pertains to data.

An examination of the development of government jobs provides proof that the government is the biggest employer and that it is committed to employment, regardless of the need for new jobs, whether quantitatively or qualitatively. This policy may lead to the growth of redtape because it may move into the government employees with no work to do or at least employees not normally needed to do the work.

This employment commitment on the part of the state is without doubt an obstacle that does not allow the market to govern with the logic of the economic benefits of the jobs it needs. Why don't we reconsider the state's guarantee to find a job for every graduate. This alone is enough to direct education toward the homeland's actual needs insofar as specializations are concerned.

Another thing is that the Higher Administrative Reform Committee is facing administrative structures that have accumulated throughout the years and are difficult to eliminate. We must supply this committee and others with all the data that makes it possible for the people in charge to adopt a sound decision. A study conducted by the Management Institute has proven that the top-level jobs (grades 14 and 15) are larger in number than the jobs immediately below. In one of the Arab countries, the position of undersecretary was abolished when the number of undersecretaries reached 25 in one of the ministries. Why don't we present this and all other data to the decisionmakers so that we may contribute to correcting many of the regulations?

Dr 'Adnan al-Najjar: Our society has set for itself an enormous and ambitious goal. This great goal brings along with it big problems, primarily administrative. The totality of the accomplishment is enormous and it is inevitable that the administrative burden and problems will be as enormous. Moreover, our society has a distinctive social and human character which may create some problems in application.

Dr 'Abdallah al-Qabba': The desired administrative reform emanates fundamentally from our determination for comprehensive and rapid development as a goal and

an objective. We want to accomplish in few years what we have missed throughout centuries. The development decision was a courageous one which focused initially on the vital economic goals and did not take into account that the administrative process itself requires similar development.

AL-YAMAMAH: How?

Dr al-Qabba': We find that ambitious projects have been drawn up in every agency but the administrative apparatus which will be entrusted with the implementation of these projects is not fully prepared to meet the implementation requirements. Therefore, we have no choice but to formulate a development plan similar to [compatible with] the existing administrative apparatus. It is a plan requiring a long time for training and developing the cadres and improving the already existing administrative capability.

Dr 'Abdallah 'Abd al-Qadir: Despite our urgent demand for administrative reform, the picture we have is not totally dark. An objective and fair look may find that we are much better off than some Arab countries that entered the field of development long before we did. We must consider the extent reached by bureaucracy in countries like Sudan and Egypt. The proof of this is that the Arab League has resorted to the Management Institute to reform the league's apparatus itself.

There is another important fact to which Dr 'Adnan has referred, namely linking management to goals. This is the policy we must adopt because it represents the latest scientific appeal in the United States. There are numerous Third World countries that are trying to implement the policy of management by goals. It is my belief that this policy is better for the Kingdom at the levels of development, reform and implementation.

There is another type of management, namely management by crisis, prevalent in the Third World countries, including the Kingdom. In this type of management we think of a project, then allocate the monies it needs and then proceed to look for the components to manage it, without considering their specializations. This type of management is far from being scientific and creates subsequent problems for the state.

AL-YAMAMAH: The Kingdom's administrative apparatus is as new as the government apparatus in our country. How can bureaucracy and redtape develop in such a new apparatus?

Dr 'Abdallah 'Abd al-Qadir: The redtape is present whether we like it or not because it generates regulations. Redtape may be a good weapon insuring fairness in the regulations and the achievement of goals in an organized and coordinated manner. It may also be the opposite. It is a two-edged weapon. We in the Kingdom suffer from redtape. It is not true that the Kingdom's administrative apparatus is new. It is an old and ancient system that has seen lean years.

The question should be: How can we transform the redtape to serve development which seeks fundamentally to mold man? The solution is by using the redtape itself, i.e., the system, because it can act as an instrument assisting in this process and can be its most ferocious enemy.



The Kingdom's redtape has undergone numerous experiments but has not benefited from them; this includes the Ford Foundation's endeavor in the 1980's [sic], and also that of a group of specialized committees which tried to study the phenomenon. In the Ministry of Finance, there is a specialized agency in the Central Administration. There is, finally, the Higher Administrative Reform Committee which is considering reorganization of the administrative structures. Despite everything, we are proceeding on the right path. But we need to be more daring in attacking the inherited administrative structures. The Kingdom's administrative system must move toward the horizons of the coming years. Dr Mahsun Jalal has predicted that by the end of the century, the Kingdom will be the third most important country in Asia and Africa, behind Japan and South Africa. Therefore, we need a high administrative capability and qualified cadres compatible with this position.

Dr 'Adnan al-Najjar: It is not necessary that 20 officials sign a formal paper. Responsibility must be given to outstanding employees to solve the problem of complications, regulations and numerous signatures. The management systems applied in the Kingdom are the same as those applied in advanced countries. But the execution is different, and herein lies the problem.

Dr 'Abdallah al-Qabba': The concept of delegation is a good idea and, therefore, I urge what may be termed the "delegation of authority" to both the citizen and the employee. I will cite a simple example. Ten years ago, to obtain a passport involved a complex process which required tens of signatures and procedural steps. With authority and trust given to the citizen, on the one hand, and the administrative apparatus, on the other, having a passport issued now requires only 24 hours. This is administrative reform in its simplest sense. Why don't we use this simple example as a model to be imitated in other complex spheres, such as in the case of people with limited income seeking to get a plot of land. What I mean to say is that the process of administrative reform through reforming the redtape starts with putting trust in the beneficiary and in the bureaucrat empowered to perform the service.

Dr 'Abdallah 'Abd al-Qadir: The citizen's participation in development means that he participates in the administrative reform process through simplified procedures and is given a high degree of trust and the responsibility of participation.

Al-YAMAMAH: What if some government sectors turn into public organizations?

Dr 'Adnan al-Najjar: This issue requires a detailed study. I am inclined toward decentralization but there are pitfalls that have to be taken into consideration.

Dr 'Abdallah al-Qabba': There are two philosophies for the private sector and the public sector. In the United States, the private sector has achieved brilliant success at the level of administrative and production efficiency. But the public sector there acts as a general supervisor and guide, without direct intervention.

In the Third World, we have a problem different from the one existing in Europe and the United States. Development in our countries has been initiated

by the public sector and the private sector's role has been missing completely. Therefore, it may be extremely difficult to suddenly shift the work to the private sector which at present is not qualified. We conclude from this that we have two kinds of activity: In the first the characteristic of profit predominates and we leave this activity to the private sector. The public characteristic predominates in the second activity and this is carried out by the state.

For its part, the state is trying to encourage the private sector with loans and facilities. It is my belief that in 10 years, the public organizations will shift to the private sector when it will have organized itself and matured for this experience.

AL-YAMAMAH: What is your evaluation of the funds experiment?

Dr 'Abdallah 'Abd al-Qadir: To answer scientifically, an on-the-spot study must be conducted on the funds. As an immediate answer, I believe that the most successful of these funds are the Real Estate Fund and the Industrial Development Fund. In the agricultural sector, we have truly achieved a miracle, considering that this sector has grown by more than 10 percent in 3 years. This growth is the result of the state's unlimited support for it.

A surface evaluation of the fund projects confirms that they have realized a splendid achievement. However, this does not mean that they have reached perfection, considering that some problems do exist at present. One such is the problem of a woman's right to get a loan from a development bank as long as she is Muslim and is given her freedom and her financial independence by Islam.

All the funds have succeeded on their own terms. But this does not mean that we should stop at this point. Rather, there has to be development, reassessment and evaluation of the results. This requires major efforts on the part of the people in charge of these funds.

Dr 'Adnan al-Najjar: There is no doubt that the results achieved by these projects are great. But they are results compatible with the size of the monies allocated for them. However, a study is necessary to correct the course and to realize the best results possible. This applies even to the successful establishments.

Dr 'Abdallah al-Qabba': The development funds came into existence at a time when the state felt the importance of the presence of distribution establishments that assist in the development plans. This is the result of the private sector's inability to embark on major projects with a full subsidy. Therefore, the state set up public companies whose shares, or a large part of them, are offered for public subscription and for the private sector's participation.

Dr 'Abdallah 'Abd al-Qadir: In my opinion, the final evaluation is that the experiment has been successful, despite the reservations.

AL-YAMAMAH: An important study by the Management Institute and other studies by a number of government agencies have proven that there is excessive employment in the government apparatus. It has also been proven that the Saudi

employee works only from 2-25 hours weekly. Is this a sign of administrative backwardness and how do we eliminate it?

Dr 'Abdallah 'Abd al-Qadir: There is employment inflation in the government apparatus. This is a fact we must acknowledge. But we must also recognize its causes. The most important of these is historically the accumulation in the administrative process which has led us to this result. This situation arose from the time when the state used to view the government job as a form of social aid for its citizens.

There has been an accumulation from this situation, over the years, (we are about to experience a geographic concentration of civil servants) in Riyadh, Jiddah and al-Dammam while the remote areas have suffered from the lack of workers. This is a poor distribution of manpower to the work agencies.

The question is: How can we best use this employee excess, from the viewpoint of successful management? The scientific path is the only answer to this question. We must expand the training programs immediately. The Management Institute has initiated a pioneer step in Riyadh and has followed this step with two branches in al-Dammam and Jiddah. Why shouldn't the institute open new branches in al-Ta'if, Medina, al-Khubar, al-Bahah, al-Ahsa', Tarif and Ha'il so that we may make the training programs compulsory and binding and not let them proceed voluntarily, as they are at present?

Another solution: Why don't we open wide the door to internal scholarships? The military sectors, such as the Ministry of Defense, the public security and the national guard, are offering us a pioneer experiment in this regard, not to mention some projects in al-Jubayl. These scholarships give the employee the opportunity to devote his time to studying so that he may raise his educational and job levels.

A third solution: Why shouldn't government incentives be reconsidered so that we may tie the incentive to progress in work and so that no employee may be promoted automatically every 4 years. Rather, he should be promoted in light of his job [performance] level, his capabilities and his development in his work.

Dr 'Adnan al-Najjar: The Management Institute has conducted a study on the employees' work attendance. This study must be put to use. But the question that persists is: What does the employee do? What is his output, because it is not important that the employee sit behind his office desk from 0800 to 1400. What is needed is to ascertain the production and the output, not the hours.

Dr 'Abdallah al-Qabba': I believe that the problem can be solved as long as we have this awareness of its dimensions and as long as we have the scientific and field studies on it. Dr al-Tawil is a member of the Higher Administrative Reform Committee. Therefore, he should start projecting the idea of expanding re-training and of the introduction of management technology which will be supreme in the future.

As for dismissing these employees, it is out of the question because of humanitarian, social and political terms. As long as the state is committed to

employing all graduates, then what is required is to use training to open new horizons before them.

AL-YAMAMAH: How can the university, in its capacity as a laboratory for (intellectual development), contribute to the needed process of administrative change?

Dr 'Abdallah 'Abd al-Qadir: We at the university do not forget our role. The college [presumably Managerial Sciences College] has invited us here to conduct courses for the personnel of public establishments, such as Petromin, SABIC [Saudi Basic Industries Corporation], and others. We have also conducted studies and courses for other agencies.

From here, I wish to call for demolishing the university walls so that the university role may not be confined only to the academic or instructional aspect. We must participate in developing society because the goals of any university are to develop education and to serve the homeland. Therefore, the kingdom's universities must participate in the development process through research, studies and training so that every barrier between the university and society may be eliminated.

AL-YAMAMAH: How and when can the Kingdom's administrative apparatus be Saudized?

Dr 'Abdallah 'Abd al-Qadir: I have followed up AL-YAMAMAH's campaign on this issue which has been presented with its various dimensions on the pages of this magazine. But I want to add that the desired Saudization is not numerical Saudization, meaning that every government and public sector worker be a Saudi. This will not be realized practically or scientifically. The intended and desired Saudization is that of feeling, meaning the Saudization of citizenship and affiliation. This meaning applies to both the Saudi and the non-Saudi. The work requires that the worker feel like a Saudi. As for numerical Saudization, it cannot be achieved. Even the United States itself employs the help of numerous nationalities in its administrative apparatus.

Dr 'Adnan al-Najjar: The Saudization of feeling is a good thing. The Kingdom's progress in the coming years will require vast human resources. Therefore, what is needed is to Saudize the affiliation.

Dr 'Abdallah al-Qabba': I agree with the brothers and add that some may understand the call for Saudization to mean dispensing with the Arab brothers. This is something that may arouse the feelings of people who have taken part with us for tens of years in building this homeland. We have among us brothers from Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Egypt who have held the highest positions with loyalty and who have adopted the slogan of Saudization in its genuine sense, namely the Saudization of feelings. In the next quarter century, the Kingdom will need skilled and unskilled labor. It is better if this labor is primarily Arab.

AL-YAMAMAH: If we want to draw up a practical plan for administrative reform, with what basic ideas should we begin?

Dr 'Abdallah 'Abd al-Qadir: From a scientific perspective, we must define a goal and then establish a policy to achieve this goal. If the goal is administrative reform, then we must first agree on the concept intended by this phrase.

Defined simply, administrative reform means the utilization of the state's material and human resources to realize the homeland's general goals in the best way possible insofar as services and production are concerned.

Dr 'Adnan al-Najjar: If man is the most important element in development, then he is also the most important element in administrative reform. Molding this man in terms of education, awareness of responsibility and appreciation of values is the most important place for us to begin. The formulation of scientific programs, plans and policies must proceed along with and in a line parallel to this developing so that molding man and building the homeland may proceed hand-in-hand and simultaneously.

Dr 'Abdallah al-Qabba': We have dwelt long on molding man. This is good. But the view concerning administrative reform must be tied to the development goals. If we have ambitious development plans, then we must do all that is possible to create an ambitious administrative apparatus. We will not be able to achieve this objective unless we overcome the seven obstacles I have referred to. Overcoming these obstacles requires consolidating all the efforts in a complete unity of action, beginning with the school and the university, and ending with the public establishment and the ministry. The process is difficult and complex, and we must formulate for it solutions that evolve from a comprehensive visualization that takes into consideration all the internal, external, Arab and international conditions facing the homeland. Once we draw up this complete plan, we will surpass the bottleneck called the crisis of the administrative apparatus.

In conclusion, this is the free dialogue "symposium" in which AL-YAMAMAH has projected in a specialized scientific manner the crisis of the Kingdom's administrative apparatus. The issue is, as we have seen, serious and nothing is more indicative of its serious nature than the fact that His Majesty King Fahd presented it personally in the national action declaration which he addressed to the nation.

The superpowers which have achieved their production revolutions started building themselves by reforming their administrative apparatus. The progress of nations is measured even up to now by their administrative progress. The Western scientists say that the United States has outgained Europe administratively and that this is why it has moved ahead of Europe and that Japan has outgained both administratively. Administrative revolutions are, nowadays, the latest revolutions in the world at the level of services and production. We have begun to enter the heart of the age and we have decided to build our present and our future in order to become a nation worthy of its glory. Are we going to reform the state's "nerve system" which moves all of the state's positions and which is known as the administrative system? This is the question and the challenge. The shape of the future awaiting all of us will depend on the answer.

8494

CSO: 4404/32



NORTHERN REGION FINANCE MINISTER INTERVIEWED

Khartoum AL-SAHFAH in Arabic 26 Aug 82 p 7

[Article: "Concerns of the Region As Seen by the New Minister of Finance; Reality Requires Cutting Off Masbiu Electricity; Serious Steps To Implement the 'Atbarah Electricity Project"]

[Text] Mukhtary 'Abd-al-'Al Hamur is a native of the Northern Region. He knows the smell of dates, beans and the friable clay, having grown up in the midst of these fragrant aromas. He received his entire education in the region, graduated and received a doctorate with all the genius and brilliance of a local son. The governor of the Northern Region honored him by giving him the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance in the region.

AL-SAHFAH had this brief conversation with him about the concerns and people of the region.

The New Budget Is Scientific But...

"To start with, it is a fact that I did not have the honor of drafting the new budget of the region. However, in all sincerity, I can say that my colleague, the former minister of finance, was able to lay out a scientific budget and to draft controls to govern the channels of expenditure. However, I feel that the budget did not meet all goals. I had hoped that assistance from the national level would be at least major so that it would cover the budget deficit, which amounts to about 1 million pounds.

The new budget totals about 50.5 million pounds. Local revenues account for 5 million pounds and centralized subsidies amount to 45 million. The development budget totals 8.5 million pounds.

The new budget is an umbrella budget in the sense that it will direct expenditures within the limits approved and set for each unit. As I said, there are regulations to ensure that the budget follows the proper and necessary course.

Budget of Area Councils

The ministry has given the area councils their budgets. The area councils are the channels of disbursement by virtue of their role in conformity with the

popular local government law. These councils have been granted full powers to spend from the budget in accordance with their programs and plans without any interference on the part of the ministry. We are confident that these councils, because of their popular composition, will disburse properly in accordance with the provisions of the budget along with devising more ways to gain popular support so that they can perform their duties in serving the people, particularly in supplying materials.

#### New Controls

Although the ministry left behind an administrative system that can rightfully be viewed as ideal, we are also working to establish more scientific bases to ensure sound performance in all areas.

For instance, we have begun to monitor the current system in the area of distribution of consumer commodities to evaluate the experiment in order to benefit from positive aspects and correct the negative.

A team has been formed from the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources with the task of checking on all agricultural projects and defining them: their area of cultivation, the amount of the machinery operating there and the fuel requirements and their crop production. The team has finished its task for Nile Province and has begun work on the Northern Province. Based on the results of these studies, the ministry can set up the necessary system to ensure sound performance on these projects and get real results in production.

#### New Frameworks for Indigenous Resources

The fact is that the Northern Region is suffering from a major shortfall in indigenous resources and is directly dependent on the centralized subsidy. The regional government has given this fact major importance because the essence of the establishment of regional government is the reliance of the region on its own potential. As an immediate step, the regional government has taken the initiative of establishing the Northern Investment Company. The company has made great headway in the areas of its basic mission. Although the regional government's share in this company is only 10 percent, the government has granted it independence, and it is finding support in performing its required task. The important thing is that national capital has given it protection from the regional government and a proper income as encouragement.

There is the popular development project. A broad conference will be held in September under the chairmanship of Dr 'Abdullah Ahmad 'Abdullah, governor of the Northern Region and chairman of the popular development committee in the region. The results of this conference will be good in this popular area.

Besides this, there is constant stimulation of the cooperative sector in the region so that it can play its positive role in the economic renaissance in this region.

## Positive Movement for Integration

Within the framework of the official movement for the revival of integration between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Democratic Republic of Sudan, the Northern Region is witnessing extensive movement in this important area. Last May, a protocol agreement on border trade was signed, and one important result of this is programs to revive wheat farming. Agreement has been reached on importing large quantities of fertilizer from the Arab Republic of Egypt. Also, within the framework of the general trade protocol, we will procure excellent strains of wheat. As part of this movement, there is a number of agreements that have been concluded between the regional ministries and Egyptian ministries. To reinforce all this, a huge athletic mission will leave the region on 1 September for Aswan Governorate to further deepen the connections between the two sister peoples. I can say that the future is bright in areas of integration between the two countries.

## Existing Electricity Crisis

The government of the Northern Region has given the issue of electricity full attention. We have held a meeting with the minister of energy and the minister of state for energy. We found them very helpful and understanding of this issue and agreement was reached on including the 'Atbarah electricity project in the new energy projects and in fact giving it priority. The paperwork has reached the Ministry of Planning and the regional government and the Ministry of Energy will monitor this issue.

However, let's talk frankly about the way things are now. We, the authority of the masses, must understand the facts so that we can do what our new role requires. The situation improved after the Masbiu firm helped out by playing a positive role pending completion of its new project. We have continued to pay for what we consume from Masbiu, and this has cost us huge sums. You should know that the lowest bill we have received from Masbiu has been 147,000 pounds for 1 month.

In all honesty, were this situation to continue, we would have no choice but to stop doing business with Masbiu because the cost per kilowatt is 11 piastres and the consumer pays 7. For the railroad it is 3. What is being asked per kilowatt is 20, and this hard fact requires that all quarters participate, including the National Electricity Board.

There is another extremely important fact that every citizen must recognize. As you know, the responsibility of the Central Electricity and Water Board reverted to the regional government beginning 1 July. The budget needed for the board totals 8 million pounds, and the board's entire revenue totals only 2 million pounds. In all honesty, as of this moment I don't know how we will make up this huge deficit.

This concluded the quick conversation we had with the minister of finance and economy in the government of the Northern Region. While the conversation contained pleasing indicators, it also had indicators that require a close look, attention and participation.

May God bring success to all.

8389

CSO: 4504/511

## RATE OF CHANGE IN PRICES RECORDED FOR VARIOUS SECTORS

Tunis LE TEMPS in French 3 Oct 82 p 4

[Text] An analysis of the activities of sectors under the Ministry of National Economy reveals a drop during the first half of 1982 compared with the same period in 1981. The decline is explained by a slump in certain sectors that are customarily high performers. However, there are fortunately indicators of extreme importance that introduce a note of optimism about the future development of the situation.

Among areas showing a decline is tourism, a field in which Algeria has had a substantial drop in revenue, while Spain has done the rest at the expense of our country. Crude oil production has experienced a drop of some 8.5, essentially due to problems relating to the delivery of gas injection equipment and workover at the Ashtart deposit. Refining continues at the saturation level and the 5-percent drop compared with last year stems only from the saturation of the production capacity. Phosphate exports have risen, but production has dropped 9 percent due to the difficulty of obtaining enough water for the washing plant and to storage problems. The decline in the iron and steel industry is on the order of 28 percent and can be explained by a slowdown for the annual inspection and especially the 3-month shutdown for the repair and modernization of equipment.

In the automobile industry, there has been a production drop of about 7 percent because of the difficulty of obtaining spare parts. Nevertheless, production of industrial vehicles has doubled compared with the first half of 1981. In the chemical industries, a slight decline of about 2 percent can be noted in production, along with a 5-percent drop in exports. However, local sales have risen 10 percent. The decline in exports and production is due to the stiff competition on the world market.

For the first five months of the year, the foreign trade deficit increased compared with the same period of the last year, with imports increasing 30 percent and a slight decline in exports (down 1 percent).

The growth in imports is linked to the increase in economic activities that are inadequately integrated. Finally, the last black spot in the picture is prices. The price index showed some inflation for the first six months of 1982 compared with the first six months of 1981: 12 compared with 8.2 percent for

the same period of last year. Contrary to what one might initially think, it is not the food group that is the cause of the higher index, inasmuch as its growth was only 10.6 percent compared with 9.2 last year (six months % six months [sic]).

However, with the exception of clothing, all the other groups saw a substantial increase in their index, whence the necessity for adequate measures in order to compensate for the growth in prices on inflationary products. Following this chapter on poor performances, one will note the increase in investments through approvals granted by the API [Investments Promotion Agency] (30-percent increase in number of projects) (9-percent increase in investments and jobs created) and an acceleration in the decentralization, particularly in Zone 4 and, to a lesser extent, in Zone 5. There are also increases in the production of electricity, gas, limestone and phosphate exports, a satisfactory supply of strategic products to the country, and more effective economic control of the increase in the number of violations found thanks to better inspection teams. Finally, in the field of energy, one will note the option for direct purchases of finished products at the expense of processing. Such an operation is more profitable because of the quality of our crude and the relative settling down of prices for finished products on the world market.

|                             |        | <u>June 1982</u><br><u>May 1982</u> | <u>June 1982</u><br><u>June 1981</u> | <u>6 Mos. 1982</u><br><u>6 Mos. 1981</u> |
|-----------------------------|--------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--|
| Food                        |        | 2.0                                 | 13.8                                 | 10.6                                     |
| Meat, offal                 | 7.1%   |                                     |                                      |  |
| Chicken                     |        |                                     |                                      |  |
| Fish                        | 2.2%   |                                     |                                      |  |
| Eggs                        | 12.3%  |                                     |                                      |  |
| Milk products               | 1.5%   |                                     |                                      |  |
| Salt, spices                | - 1.5% |                                     |                                      |  |
| Vegetables                  | - 1.1% |                                     |                                      |  |
| (fresh corn, dry onions)    |        |                                     |                                      |  |
| Fruit                       | + 4 %  |                                     |                                      |  |
| Housing                     |        | 0.3                                 | 16.5                                 | 14.9                                     |
| Health Care                 |        | 4.7                                 | 27.2                                 | 17.9                                     |
| Medicines                   | (15%)  |                                     |                                      |  |
| Medical analysis,           |        |                                     |                                      |  |
| doctor's fee                | 8.9%   |                                     |                                      |  |
| Personal hygiene, shower    | 2.1%   |                                     |                                      |  |
| Cleaning materials          | 1.6%   |                                     |                                      |  |
| (Nadhif- bleach)            |        |                                     |                                      |  |
| Transport                   |        | 1.1                                 | 21.0                                 | 19.1                                     |
| Spare parts                 |        |                                     |                                      |  |
| (Innertubes, bicycle chain) | 6.8%   |                                     |                                      |  |
| Clothing                    |        | 0.4                                 | 9.4                                  | 7.1                                      |
| Culture, Misc.              |        | 0.1                                 | 16.1                                 | 13.5                                     |
| General Total               |        | 1.5                                 | 15.1                                 | 12.0                                     |

Note: If prices are frozen at their June 1982 level, the average price increase in 1982 would be 10.7 percent compared with 6.7 percent last year, using the same hypotheses, the "inherited increase." The 1982 price increase would be a minimum 10.7 percent.



Price Index (Six Months 1982)

|                               | 1981<br><u>Mo. Incr.</u> | <u>Cum.</u> | 1982<br><u>Mo. Incr.</u> | <u>Cum.</u> |
|-------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------|--------------------------|-------------|
| January                       | + 2.1%                   |             | - 1.6%                   |             |
| February                      | + 0.7%                   |             | - 0.5%                   |             |
| March                         | + 0.1%                   | 1.6%        | - 0.5%                   | 5.1%        |
| April                         | - 0.8%                   |             | - 0.3%                   |             |
| May                           | - 0.8%                   |             | - 1.3%                   |             |
| June                          | + 0.0%                   |             | - 1.5%                   |             |
| July                          | + 0.2%                   |             |                          |             |
| August                        | + 2.2%                   |             |                          |             |
| September                     | + 1.8%                   |             |                          |             |
| October                       | + 1.9%                   |             |                          |             |
| November                      | + 1.6%                   |             |                          |             |
| December                      | + 1.6%                   |             |                          |             |
| Aver. mo. rate for 1st 6 mos. | + .26%                   |             | + 0.85%                  |             |
| Inflation for 1st 6 mos.      | + 8.2%                   |             | + 12 %                   |             |
| Annual inflation rate         | + 8.9%                   |             | + 13 % (likely)          |             |
| Rate (inherited)              |                          |             | 10.7%                    |             |

Price Index: Variations in June Compared with May for Past 5 Years

| <u>Item</u>             | <u>Weighting</u> | <u>1977</u> | <u>1978</u> | <u>1979</u> | <u>1980</u> | <u>1981</u> | <u>1982</u> |
|-------------------------|------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Food                    | 508              | -0.6        | -1.4        | +0.5        | -1          | +0          | +2          |
| Housing                 | 153              | +0.3        | +0.1        | +0.2        | +0.1        | -0.1        | +0.3        |
| Health main. and care   | 59               | +1.5        | +0          | +0.1        | +0.6        | +0.2        | +4.7        |
| Transport               | 56               | +0.1        | +0.1        | +0.2        | +0.6        | +0.1        | +1.1        |
| Clothing                | 110              | +0.3        | +0.3        | +0.2        | +0.3        | +0.2        | +0.4        |
| Leisure, culture, misc. | 114              | +0.9        | +0.1        | +0.1        | +0.1        | +0.0        | +0.1        |
| Overall                 | 1,000            | -0.1        | -0.6        | -0.4        | -0.4        | +0          | +2.5        |

Annual Variations (June/June) for Past 5 Years

| <u>Item</u>             | <u>Weighting</u> | <u>1977</u> | <u>1978</u> | <u>1979</u> | <u>1980</u> | <u>1981</u> | <u>1982</u> |
|-------------------------|------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Food                    | 508              |             | +4.3        | 12.7        | 11.1        | 8.9         | 13.8        |
| Housing                 | 153              |             | 3.7         | 5.4         | 7.3         | 6.5         | 16.5        |
| Health main. and care   | 59               |             | 2.5         | 5           | 10.1        | 8.4         | 27.2        |
| Transport               | 56               |             | 19.4        | 3.6         | 3.3         | 3.2         | 21          |
| Clothing                | 110              |             | 3.5         | 4.9         | 6.3         | 6.3         | 9.4         |
| Leisure, culture, misc. | 114              |             | 3           | 7.8         | 3.7         | 7.6         | 16.1        |
| Overall                 | 1,000            |             | 4.8         | 9.1         | 8.7         | 7.9         | 15.1        |

## Price Index

In June 1982, the family consumer price index reached the level of 152.3 (base 100 in 1977), thus showing a 1.5-percent increase compared with the May level. This increase constitutes a record for the month of June for the past 5 years. Actually, growth in June 1982 was beyond the average increase for that months since 1977.

In addition, with the exception of "leisure, culture and miscellaneous," all groups in the index beat their own record for relative increases for the months of June (see above table). With respect to the first half of 1982, while increases for the beginning of the year were below the average, beginning with the month of March (1.3 percent) and unlike in preceding years, one observed a major increase in the index that was confirmed in June (up 1.5 percent) and increased the average monthly rate for the first six months to .85 percent compared with .26 percent in 1981.

By group, contrary to what one might initially think, it is not the food group that is the cause of the increase. Its rise was 10.6 percent, compared with 9.2 percent in 1981, the lowest after clothing (7.9 percent). However, this does not mean that food products remained protected from substantial price increases that affected several other products during the six-month period, particularly beef, eggs, fruit, milk products and butter.

The "housing" group registered a rate of inflation of 14.9 percent, compared with 6.5 percent in 1981. This increase is due to increases in domestic gas, kerosene and household articles. The "health maintenance and care" group suffered an alarming increase of 17 percent due to increases in prices for personal hygiene products and cleaning products such as bleach, OMO and insecticides. Medical expenses rose due to the cost of medicines and doctors' fees.

The "transport" column showed a price increase (19.1 percent) that was greater than that of any other group and without precedent in the preceding year. The increase is due to spare parts. Changes in postal and telecommunications rates during the month of April were the main cause of the increase observed.

The price of clothing rose at a more moderate rate than other groups, with this six-month inflation rate (7.1 percent) being close to that of last year.

The "leisure, culture and miscellaneous" group showed a relatively strong increase: 13.5 percent compared with 8 percent in 1981. Increases for the first six months affected tobacco and cigarettes, which showed a heavy increase in March, leisure articles and services, whose prices steadily rose during the first six months. Restaurant prices, uncontrolled, showed a major rise.

The rate of inflation for the six-month period in consideration is 12 percent, compared with 8.2 percent for the same period in 1981.

The conclusion derived from this situation is that if prices are frozen at their June 1982 level, the increases accumulated during the first six months guarantee us of a minimum rate of inflation of 10.7 percent as the inherited rate, compared with 6.7 percent last year.

Given the evolution in the index during the first six months and the trend observed during the second half of preceding years, projection of the index based on the different hypotheses allows one to predict an inflation rate on the order of 13 percent for 1982.

Finally, it should be emphasized that insofar as groups other than food were the cause of the increases, deliberate action is needed to control prices of all untaxed products through control of the structure of authorized or self-authorized prices, as well as an intensification of an economic price control at the level of trade in nonfood products previously relatively neglected.

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